Power, prosperity and social choice: A review

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 85-118

  Schofield, Norman ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037242942     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550200170     Document Type: Review

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