The effect of disagreement on noncooperative bargaining

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 107, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 490-499

  Manzini, Paola ^a   Mariotti, Marco ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Disagreement

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036925151     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2959     Document Type: Editorial

References (10)

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3. N. Dagan, O. Volij, and E. Winter, A characterization of the Nash bargaining solution, mimeo, Brown University, 2000.
4. J. M. Esteban and J. Sàkovics, Who gets the lion share? A disagreement theory of bargaining, mimeo, Universitàt Autònoma de Barcelona, 1999.
5. A. Muthoo, "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1999.
6. R. B. Myerson, "Game Theory," Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
7. M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, "Bargaining and Markets," Academic Press, San Diego, 1990.
8. H. Peters and E. van Damme, Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa bargaining solutions by disagreement point axioms, Math. Oper. Res. 16 (1991), 447- 461.
9. A. Rubinstein, Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica 50 (1982), 97-109.
10. A. Shaked and J. Sutton, Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica 52 (1984),1351-1364.