Political Coase theorem

Public Choice

Volumn 115, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 1-36

  Parisi, Francesco ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037245090     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1022877303100     Document Type: Review

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