Determinants of the increase in the number of interest groups in western democracies: Theoretical considerations and evidence from 21 OECD countries

Public Choice

Volumn 114, Issue 1-2, 2003, Pages 197-218

  Bischoff, Ivo ^a  

^a JUSTUS LIEBIG UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037209889     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020838017459     Document Type: Review

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