Hostile–vs.–white-knight bidders

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 163-171

  Carroll, Carolyn ^a   Griffith, John M ^b   Rudolph, Patricia M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

^b OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037539137     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199905)20:3<163::AID-MDE923>3.0.CO;2-7     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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