Should bank runs be prevented?

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 27, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 977-1000

  Samartín, Margarita ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

Author keywords

Bank runs; Deposit contracts; Liquidation costs; Optimal risk sharing; Suspension of convertibility

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037404252     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(02)00243-1     Document Type: Article

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