메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 923-938

Examining claims about procedural choice: The use of floor waivers in the U.S. House

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0036990996     PISSN: 10659129     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/106591290205500410     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (5)

References (19)
  • 2
    • 0013305355 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The consequence of party organization in the house: Theory and evidence on conditional party government
    • Atlanta
    • _. 1998. "The Consequence of Party Organization in the House: Theory and Evidence on Conditional Party Government." Presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta.
    • (1998) Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association
  • 3
    • 0034348801 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The republican revolution and the house appropriations committee
    • _. 2000. "The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee." Journal of Politics 62 (1): 1-33.
    • (2000) Journal of Politics , vol.62 , Issue.1 , pp. 1-33
  • 8
    • 0030306675 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Procedural choice and the house committee on rules
    • Dion, Douglas, and John D. Huber. 1996. "Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules." Journal of Politics 58 (1): 25-53.
    • (1996) Journal of Politics , vol.58 , Issue.1 , pp. 25-53
    • Dion, D.1    Huber, J.D.2
  • 9
    • 84937346162 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Explaining partisanship on special rules in the postreform house
    • Hixon, William, and Bryan W. Marshall. 2001. "Explaining Partisanship on Special Rules in the Postreform House." Journal of Legislative Studies 7 (4): 127-40.
    • (2001) Journal of Legislative Studies , vol.7 , Issue.4 , pp. 127-140
    • Hixon, W.1    Marshall, B.W.2
  • 11
    • 0031285016 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Restrictive rules reconsidered
    • _. 1997. "Restrictive Rules Reconsidered." American Journal of Political Science 41 (3): 919-44.
    • (1997) American Journal of Political Science , vol.41 , Issue.3 , pp. 919-944
  • 12
    • 84937184960 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The party effect from A to Z and beyond
    • _. 1999. "The Party Effect from A to Z and Beyond." Journal of Politics 61 (3): 832-40.
    • (1999) Journal of Politics , vol.61 , Issue.3 , pp. 832-840
  • 13
    • 0013211916 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Explaining the role of restrictive rules in the postreform house
    • Marshall, Bryan W. 2002. "Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House." Legislative Studies Quarterly 27 (1): 61-85.
    • (2002) Legislative Studies Quarterly , vol.27 , Issue.1 , pp. 61-85
    • Marshall, B.W.1
  • 15
    • 0038660420 scopus 로고
    • House special rules and the institutional design controversy
    • Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, eds., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
    • Sinclair, Barbara. 1995. "House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy" In Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast, eds., Positive Theories of Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
    • (1995) Positive Theories of Legislative Organization
    • Sinclair, B.1
  • 16
    • 0043076651 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Do parties matter?
    • Stanford University
    • _. 1999. "Do Parties Matter?" Paper presented at the History of Congress Conference, Stanford University.
    • (1999) History of Congress Conference
  • 18
    • 0013261125 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • U.S. House of Representatives. 104th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office
    • U.S. House of Representatives. 1996. Survey of Activities of the House Committee on Rules. 104th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, DC: U.S. Printing Office.
    • (1996) Survey of Activities of the House Committee on Rules
  • 19
    • 84936180133 scopus 로고
    • The industrial organization of congress; Or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets
    • Weingast, Barry R., and William J. Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, are Not Organized as Markets." Journal of Political Economy 96 (1): 132-63.
    • (1988) Journal of Political Economy , vol.96 , Issue.1 , pp. 132-163
    • Weingast, B.R.1    Marshall, W.J.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.