Semivalue versatility and applications

Annals of Operations Research

Volumn 109, Issue 1-4, 2002, Pages 343-358

  Carreras, Francesc ^a   Freixas, Josep ^a  

^a UNIVERSITAT POLITÈCNICA DE CATALUNYA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Allocation; Conflictivity; Regularity; Semivalue; Shapley and Banzhaf values; Versatility; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037625196     PISSN: 02545330     EISSN: 15729338     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1016320723186     Document Type: Article

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