The game take-or-play: A paradox of rationality in simultaneous move games

Bulletin of Economic Research

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 195-202

  Colombo, Ferdinando ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0037389846     PISSN: 03073378     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8586.00169     Document Type: Article

References (29)

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