Hostages, marginal deterrence and franchise contracts

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 9, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 317-331

  Dnes, Antony W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Contracts; Franchising; Hostages

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037409144     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(02)00009-3     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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