Bidding wars over R&D-intensive firms: Knowledge, opportunism, and the market for corporate control

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 74-85

  Coff, Russell ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037297827     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/30040677     Document Type: Article

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