Trade and competition in the WTO: Pondering the applicability of special and differential treatment

Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 23-47

  Nottage, Hunter ^a  

^a Advisory Centre on WTO Law   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0037235540     PISSN: 13693034     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/6.1.23     Document Type: Review

References (113)

1. WTO Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, at para 23.
2. Ibid, at para 25.
3. Ibid, at para 23. The exact meaning of this phrase has been a source of contention from the outset, resulting in a statement of clarification by the Chairman of the 4th Session of the Ministerial Conference, Youssef Kamal, setting out that 'this would give each Member the right to take a position on modalities that would prevent negotiations from proceeding after the 5th Session of the Ministerial Conference'.
4. Ibid, at para 50.
5. WTO Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, Ministerial Conference, 4th Session, 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/17, at para 12.
6. Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Chile, Cuba, China, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and Syria.
7. The preamble of the original GATT agreement stressed the importance of 'the elimination of discriminatory treatment' and emphasized 'reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements'. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
8. Other Members may however challenge the proclamation as a developing country, which can then lead to negotiations to clarify the position. For countries which have acceded to the WTO after 1995, their status has been a matter taken up during accession negotiations.
9. Part IV was drafted by the Committee on the Legal and Institutional Framework of GATT in Relation to Less-Developed Countries, and went into legal effect on 27 June 1966.
10. See GATT document, COM.TD/W/37, at 9.
11. The Generalized System of Preferences was proposed under the auspices of UNCTAD in 1964 and implemented in 1971 to recognize 'agreement in favour of the early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences which would be beneficial to developing countries'. See Resolution 21(II) of the Second UNCTAD Conference, in UNCTAD, Proceedings of the Conference of 1968, Report and Annexes (United Nations, TD/97).
12. Unlike developing countries, the WTO designates least-developed countries in accordance with the United Nations' official list of least-developed countries, which currently totals 49 countries of which 29 are WTO Members.
13. See M. Pangetsu, 'Special and Differential Treatment in the Millennium: Special for Whom and How Different?', 23(9) The World Economy (2000), at 1289.
14. WTO (1999), 'Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System: Past and Present', Background Note by the Secretariat, 1999, World Trade Organization, Geneva, at 17.
15. Ibid, at 17.
16. Although this is not to say that they were critical of all aspects of S&D and certainly continued to advocate for preferential access to developed country markets, see E. Kessie, 'Enforceability of the Legal Provisions Relating to Special and Differential Treatment under the WTO Agreements', 3(6) Journal of World Intellectual Property (2000), at 962.
17. Developing countries accepted as a single undertaking the major agreements constituting the WTO Agreement. Only four agreements in the area of goods remained plurilateral, of which only the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft and the Agreement on Government Procurement are still in effect.
18. See Bhagwati and Panagariya The Truth About Protectionism', Financial Times (30 March 2001) where they call for poor countries to not shy from reducing trade barriers on the basis that historically and '(u)nsurprisingly, giving few concessions of their own, poor countries got little in return'.
19. WTO (2000a), 'Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions', Note by the Secretariat, 2000, WT/COMTD/W77, World Trade Organization, Geneva, at 3; and WTO (1999), above n 14, at 18.
20. WTO (2000a), 'Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions', Note by the Secretariat, 2000, WT/COMTD/W77, World Trade Organization, Geneva, at 3; and WTO (1999), above n 14, at 18.
21. As John Whalley summarized, '(s)pecial and differential treatment changed from a focus on preferential [market] access and special rights to protect, to one of responding to special adjustment difficulties in developing countries stemming from the implementation of WTO decisions'. See J. Whalley, 'Special and Differential Treatment in the Millennium Round', 22(8) The World Economy (1999), at 1073.
22. 'GATT 1994' came into force at the same time as the WTO Agreements, and consists of the original GATT agreement (hereinafter referred to as 'GATT 1947') as amended, the legal instruments entered into force under GATT 1947 and six 'Understandings' on the GATT provisions. See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Annex 1A, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
23. Preamble, Agreement on Agriculture.
24. Article 12.2, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.
25. Article 15, Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 ('Anti-dumping').
26. These have been described earlier. They include Article XXXVI GATT 1947 and the 'Enabling Clause', which both allowed for non-reciprocity with respect to the removal or reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, as well as Article XVIII GATT 1947.
27. For instance, the GATS Annex on Telecommunications offers a new dimension to S&D by setting out reasonable conditions of access to public telecommunications transport networks and services consonant with the need to strengthen domestic telecommunications infrastructure and increase participation (of the developing country Member) in international trade, see GATS, Annex 2, para 5(g).
28. Under the Agreement on Agriculture, lower subsidy and domestic support reductions apply for developing country Members. Furthermore, investment subsidies for agriculture and agricultural inputs are exempt from domestic support reduction commitments (Article 6.2) and agricultural export subsidies are allowed for marketing costs as well as internal transport and freight charges during the implementation period (Article 9.4). The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in recognition that subsidies may play an important role in economic developmental programmes, exempts developing countries with a per capita income of less than US$1,000 (and listed in Annex VII) from the prohibition on export subsidies (Article 27.2) while other developing countries have been given an eight-year transitional period to phase out such subsidies (Article 27.2(b)).
29. WTO (2000a), above n 19, at 5. Exceeded only by provisions to safeguard the interests of developing country Members (category (2) above), which total 49.
30. WTO (1999), above n 14, at 21.
31. See C. Michalopoulos, "The Role of Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries in the GATT and the World Trade Organization', 2000, Policy Research Working Paper No 2388, World Bank.
32. OECD (1999), Trade and Competition Policies, Exploring Ways Forward, 1999, Paris, at 13-24.
33. UNCTAD (1999a), 'Preparing for Future Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Issues and Research Needs from a Development Perspective', UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/6, September 1999, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva.
34. In particular. Article 7 of Section C(iii) is titled 'Preferential or differential treatment for developing countries' and sets out that: In order to ensure the equitable application of the Set of Principles and Rules, States, particularly developed countries, should take into account in their control of restrictive business practices the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries, in particular of the least developed countries, for the purposes especially of developing countries in: (a) Promoting the establishment or development of domestic industries and the economic development of other sectors of the economy, and (b) Encouraging their economic development through regional or global arrangements among developing countries. The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, United Nations General Assembly, (35th Session), Resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980.
35. See for example, Communication from Uruguay, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 4 July 2001, WT/WGTCP/W/169, at 3-5.
36. See intervention of Morocco at the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, referred to in the Report of the Meeting of 5-6 July 2001, Note by the Secretariat, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para 13.
37. See intervention of Venezuela at the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, referred to in the Report of the Meeting of 15-16 June 2000, Note by the Secretariat, 15 September 2000, WT/WGTCP/M/11, para 41.
38. WTO (2000b), 'Report (2000) of the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council', 30 November 2000, WT/WGTCP/4, para 76.
39. Ibid, at para 76.
40. Ibid, at para 28.
41. Ibid, at paras 40 and 76. See also OECD (1999), above n 31, at 14-16.
42. Ibid, at paras 40 and 76. See also OECD (1999), above n 31, at 14-16.
43. WTO Ministerial Declaration, above n 1, at para 25.
44. Increased participation is intended to be achieved through the negotiation of specific commitments, relating to: (a) the strengthening of their domestic services capacity and its efficiency and competitiveness, inter alia, through access to technology on a commercial basis; (b) the improvement of their access to distribution channels and information networks; and (c) the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of priority export interest to them.
45. See developing country concerns as set out in WTO (1999), above n 14, at 26.
46. See statement by Ambassador Narayanan of India at the 4th Session of the WTO Seminar on Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, 7 March 2000, World Trade Organization, Geneva, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop>e/devel>e/sem01>e/sdtind>e.htm (visited 13 November 2002). Edwini Kessie, following an extensive examination of the legal enforceability of S&D provisions, has opined that 'at the moment, much of the WTO provisions dealing with special and differential treatment could be said to be unenforceable, as they are expressed in imprecise and hortatory language', see Kessie, above n 16, at 975.
47. See statement by Ambassador Narayanan of India at the 4th Session of the WTO Seminar on Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, 7 March 2000, World Trade Organization, Geneva, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop>e/devel>e/sem01>e/sdtind>e.htm (visited 13 November 2002). Edwini Kessie, following an extensive examination of the legal enforceability of S&D provisions, has opined that 'at the moment, much of the WTO provisions dealing with special and differential treatment could be said to be unenforceable, as they are expressed in imprecise and hortatory language', see Kessie, above n 16, at 975.
48. See P. Sauvé, 'Developing Countries and GATS 2000 Round', 34(2) Journal of World Trade (2000), at 85-92; and A. Mattoo, 'Developing Countries in the New Round of GATS Negotiations: From a Defensive to a Pro-Active Role', paper prepared for a WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries in a Millennium Round, 20-21 September 1999, Geneva. Further attention to competition disciplines will likely be required when various other service sectors are addressed in future GATS negotiations (e.g. energy and both air and maritime transport services).
49. See P. Sauvé, 'Developing Countries and GATS 2000 Round', 34(2) Journal of World Trade (2000), at 85-92; and A. Mattoo, 'Developing Countries in the New Round of GATS Negotiations: From a Defensive to a Pro-Active Role', paper prepared for a WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries in a Millennium Round, 20-21 September 1999, Geneva. Further attention to competition disciplines will likely be required when various other service sectors are addressed in future GATS negotiations (e.g. energy and both air and maritime transport services).
50. The European Community and its Member States is one of the leading advocates of such an approach. Their ideas have been elucidated in the WTO Working Party on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, notably its communication on 'A Multilateral Framework Agreement on Competition Policy', 25 September 2000, WT/WGTCP/W/152. This should be read in conjunction with communications on 'A WTO Competition Agreement and Development', 26 July 2001, WT/WGTCP/W/175; and 'The Development Dimension of Trade and Competition Policy', 8 June 2000, WT/WGTCP/W/140. Amongst others, Canada and the Czech Republic concur with such an approach as reflected in their communications to the WTO Working Party on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy set out in WT/WGTCP/W/174 of 28 June 2001; and WT/WGTCP/W/165 of 26 July 2001 respectively.
51. These proposals are described in detail in the WTO communications cited above.
52. While the terms 'exception', 'exemption', and 'exclusion' can have specific meanings in the context of particular national legal systems, at a general level the terms have been used somewhat inter-changeably in trade and competition discussions to date. Hereinafter this paper refers to all three categories as 'exceptions and exemptions'.
53. This basic distinction between sectoral and non-sectoral exceptions and exemptions mirrors that adopted in WTO (2001), 'Exceptions, Exemptions and Exclusions Contained in Members' National Competition Legislation', Note by the Secretariat, 6 July 2001, WT/WGTCP/W/172. It lists non-sectoral exceptions and exemptions as practices and arrangements including, inter alia, statutory monopolies, small and medium enterprises, research and development agreements, efficiency enhancing measures, and other efficiency enhancing arrangements.
54. See the intervention of Trinidad and Tobago at the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, referred to in Report of the Meeting of 5-6 July 2001, Note by the Secretariat, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para 28.
55. Ibid. Morocco has also called for '... safeguards for national strategic objectives in the form of exemptions', see WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report of the Meeting of 5-6 July 2001, Note by the Secretariat, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para 13.
56. Ibid. Morocco has also called for '... safeguards for national strategic objectives in the form of exemptions', see WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report of the Meeting of 5-6 July 2001, Note by the Secretariat, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para 13.
57. WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report of the Meeting of 5-6 July 2001, Note by the Secretariat, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para 9.
58. See Communication from Canada, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 28 June 2001, WT/WGTCP/W/174, p 3.
59. See intervention from UNCTAD, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report of the Meeting of 22-23 March 2001, Note by the Secretariat, 2 July 2001,WT/WGTCP/M/14, para 19. The UNCTAD Secretariat has also specifically singled out the potential developmental benefits of sectoral exceptions and exemptions for developing countries and therefore that 'the special and differential treatment of developing countries ... could encompass the right to exempt sectors from national competition rules for development reasons', see UNCTAD (1999b), Trade and Development Report 1999, UNCTAD/TDR/(1999), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, at 43.
60. See intervention from UNCTAD, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report of the Meeting of 22-23 March 2001, Note by the Secretariat, 2 July 2001,WT/WGTCP/M/14, para 19. The UNCTAD Secretariat has also specifically singled out the potential developmental benefits of sectoral exceptions and exemptions for developing countries and therefore that 'the special and differential treatment of developing countries ... could encompass the right to exempt sectors from national competition rules for development reasons', see UNCTAD (1999b), Trade and Development Report 1999, UNCTAD/TDR/(1999), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, at 43.
61. See OECD (1996), Antitrust and Market Access: The Scope and Coverage of Competition Laws and Implications for Trade, 1996, Paris. The jurisdictions reviewed were those of Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Community.
62. See WTO (2001), above n 49. Uruguay has also conducted a comparative study of exceptions and exemptions from national competition legislation which reveals their wide breadth and use in both developed and developing countries, see Communication from Uruguay, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 4 July 2001, WT/WGTCP/W/109, at 3-5.
63. United States, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report of the Meeting of 5-6 July 2001, Note by the Secretariat, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para 30.
64. See Communication from Japan, 'Competition Policies and Exemption Systems', WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 4 July 2001, WT/WGTCP/W/177.
65. Ibid, at 5.
66. Ibid, at 5.
67. See text at nn 50 to 54 above.
68. See Communication from the OECD, WTO Working Group on the Interaction of Trade and Competition Policy, 29 July 1997, WT/WGTCP/W/21, para 17.
69. OECD (1997), The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform: Synthesis, 1997, Paris, at 32. The synthesis report goes on to makes calls to 'eliminate sectoral gaps in the coverage of competition law, unless evidence suggests that compelling public interests cannot be served in better ways'.
70. For example, in OECD (1996), 'natural monopoly', economies of scale, and market failure considerations were invoked to support exclusions or special treatment of certain sectors, see above n 55, at 17.
71. Colombia, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para 15.
72. WTO Ministerial Declaration, above n 1, paras 23-25.
73. WTO (2000b), above n 37, para 40.
74. WTO (2000b), above n 37, paras 14, 26, and 30.
75. See for example the elucidation in OECD (1999), above n 31, at 16-20.
76. OECD (1999), above n 31, at 17.
77. WTO (2000b), above n 37, paras 17 and 87, acknowledging that 'not all questions were resolved as to which elements could most usefully be addressed at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels', and setting out demands for further study including cost-benefit analysis.
78. OECD (1999), above n 31, at 17.
79. EU Commission Paper: State of Play and Strategy for the New WTO Round, Note for the Attention of the 133 Committee, Brussels, 13 December 2000.
80. Perhaps one immediate concern is whether this model is likely to include developing countries at the final stage. The EU Commission Paper states that it believes that 'most Members' will join such an agreement clarifying that both the 'key countries', which the paper leaves undefined, and countries that already have a competition law will be attracted to joining this type of agreement, ibid.
81. Consisting of Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba.
82. See 'Developing Countries Propose New Negotiating Areas for Doha', 19(38) Inside US Trade (21 September 2001), at 6.
83. OECD (2001), The Development Dimensions of Trade, 2001, Paris, at 80.
84. See E. Drage, Presentation made at the OECD Global Forum for Trade, 'Trade Policy Issues: The Labour, Environmental and Competition Dimensions', Paris, 8-9 March 2001, available at: http://www1.oecd.org//ech/globalforum/programme.htm (visited 13 November 2002).
85. OECD (2001), above n 77, at 80.
86. Trinidad and Tobago, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para 29.
87. See WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 14 August 2001, WT/WGTCP/M/15, para 61.
88. WTO Ministerial Declaration, above n 1, at para 23.
89. WTO (2000b), above n 37, at paras 63 and 86.
90. OECD (1999) above n 31, at 14. For a critical yet also forward-looking discussion of the role of technical assistance and capacity building in a trade and competition context, see I. Garcia Bercero and S. Amarasinha, 'Moving the Trade and Competition Debate Forward', 4(3) JIEL (2001), at 499.
91. OECD (1999) above n 31, at 14. For a critical yet also forward-looking discussion of the role of technical assistance and capacity building in a trade and competition context, see I. Garcia Bercero and S. Amarasinha, 'Moving the Trade and Competition Debate Forward', 4(3) JIEL (2001), at 499.
92. A second possible contributing factor to the implementation problems currently faced has less to do with the practical difficulties in dealing with new commitments and more to do with the view that some of the commitments entered into during the Uruguay Round may be unduly onerous, unsupportive of development, or simply not in the national interest.
93. Jan Pronk, as Chairman of the WTO High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries, commented that '... foreign assistance can help, but often did not. Too often supply driven assistance and incoherent diagnoses from a wide range of development agencies, undercut the domestic will to reform: too much expatriate technical assistance and proliferation of donor schemes overtaxed the domestic capacity to reform and led to confusion and duplication', see WTO High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries, 27 October 2000, World Trade Organization, Geneva.
94. It has been pointed out that trade-related technical assistance accounted for less than 2% of ODA provided by OECD countries, which allegedly does not correspond with the promises made during the multilateral trade negotiations, UNCTAD (1999a), above n 32, at 141. This situation improved on 11 March 2002, however, when WTO Member Governments pledged CHF 30 million for trade-related technical assistance to the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund.
95. WTO (1999), above n 14, at 26.
96. OECD (1999), above n 31, at 13.
97. See for example, T. Winslow, 'OECD Competition Law Recommendations, Developing Countries, and Possible WTO Competition Rules', 3(1) OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy (2001), Paris.
98. Submission from the Republic of Korea, WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 10 December 1997, WT/WGTCP/W/56, para 13. More recently, a communication from the Republic of Korea to the Working Group set out that 'Korea's experience illustrates that it is better to introduce a competition regime at the initial stage of economic growth, when monopolies have not yet gained political and economic power', see Communication from the Republic of Korea, 26 June 2001, WT/WGTCP/W/166, para 11.
99. WTO (2000b), above n 37, at para 18.
100. A commentator who has advocated a comprehensive set of international competition policies under the ambit of the WTO, contemplated at least seven years for full implementation of its provisions to give nations not only the opportunity to observe the process evolve before making a full commitment but also to reflect the gradual pace at which both individual nations and the European Community introduced and expanded their competition policies, see F. M. Scherer, Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy (Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1994), especially at 89-97. Notably, the seven-year transition period of that proposal was not specifically to address developing countries' implementation difficulties, for which longer phase-in periods might be appropriate. On the other hand, it appears that some developing countries have established competent competition law enforcement regimes in less than seven years.
101. WTO (1999), above n 14, at 26.
102. Certainly the WTO reports concerns raised by developing countries that the time periods do not always give sufficient time to deal with specific shortfalls in capacity that are faced by individual Members, or with their precise development needs, see WTO (1999), above n 14, at 26. See also Michalopolous who states that '(o)ne of the more urgent issues that should be the subject of a systematic review of the implementation of special and differential treatment of developing countries is the time limits set for full implementation of certain provisions of the agreements relative to the institutional capacity to do so', see Michalopolous, above n 30, at 22.
103. Certainly the WTO reports concerns raised by developing countries that the time periods do not always give sufficient time to deal with specific shortfalls in capacity that are faced by individual Members, or with their precise development needs, see WTO (1999), above n 14, at 26. See also Michalopolous who states that '(o)ne of the more urgent issues that should be the subject of a systematic review of the implementation of special and differential treatment of developing countries is the time limits set for full implementation of certain provisions of the agreements relative to the institutional capacity to do so', see Michalopolous, above n 30, at 22.
104. See OECD (2001), above n 77, at 74; Michalopoulos, above n 30, at 24; and Pangetsu, above n 13, at 1293.
105. See OECD (2001), above n 77, at 74; Michalopoulos, above n 30, at 24; and Pangetsu, above n 13, at 1293.
106. See OECD (2001), above n 77, at 74; Michalopoulos, above n 30, at 24; and Pangetsu, above n 13, at 1293.
107. A number of papers summarize developing countries' concerns with S&D. See in particular, OECD (2001), above n 77, at 74-85; and WTO (1999), above n 14, at 25-26, According to UNCTAD, S&D provisions were incorporated in an ad hoc manner without a guiding consensus on how developing countries' needs should be reflected in WTO principles and rules, see UNCTAD (1999a), above n 32, at 137.
108. A number of papers summarize developing countries' concerns with S&D. See in particular, OECD (2001), above n 77, at 74-85; and WTO (1999), above n 14, at 25-26, According to UNCTAD, S&D provisions were incorporated in an ad hoc manner without a guiding consensus on how developing countries' needs should be reflected in WTO principles and rules, see UNCTAD (1999a), above n 32, at 137.
109. A number of papers summarize developing countries' concerns with S&D. See in particular, OECD (2001), above n 77, at 74-85; and WTO (1999), above n 14, at 25-26, According to UNCTAD, S&D provisions were incorporated in an ad hoc manner without a guiding consensus on how developing countries' needs should be reflected in WTO principles and rules, see UNCTAD (1999a), above n 32, at 137.
110. Michalopoulos, above n 30, at 24, 30; T. Srinivasan, 'Developing Countries in the World Trading System: From GATT 1947 to the Third Ministerial Meeting of the WTO, 1999', 22(8) The World Economy (1999), at 1047-1064; and generally J. Finger and L. Winters, 'What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?', in A. Krueger (ed), The WTO as an International Organization, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1998).
111. Michalopoulos, above n 30, at 24, 30; T. Srinivasan, 'Developing Countries in the World Trading System: From GATT 1947 to the Third Ministerial Meeting of the WTO, 1999', 22(8) The World Economy (1999), at 1047-1064; and generally J. Finger and L. Winters, 'What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?', in A. Krueger (ed), The WTO as an International Organization, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1998).
112. Michalopoulos, above n 30, at 24, 30; T. Srinivasan, 'Developing Countries in the World Trading System: From GATT 1947 to the Third Ministerial Meeting of the WTO, 1999', 22(8) The World Economy (1999), at 1047-1064; and generally J. Finger and L. Winters, 'What Can the WTO Do for Developing Countries?', in A. Krueger (ed), The WTO as an International Organization, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press 1998).
113. Concerns referred to in UNCTAD (1999a), above n 32, at 137.