Colonial violence and the rhetoric of evasion: Tocqueville on Algeria

Political Theory

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 235-264

  Welch, Cheryl B ^a  

^a SIMMONS COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Colonialism; Imperialism; Rhetoric; Tocqueville; Violence

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037248942     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591702251011     Document Type: Article

References (153)

1. On these characteristic liberal arguments, see Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 46-76.
2. Tzevetan Todorov rather implausibly argues that Tocqueville projected the classic liberal notion of individual sovereignty into the international arena and hence single-mindedly pursued the French national interest without inconsistency. "Introduction: Tocqueville et la doctrine coloniale," in De la colonie en Algérie, ed. T. Todorov (Paris: Editions complexe, 1988), 24-27. For a similar argument see Stéphane Dion, "Durham et Tocqueville sur la colonisation libérale," Revue d'études canadiennes/Review of Canadian Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 60-77. The best discussions of Tocqueville on Algeria are the classic article by Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," Review of Politics 25 (July 1963): 362-99, and recent work by Jennifer Pitts. Both present Tocqueville as an inconsistent universalist, although they differ on the nature of his inconsistencies and the best way to contextualize these "lapses." Pitts has published an excellent English translation of Tocqueville's writings on Algeria, Writings on Empire and Slavery (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), from which I have cited throughout this article. See also her "Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question," Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2000): 295-318. For an analysis that links Tocqueville's position on Algeria to the weakness of his concept of political reason, see Michael Hereth, Alexis de Tocqueville: Threats to Freedom in Democracy, trans. George Bogardus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 145-65.
3. Tzevetan Todorov rather implausibly argues that Tocqueville projected the classic liberal notion of individual sovereignty into the international arena and hence single-mindedly pursued the French national interest without inconsistency. "Introduction: Tocqueville et la doctrine coloniale," in De la colonie en Algérie, ed. T. Todorov (Paris: Editions complexe, 1988), 24-27. For a similar argument see Stéphane Dion, "Durham et Tocqueville sur la colonisation libérale," Revue d'études canadiennes/Review of Canadian Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 60-77. The best discussions of Tocqueville on Algeria are the classic article by Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," Review of Politics 25 (July 1963): 362-99, and recent work by Jennifer Pitts. Both present Tocqueville as an inconsistent universalist, although they differ on the nature of his inconsistencies and the best way to contextualize these "lapses." Pitts has published an excellent English translation of Tocqueville's writings on Algeria, Writings on Empire and Slavery (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), from which I have cited throughout this article. See also her "Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question," Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2000): 295-318. For an analysis that links Tocqueville's position on Algeria to the weakness of his concept of political reason, see Michael Hereth, Alexis de Tocqueville: Threats to Freedom in Democracy, trans. George Bogardus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 145-65.
4. Tzevetan Todorov rather implausibly argues that Tocqueville projected the classic liberal notion of individual sovereignty into the international arena and hence single-mindedly pursued the French national interest without inconsistency. "Introduction: Tocqueville et la doctrine coloniale," in De la colonie en Algérie, ed. T. Todorov (Paris: Editions complexe, 1988), 24-27. For a similar argument see Stéphane Dion, "Durham et Tocqueville sur la colonisation libérale," Revue d'études canadiennes/Review of Canadian Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 60-77. The best discussions of Tocqueville on Algeria are the classic article by Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," Review of Politics 25 (July 1963): 362-99, and recent work by Jennifer Pitts. Both present Tocqueville as an inconsistent universalist, although they differ on the nature of his inconsistencies and the best way to contextualize these "lapses." Pitts has published an excellent English translation of Tocqueville's writings on Algeria, Writings on Empire and Slavery (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), from which I have cited throughout this article. See also her "Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question," Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2000): 295-318. For an analysis that links Tocqueville's position on Algeria to the weakness of his concept of political reason, see Michael Hereth, Alexis de Tocqueville: Threats to Freedom in Democracy, trans. George Bogardus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 145-65.
5. Tzevetan Todorov rather implausibly argues that Tocqueville projected the classic liberal notion of individual sovereignty into the international arena and hence single-mindedly pursued the French national interest without inconsistency. "Introduction: Tocqueville et la doctrine coloniale," in De la colonie en Algérie, ed. T. Todorov (Paris: Editions complexe, 1988), 24-27. For a similar argument see Stéphane Dion, "Durham et Tocqueville sur la colonisation libérale," Revue d'études canadiennes/Review of Canadian Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 60-77. The best discussions of Tocqueville on Algeria are the classic article by Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," Review of Politics 25 (July 1963): 362-99, and recent work by Jennifer Pitts. Both present Tocqueville as an inconsistent universalist, although they differ on the nature of his inconsistencies and the best way to contextualize these "lapses." Pitts has published an excellent English translation of Tocqueville's writings on Algeria, Writings on Empire and Slavery (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), from which I have cited throughout this article. See also her "Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question," Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2000): 295-318. For an analysis that links Tocqueville's position on Algeria to the weakness of his concept of political reason, see Michael Hereth, Alexis de Tocqueville: Threats to Freedom in Democracy, trans. George Bogardus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 145-65.
6. Tzevetan Todorov rather implausibly argues that Tocqueville projected the classic liberal notion of individual sovereignty into the international arena and hence single-mindedly pursued the French national interest without inconsistency. "Introduction: Tocqueville et la doctrine coloniale," in De la colonie en Algérie, ed. T. Todorov (Paris: Editions complexe, 1988), 24-27. For a similar argument see Stéphane Dion, "Durham et Tocqueville sur la colonisation libérale," Revue d'études canadiennes/Review of Canadian Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 60-77. The best discussions of Tocqueville on Algeria are the classic article by Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," Review of Politics 25 (July 1963): 362-99, and recent work by Jennifer Pitts. Both present Tocqueville as an inconsistent universalist, although they differ on the nature of his inconsistencies and the best way to contextualize these "lapses." Pitts has published an excellent English translation of Tocqueville's writings on Algeria, Writings on Empire and Slavery (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), from which I have cited throughout this article. See also her "Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question," Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2000): 295-318. For an analysis that links Tocqueville's position on Algeria to the weakness of his concept of political reason, see Michael Hereth, Alexis de Tocqueville: Threats to Freedom in Democracy, trans. George Bogardus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 145-65.
7. Tzevetan Todorov rather implausibly argues that Tocqueville projected the classic liberal notion of individual sovereignty into the international arena and hence single-mindedly pursued the French national interest without inconsistency. "Introduction: Tocqueville et la doctrine coloniale," in De la colonie en Algérie, ed. T. Todorov (Paris: Editions complexe, 1988), 24-27. For a similar argument see Stéphane Dion, "Durham et Tocqueville sur la colonisation libérale," Revue d'études canadiennes/Review of Canadian Studies 25, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 60-77. The best discussions of Tocqueville on Algeria are the classic article by Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," Review of Politics 25 (July 1963): 362-99, and recent work by Jennifer Pitts. Both present Tocqueville as an inconsistent universalist, although they differ on the nature of his inconsistencies and the best way to contextualize these "lapses." Pitts has published an excellent English translation of Tocqueville's writings on Algeria, Writings on Empire and Slavery (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), from which I have cited throughout this article. See also her "Empire and Democracy: Tocqueville and the Algeria Question," Journal of Political Philosophy 8, no. 3 (2000): 295-318. For an analysis that links Tocqueville's position on Algeria to the weakness of his concept of political reason, see Michael Hereth, Alexis de Tocqueville: Threats to Freedom in Democracy, trans. George Bogardus (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986), 145-65.
8. For my view of the place of ethical argument in Tocqueville, see De Tocqueville (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 32-42, 165-216.
9. I borrow this phrase from John Rawls's Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xviii. Rawls uses it to characterize a political situation in which differing transcendent notions of the good are introduced into politics, producing conflicts that can be moderated only by serendipity, exhaustive conflict, or "reasonable" accommodations based on public recognition of equality and liberty. I am using it here in a loose analogy to suggest the internal psychological conflict produced by simultaneous commitments to apparently conflicting ultimate ends.
10. Tocqueville referred to the normative limits exceeded by terrorists in the French Revolution as "maximes humaines." "Fragments et notes inédites sur la révolution," in Oeuvres complètes, ed. J. P. Mayer (Paris: Gallimard, 1954-), 2:2, 227 (hereafter cited as OC).
11. Other reasons proposed for the French desire to control North Africa include the influence of commercial elements in Marseilles. See Amedée Desjobert, La question d'Alger: politique, colonisation, commerce (Paris: P. Dufart, 1837), 161-64. For a later historical judgment, see André Jardin and André-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction: 1815-1848, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 159-60.
12. Other reasons proposed for the French desire to control North Africa include the influence of commercial elements in Marseilles. See Amedée Desjobert, La question d'Alger: politique, colonisation, commerce (Paris: P. Dufart, 1837), 161-64. For a later historical judgment, see André Jardin and André-Jean Tudesq, Restoration and Reaction: 1815-1848, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 159-60.
13. Tocqueville quoted General Bugeaud in a speech to the Chamber in 1846, "Intervention," 118. Chouans were royalist guerillas in the French Revolution; chouannerie was a neologism also employed to characterize Spanish resistance to Napoleon in the peninsular war.
14. By 1848 it is estimated that more than a tenth of the Arab population had been killed and the economy was in ruins. Raphael Danziger, Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), xi. For subsequent judgments that only such destructive measures could have brought success, given the resistance encountered in North Africa, see Jean Gottman, "Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. E. M. Earle, G. A. Craig, and F. Gilbert (New York: Atheneum, 1967). 236-38; Jeremy Black, Western Warfare 1775-1882 (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 86-87.
15. By 1848 it is estimated that more than a tenth of the Arab population had been killed and the economy was in ruins. Raphael Danziger, Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), xi. For subsequent judgments that only such destructive measures could have brought success, given the resistance encountered in North Africa, see Jean Gottman, "Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. E. M. Earle, G. A. Craig, and F. Gilbert (New York: Atheneum, 1967). 236-38; Jeremy Black, Western Warfare 1775-1882 (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 86-87.
16. By 1848 it is estimated that more than a tenth of the Arab population had been killed and the economy was in ruins. Raphael Danziger, Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians: Resistance to the French and Internal Consolidation (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), xi. For subsequent judgments that only such destructive measures could have brought success, given the resistance encountered in North Africa, see Jean Gottman, "Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. E. M. Earle, G. A. Craig, and F. Gilbert (New York: Atheneum, 1967). 236-38; Jeremy Black, Western Warfare 1775-1882 (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001), 86-87.
17. Lucien-François de Montagnac to Célestine de Montagnac, May 2, 1843, Lettres d'un soldat: neuf années de campagnes en Afrique (Paris: E. Plon Nourrit, 1885), 308.
18. General Bugeaud called the military policies alleged to be necessary in Algeria a different kind of legality, "brutal but logical." Quoted in Jean-Pierre Bois, Bugeaud (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 379. Indeed, observers in both France and Algeria recognized that French methods exceeded "the limits of common morality." See Charles-Henri Favrod, Le FLN et l'Algérie (Paris: Plon, 1962), 30-31.
19. General Bugeaud called the military policies alleged to be necessary in Algeria a different kind of legality, "brutal but logical." Quoted in Jean-Pierre Bois, Bugeaud (Paris: Fayard, 1999), 379. Indeed, observers in both France and Algeria recognized that French methods exceeded "the limits of common morality." See Charles-Henri Favrod, Le FLN et l'Algérie (Paris: Plon, 1962), 30-31.
20. Bois, Bugeaud, 455-56. Saint-Arnaud later killed hundreds of members of the Sbéah tribe in a similar way: "I hermetically sealed all the exits and I made a vast cemetery." Saint-Arnaud to A. M. Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, August 15, 1845, Lettres du Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud 1832-1854 (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1864), 2:26.
21. Bois, Bugeaud, 455-56. Saint-Arnaud later killed hundreds of members of the Sbéah tribe in a similar way: "I hermetically sealed all the exits and I made a vast cemetery." Saint-Arnaud to A. M. Leroy de Saint-Arnaud, August 15, 1845, Lettres du Maréchal de Saint-Arnaud 1832-1854 (Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1864), 2:26.
22. Farriadis Fleurus Duvivier, Solution de la question de l'Algérie (Paris: Librairie militaire de Gaultier-Laguionie, 1841), 285.
23. Jules Cambon, Governor General in Algeria, reporting to the French Senate in 1894. Quoted in William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), 5.
24. In a recent study of the use of torture by the French army during the 1954 to 1962 Algerian war, Raphaëlle Branche points out disturbing parallels between this conflict and the original conquest. In both periods, "it is less law that guides war than war that dictates to the law." La torture et l'armée pendant la guerre d'Algérie, 1954-62 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 22.
25. "Notes on the Koran," 27-35.
26. Possibly a first sketch for a journal article that was never completed, this essay remained unpublished until 1962.
27. Though Tocqueville was writing for the committee as a whole, these reports largely restate the opinions of his 1841 essay and are included in his collected works. Richter argues that the "edifying tone" of the later reports was adopted for public consumption. "Tocqueville on Algeria," 365. Pitts adds that Tocqueville might also have allowed his moral concerns greater play once French domination was secure. Writings, xxvi.
28. Though Tocqueville was writing for the committee as a whole, these reports largely restate the opinions of his 1841 essay and are included in his collected works. Richter argues that the "edifying tone" of the later reports was adopted for public consumption. "Tocqueville on Algeria," 365. Pitts adds that Tocqueville might also have allowed his moral concerns greater play once French domination was secure. Writings, xxvi.
29. Tocqueville: A Biography (1805-59), trans. Lydia Davis with Robert Hemenway (London: Peter Halban, 1988), 333. While Jardin's account of Tocqueville on Algeria is important, he dismisses any moral difficulty by seeing Tocqueville rather unproblematically as a defender of French interests "faithful to the traditions of his ancestors Malesherbes and Vauban" (p. 342).
30. Democracy in America, ed. Max Lerner and J.-P. Mayer, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), II: 617 (hereafter cited as DAI or DAII).
31. 20. DAI, 339, n. 29.
32. Unpublished draft for the 1840 "Preface" to Democracy in America, quoted in James T. Schleifer, "Tocqueville as Historian," in Reconsidering Tocqueville's "Democracy in America," ed. Abraham Eisenstadt (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 151. See also a similar passage in his unpublished notes on the revolution, OC, 2:2, 346-47.
33. Unpublished draft for the 1840 "Preface" to Democracy in America, quoted in James T. Schleifer, "Tocqueville as Historian," in Reconsidering Tocqueville's "Democracy in America," ed. Abraham Eisenstadt (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988), 151. See also a similar passage in his unpublished notes on the revolution, OC, 2:2, 346-47.
34. Recollections, trans. George Lawrence, ed. J. P. Mayer and A. P. Kerr (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1971), 104.
35. DAI, 193.
36. DAI, 250.
37. "État social et politique de la France," OC, 2:1, 62.
38. Ibid., 62-63. Pitts reads too much into this passage, interpreting it as a "commitment in principle to the ability of all peoples to rule themselves" or as a "theoretical denunciation of imperialism." "Empire and Democracy," 314. Cf. a similar ambiguous contrast between aristocratic and modern liberty in "Sur la morale," OC. 16, 223-24.
39. Ibid., 62-63. Pitts reads too much into this passage, interpreting it as a "commitment in principle to the ability of all peoples to rule themselves" or as a "theoretical denunciation of imperialism." "Empire and Democracy," 314. Cf. a similar ambiguous contrast between aristocratic and modern liberty in "Sur la morale," OC. 16, 223-24.
40. Ibid., 62-63. Pitts reads too much into this passage, interpreting it as a "commitment in principle to the ability of all peoples to rule themselves" or as a "theoretical denunciation of imperialism." "Empire and Democracy," 314. Cf. a similar ambiguous contrast between aristocratic and modern liberty in "Sur la morale," OC. 16, 223-24.
41. "État social et politique de la France," OC. 2:1, 42.
42. Unpublished letter from Tocqueville to Freslon, September 20, 1856, quoted in Jardin, Tocqueville, 514.
43. Jon Elster, Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993), 101.
44. DAII, 695.
45. Welch, De Tocqueville, 98-100, 185-210.
46. OC, 3:1, 443-553.
47. OC, 3:1, 505.
48. See Mary Lawlor, Alexis de Tocqueville in the Chamber of Deputies: His Views on Foreign and Colonial Policy (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1959), 173-74, 43-66.
49. "Essay," 60. Tocqueville clearly fears English domination of the strategically important Mediterranean.
50. The closest he comes to such a claim is in his analysis of the Irish situation, where the subjugation of a European Catholic people by a Protestant nobility engaged his strongest sympathies. See "De la situation Intérieure de l'Irlande," Le Commerce, October 2, 1844, OC, 3:2, 472-77, and "L'Irlande et l'Angleterre," Le Commerce, October 20, 1844, Ibid., 478-82. Cf. also "Voyage d'Irlande," OC, 5:2, 93-169. But even here he does not directly assert that the Irish have a right to self-determination, or that the English had no right to conquer Ireland. Rather he points to the devastation that may happen when there is no community of interest between ruler and ruled, and when a social class is permitted to exploit without any effective restraints.
51. The closest he comes to such a claim is in his analysis of the Irish situation, where the subjugation of a European Catholic people by a Protestant nobility engaged his strongest sympathies. See "De la situation Intérieure de l'Irlande," Le Commerce, October 2, 1844, OC, 3:2, 472-77, and "L'Irlande et l'Angleterre," Le Commerce, October 20, 1844, Ibid., 478-82. Cf. also "Voyage d'Irlande," OC, 5:2, 93-169. But even here he does not directly assert that the Irish have a right to self-determination, or that the English had no right to conquer Ireland. Rather he points to the devastation that may happen when there is no community of interest between ruler and ruled, and when a social class is permitted to exploit without any effective restraints.
52. The closest he comes to such a claim is in his analysis of the Irish situation, where the subjugation of a European Catholic people by a Protestant nobility engaged his strongest sympathies. See "De la situation Intérieure de l'Irlande," Le Commerce, October 2, 1844, OC, 3:2, 472-77, and "L'Irlande et l'Angleterre," Le Commerce, October 20, 1844, Ibid., 478-82. Cf. also "Voyage d'Irlande," OC, 5:2, 93-169. But even here he does not directly assert that the Irish have a right to self-determination, or that the English had no right to conquer Ireland. Rather he points to the devastation that may happen when there is no community of interest between ruler and ruled, and when a social class is permitted to exploit without any effective restraints.
53. The closest he comes to such a claim is in his analysis of the Irish situation, where the subjugation of a European Catholic people by a Protestant nobility engaged his strongest sympathies. See "De la situation Intérieure de l'Irlande," Le Commerce, October 2, 1844, OC, 3:2, 472-77, and "L'Irlande et l'Angleterre," Le Commerce, October 20, 1844, Ibid., 478-82. Cf. also "Voyage d'Irlande," OC, 5:2, 93-169. But even here he does not directly assert that the Irish have a right to self-determination, or that the English had no right to conquer Ireland. Rather he points to the devastation that may happen when there is no community of interest between ruler and ruled, and when a social class is permitted to exploit without any effective restraints.
54. The closest he comes to such a claim is in his analysis of the Irish situation, where the subjugation of a European Catholic people by a Protestant nobility engaged his strongest sympathies. See "De la situation Intérieure de l'Irlande," Le Commerce, October 2, 1844, OC, 3:2, 472-77, and "L'Irlande et l'Angleterre," Le Commerce, October 20, 1844, Ibid., 478-82. Cf. also "Voyage d'Irlande," OC, 5:2, 93-169. But even here he does not directly assert that the Irish have a right to self-determination, or that the English had no right to conquer Ireland. Rather he points to the devastation that may happen when there is no community of interest between ruler and ruled, and when a social class is permitted to exploit without any effective restraints.
55. OC, 3:1, 505. In the 1835 Democracy Tocqueville expresses similar disdain for the Anglo-Americans' self-justifications and manipulations of the language of justice in their official reports on Indian affairs. DAI, 339, n. 29.
56. OC, 3:1, 505. In the 1835 Democracy Tocqueville expresses similar disdain for the Anglo-Americans' self-justifications and manipulations of the language of justice in their official reports on Indian affairs. DAI, 339, n. 29.
57. Part of what interested Tocqueville about India was the "feeling of greatness and power that [British dominance in India] gives a whole people." OC, 3:1, 478. Seymour Drescher has shown how Tocqueville's growing fears about the entropy of French political culture under the July Monarchy preoccupied him during the composition of the 1840 Democracy. See "More than America: Comparison and Synthesis in Democracy in America," in Reconsidering Democracy, ed. Eisenstadt, 77-93.
58. Part of what interested Tocqueville about India was the "feeling of greatness and power that [British dominance in India] gives a whole people." OC, 3:1, 478. Seymour Drescher has shown how Tocqueville's growing fears about the entropy of French political culture under the July Monarchy preoccupied him during the composition of the 1840 Democracy. See "More than America: Comparison and Synthesis in Democracy in America," in Reconsidering Democracy, ed. Eisenstadt, 77-93.
59. See "Some Ideas about What Prevents the French from Having Good Colonies," 4.
60. On the empirical weakness and self-delusion of arguments connecting external aggression and internal renewal, see Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," 385, and Pitts, Writings, xxxiv.
61. On the empirical weakness and self-delusion of arguments connecting external aggression and internal renewal, see Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," 385, and Pitts, Writings, xxxiv.
62. See Patricia M. E. Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995), 17-52, for a discussion of the later construction of "bad" Arabs as against "good" Kabyles.
63. "First Letter," 9.
64. "Second Letter," 21.
65. "First Letter," 7.
66. "Second Letter," 24.
67. "Second Letter," 24. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville himself recognizes the flaw in this analogy. "[W]then the side that has the physical force has intellectual superiority too, it is rare for the conquered to become civilized; they either withdraw or are destroyed." DAI, 331.
68. "Second Letter," 24. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville himself recognizes the flaw in this analogy. "[W]then the side that has the physical force has intellectual superiority too, it is rare for the conquered to become civilized; they either withdraw or are destroyed." DAI, 331.
69. "Essay," 111.
70. See "First Report," 161-62, for his final statement on this matter: "It is not a matter of creating a new people, with its own laws, its customs, its interests, and sooner or later its separate nationality, but of implanting in Africa a population that resembles us in everything." In both reports on Algeria the primary question is the establishment and internal administration of a European society. Relations with the indigenous inhabitants are secondary. See Tocqueville to Beaumont, October 28, 1846, OC, 8:1, 592.
71. See "First Report," 161-62, for his final statement on this matter: "It is not a matter of creating a new people, with its own laws, its customs, its interests, and sooner or later its separate nationality, but of implanting in Africa a population that resembles us in everything." In both reports on Algeria the primary question is the establishment and internal administration of a European society. Relations with the indigenous inhabitants are secondary. See Tocqueville to Beaumont, October 28, 1846, OC, 8:1, 592.
72. Charles Robert Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present, trans. and ed. Michael Brett (London: Hurst, 1991), 22.
73. "Essay," 59.
74. "Essay," 70. Tocqueville's belief that France could not abandon Algeria without dishonor never wavered; see his claim in the "First Report," 167-68: "Our preponderance in Europe, the order of our finances, the lives of part of our citizenry, and our national honor are engaged here in the most compelling manner."
75. "Essay," 70. Tocqueville's belief that France could not abandon Algeria without dishonor never wavered; see his claim in the "First Report," 167-68: "Our preponderance in Europe, the order of our finances, the lives of part of our citizenry, and our national honor are engaged here in the most compelling manner."
76. "Essay," 123, 127. Cf. the social economist Eugène Buret, who argued that if France abandoned the conquest she would - like Spain earlier - leave only "humiliating traces of her own powerlessness" in Africa. Question d'Afrique (Paris: Ledoyen, 1842), 35.
77. "Essay," 123, 127. Cf. the social economist Eugène Buret, who argued that if France abandoned the conquest she would - like Spain earlier - leave only "humiliating traces of her own powerlessness" in Africa. Question d'Afrique (Paris: Ledoyen, 1842), 35.
78. Quoted in Bois, Bugeaud, 320-21. Buret noted that French public opinion, by unreservedly supporting the conquest, had placed the retention of Algeria "under the protection of the national honor." Question d'Afrique, 6.
79. Quoted in Bois, Bugeaud, 320-21. Buret noted that French public opinion, by unreservedly supporting the conquest, had placed the retention of Algeria "under the protection of the national honor." Question d'Afrique, 6.
80. Duvivier, Solution de la question, 285-86. The anti-imperialist critic Desjobert drew opposite conclusions. He believed there was no good argument for the original conquest, and that the costs of colonization were morally unacceptable. France, then, should limit herself to occupying a few coastal ports. La question d'Alger, 306-36. In effect, Desjobert argued that Algeria presented a case where considerations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello come together to make a war indefensible. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 195-96.
81. Duvivier, Solution de la question, 285-86. The anti-imperialist critic Desjobert drew opposite conclusions. He believed there was no good argument for the original conquest, and that the costs of colonization were morally unacceptable. France, then, should limit herself to occupying a few coastal ports. La question d'Alger, 306-36. In effect, Desjobert argued that Algeria presented a case where considerations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello come together to make a war indefensible. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 195-96.
82. "Second Letter," 15.
83. "Second Letter," 24-25.
84. "Notes," 37.
85. Cf. "Notes," 53-55, and "Essay," 83-84.
86. Cf. "Notes," 53-55, and "Essay," 83-84.
87. "Essay," 83.
88. I b i d.
89. "Notes," 41, 53.
90. "Essay," 50. Apparently the key dispute was not so much over the translation of "sovereignty" as over discrepancies in the Arabic and French versions of the provision that defined the eastern boundary of French territory. See Danziger, Abd al-Qadir, 143-44.
91. "Essay," 50. Apparently the key dispute was not so much over the translation of "sovereignty" as over discrepancies in the Arabic and French versions of the provision that defined the eastern boundary of French territory. See Danziger, Abd al-Qadir, 143-44.
92. "First Report," 140. Cf. an incident Tocqueville relates in the Souvenirs. In 1849, relying on false interpretations of preceding treaties, Austria and Russia demanded that Turkey turn over Polish rebels who had appealed to the Turkish sultan for protection. The Turks refused, invoking their honor, Islamic law, and the law of nations. Tocqueville ironically notes that they "modestly suggested that what was right on the left bank of the Danube should be so on the right bank too." Recollections, 317. Pitts sees in this discussion evidence of Tocqueville's theoretical support for the universal application of natural law principles. "Empire and Democracy," 314. In context, however, what emerges is less a claim that universal justice should bind everyone equally than a claim that "civilized" powers shame themselves when they break self-imposed rules.
93. "First Report," 140. Cf. an incident Tocqueville relates in the Souvenirs. In 1849, relying on false interpretations of preceding treaties, Austria and Russia demanded that Turkey turn over Polish rebels who had appealed to the Turkish sultan for protection. The Turks refused, invoking their honor, Islamic law, and the law of nations. Tocqueville ironically notes that they "modestly suggested that what was right on the left bank of the Danube should be so on the right bank too." Recollections, 317. Pitts sees in this discussion evidence of Tocqueville's theoretical support for the universal application of natural law principles. "Empire and Democracy," 314. In context, however, what emerges is less a claim that universal justice should bind everyone equally than a claim that "civilized" powers shame themselves when they break self-imposed rules.
94. Lorcin, Imperial identities, 38-39. Desjobert, quoting Tocqueville from Democracy in America, argued that French policies would lead to extermination, even if no one explicitly intended this result, La question d'Alger. 63-65. It was this issue that most troubled Tocqueville's friend Corcelle about French policies in Algeria. See Tocqueville to Corcelle, December 1, 1846, OC, 15:1.
95. Lorcin, Imperial identities, 38-39. Desjobert, quoting Tocqueville from Democracy in America, argued that French policies would lead to extermination, even if no one explicitly intended this result, La question d'Alger. 63-65. It was this issue that most troubled Tocqueville's friend Corcelle about French policies in Algeria. See Tocqueville to Corcelle, December 1, 1846, OC, 15:1.
96. "Intervention" (1846), 118.
97. "Essay," 70.
98. "Essay," 78. Cf. his observation that the French public was willing to tolerate suspension of the rule of law in Algeria because "deep down [it] has a certain taste for violent and summary proceedings when it does not suffer itself." Ibid., 110.
99. "Essay," 78. Cf. his observation that the French public was willing to tolerate suspension of the rule of law in Algeria because "deep down [it] has a certain taste for violent and summary proceedings when it does not suffer itself." Ibid., 110.
100. Robespierre defined terror as "a consequence of the general principle of democracy, applied to the most urgent needs of the nation (patrie)." Discours et Rapports à la Convention (Paris: Union Générale d'Editions, 1965), 222. Tocqueville's belief that an aggressive patriotic foreign policy was in some measure a prophylactic against the ascendancy of domestic revolutionaries who, he believed, also endangered property and the rule of law undoubtedly contributed to his ability to repress the dangers of lawlessness in Algeria. See his notes for his speech on the Eastern question (November 30, 1840), OC, 3:2, 304, and the speech itself, OC, 3:2, 299-301.
101. In 1846 Tocqueville wrote to Corcelle from Algiers of the wretchedness of the Arab tribes in a passage that in some ways recalls his descriptions in Democracy in America of the starving Choctaws. Yet the emotional register is different. Although Tocqueville takes no joy from Arab starvation, and distances himself from those army officers who hate Arabs and treat them like beasts, it is clear that his dominant reaction to this suffering is relief. Starvation interests him primarily as evidence that the French have prevailed and the war is over. December 1, 1846, OC, 15:1, 224-25.
102. "Notes," 57.
103. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 73-95.
104. Sheldon Wolin, Tocqueville between Two Worlds: The Making of a Political and Theoretical Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 541.
105. "Essay," 70.
106. "First Report," 141. Cf. Tocqueville to his father, May 23, 1841, OC, 14, 218-19.
107. "First Report," 141. Cf. Tocqueville to his father, May 23, 1841, OC, 14, 218-19.
108. For an analysis of these uses of ironic comparison with non-European societies in the eighteenth century, see Melvin Richter, "Europe and the Other in Eighteenth-Century Thought," Politisches Denken Jahrbuch 1997 (Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler), 25-47. See also endnote 63 above.
109. DAI, 339.
110. See, for example, Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," 363, 372, and Wolin, Tocqueville between Two Worlds, 271. Pitts, on the other hand, suggests perceptively that Tocqueville's interest in American expansion into Amerindian territory and his refusal to condemn it (even as he sympathized with its victims) are analogous to his interest in British imperialism in India. Writings, xiv-vi.
111. See, for example, Richter, "Tocqueville on Algeria," 363, 372, and Wolin, Tocqueville between Two Worlds, 271. Pitts, on the other hand, suggests perceptively that Tocqueville's interest in American expansion into Amerindian territory and his refusal to condemn it (even as he sympathized with its victims) are analogous to his interest in British imperialism in India. Writings, xiv-vi.
112. See, for example, his invocation of the Spanish example in the "First Report," 146: "Let us not, in the middle of the nineteenth century, begin the history of the conquest of America over again. Let us not imitate the bloody examples that the opinion of the human race has stigmatized."
113. "First Report," 130; see also Tocqueville to Henry Reeve, April 12, 1840, OC, 6:1, 58.
114. "First Report," 130; see also Tocqueville to Henry Reeve, April 12, 1840, OC, 6:1, 58.
115. "Essay," 85, 87.
116. "Essay," 111. In addressing Corcelle's fears that extermination will be the result of French policies, Tocqueville says that to "wish for" the disappearance of the Arabs is cruel, absurd, and impractical. But he adds, "But what should be done so that the two races enter into contact with one another? I confess with chagrin that here my mind is troubled and hesitates." Tocqueville to Corcelle, December 1, 1846, OC, 15:1, 224.
117. "Intervention," 122.
118. Tocqueville to Kergolay, May 23, 1841, OC, 13:2, 84.
119. "First Report," 135. Cf. "Essay," 68, where Tocqueville speaks of warfare as a controlled means to "dishearten and exhaust."
120. "First Report," 135. Cf. "Essay," 68, where Tocqueville speaks of warfare as a controlled means to "dishearten and exhaust."
121. "Essay." 75-80.
122. "Essay," 88.
123. "First Report," 149.
124. "First Report," 163.
125. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci, rev. E. R. P. Vincent, in The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Modern Library, 1950), 34. Sheldon Wolin has an interesting discussion of the moral ambiguities of this "economy of violence" in Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown. 1960), 220-24.
126. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci, rev. E. R. P. Vincent, in The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Modern Library, 1950), 34. Sheldon Wolin has an interesting discussion of the moral ambiguities of this "economy of violence" in Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown. 1960), 220-24.
127. "First Report," 175.
128. "Notes," 38-39; "Essay," 86-88.
129. "Notes," 38-39; "Essay," 86-88.
130. See the table summarizing "Processes of Moral Exclusion" in Susan Opitow, "Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction." Journal of Social Issues 46, no. 1 (1990): 10-11.
131. "Essay," 67.
132. "First Report," 129.
133. "Essay," 70.
134. "Essay," 70.
135. "Essay," 71. Cf. Ibid.: "I think that all means of desolating these tribes must be employed. I make an exception only of those condemned by humanity and by the law of nations." It is unclear what Tocqueville means substantively here, since he never explicitly discusses what he thinks the law of nations condemns, but he probably means to draw a line between necessary and unnecessary violence.
136. "Essay," 71. Cf. Ibid.: "I think that all means of desolating these tribes must be employed. I make an exception only of those condemned by humanity and by the law of nations." It is unclear what Tocqueville means substantively here, since he never explicitly discusses what he thinks the law of nations condemns, but he probably means to draw a line between necessary and unnecessary violence.
137. "Intervention," 118-19.
138. "First Report," 139-40.
139. Tocqueville to Corcelle, October 11, 1846, OC, 15:1, 219; "First Report." 141.
140. Tocqueville to Corcelle, October 11, 1846, OC, 15:1, 219; "First Report." 141.
141. He may or may not mean to include such incidents in scattered vague references to "violent and tyrannical" behavior. See, for example, "First Report," 137. There is an oblique reference to a resistance leader "vainly having tried to resist our force" that may refer to Saint-Arnaud's smoking of members of the Sbéah tribe in the course of putting down a rebellion led by "Bu Maza" in 1845. Ibid., 129. On this matter see Pitts, Writings, 250, n. 5.
142. He may or may not mean to include such incidents in scattered vague references to "violent and tyrannical" behavior. See, for example, "First Report," 137. There is an oblique reference to a resistance leader "vainly having tried to resist our force" that may refer to Saint-Arnaud's smoking of members of the Sbéah tribe in the course of putting down a rebellion led by "Bu Maza" in 1845. Ibid., 129. On this matter see Pitts, Writings, 250, n. 5.
143. Desjobert, La question d'Alger, 43.
144. Albert Hirschman, The Rhetoric of Reaction; Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 153.
145. Ibid., 139, 167-68.
146. Bernard Williams, "In the Beginning Was the Deed," in Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights, ed. Harold Hongju Koh and Ronald C. Slye (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 54.
147. The flagrant violation of the most basic human rights is devoid of philosophical interest. The maintenance of power by the torture and execution of political dissidents or religious minorities, denial of civil rights to women, total censorship, and so forth demand denunciation and practical opposition, not theoretical discussion. "Personal Rights and Public Space," in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Harold Hongju Koh and Ronald C. Slye, 34. Or see August Richard Norton: "A detailed excursus into moral philosophy is hardly required to convince most members of the human race that the intentional slaughter of innocent people is morally indefensible." "Drawing the Line on Opprobrious Violence," in Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader, ed. Joel H. Rosenthal (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1995), 186. See also Michael Ignatieff's discussion of the necessarily "thin" philosophical grounding of human rights in Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 53-58.
148. The flagrant violation of the most basic human rights is devoid of philosophical interest. The maintenance of power by the torture and execution of political dissidents or religious minorities, denial of civil rights to women, total censorship, and so forth demand denunciation and practical opposition, not theoretical discussion. "Personal Rights and Public Space," in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Harold Hongju Koh and Ronald C. Slye, 34. Or see August Richard Norton: "A detailed excursus into moral philosophy is hardly required to convince most members of the human race that the intentional slaughter of innocent people is morally indefensible." "Drawing the Line on Opprobrious Violence," in Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader, ed. Joel H. Rosenthal (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1995), 186. See also Michael Ignatieff's discussion of the necessarily "thin" philosophical grounding of human rights in Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 53-58.
149. The flagrant violation of the most basic human rights is devoid of philosophical interest. The maintenance of power by the torture and execution of political dissidents or religious minorities, denial of civil rights to women, total censorship, and so forth demand denunciation and practical opposition, not theoretical discussion. "Personal Rights and Public Space," in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Harold Hongju Koh and Ronald C. Slye, 34. Or see August Richard Norton: "A detailed excursus into moral philosophy is hardly required to convince most members of the human race that the intentional slaughter of innocent people is morally indefensible." "Drawing the Line on Opprobrious Violence," in Ethics and International Affairs: A Reader, ed. Joel H. Rosenthal (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1995), 186. See also Michael Ignatieff's discussion of the necessarily "thin" philosophical grounding of human rights in Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 53-58.
150. See the discussion of American policy towards genocide in the conclusion to Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 503-16.
151. See, for example, Stanley Cohen, "Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials, and Counterclaims," Human Rights Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1996): 517-43, and Albert Bandura, "Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control," Journal of Social Issues 46, no. 1 (1990): 27-46.
152. See, for example, Stanley Cohen, "Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials, and Counterclaims," Human Rights Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1996): 517-43, and Albert Bandura, "Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control," Journal of Social Issues 46, no. 1 (1990): 27-46.
153. George Kateb, "The Adequacy of the Canon," Political Theory 30, no. 4 (August 2002): 486.