Does the theory of the 'core' explain why airlines fail to cover their long-run costs of capital?

Journal of Air Transport Management

Volumn 9, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 5-14

  Button, Kenneth ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Airline regulation; Capital cost recovery; Core theory

Indexed keywords

AIRLINE INDUSTRY; DEREGULATION; INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE; SUBSIDY SYSTEM;

EID: 0037263723     PISSN: 09696997     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0969-6997(02)00075-3     Document Type: Article

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