Reviewing the GPA: The role and development of the plurilateral agreement after Doha

Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 761-790

  Arrowsmith, Sue ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036908998     PISSN: 13693034     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/5.4.761     Document Type: Review

References (229)

1. The issues covered in this article are addressed more fully in Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (forthcoming, Kluwer Law International).
2. In developed countries, excluding military purchases and those by state utilities, generally about 79% of GDP: for further recent statistics see Trionfetti, 'Discriminatory Procurement and International Trade', 23 The World Economy (2002) 57 at 60-61.
3. Although not all discriminatory practices affect trade. On the economic issues see Trionfetti, 'The Economics of Opening Up Public Procurement' in Arrowsmith and Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: the Continuing Revolution (forthcoming, Kluwer Law International) and on markets in which foreign participation occurs through a local presence; Evenett and Hoekman, 'Government Procurement of Services and Multilateral Disciplines', ch 6 in Sauvé and Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization 143.
4. Although not all discriminatory practices affect trade. On the economic issues see Trionfetti, 'The Economics of Opening Up Public Procurement' in Arrowsmith and Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: the Continuing Revolution (forthcoming, Kluwer Law International) and on markets in which foreign participation occurs through a local presence; Evenett and Hoekman, 'Government Procurement of Services and Multilateral Disciplines', ch 6 in Sauvé and Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization 143.
5. See generally Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement', 47 ICLQ 793-816 (1998); Dischendorfer, The Existence and Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement under the Framework of the WTO', 9 Public Procurement Law Review 1 (2000); Abbott, 'Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption', 4 JIEL 275 (2001); Rege, 'Transparency in Government Procurement - Issues of Concern and Interest to Developing Countries', 35 Journal of World Trade 489 (2001); Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International Relations Theory', in Arrowsmith and Trybus, n 3 above; Priess and Pitschas, 'The Proposed WTO Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement - Doha and Beyond', 11 Public Procurement Law Review NA13 (2002); Low, Mattoo and Subramaniam, 'Government Procurement in Services', 30 World Competition 5 (1996).
6. See generally Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement', 47 ICLQ 793-816 (1998); Dischendorfer, The Existence and Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement under the Framework of the WTO', 9 Public Procurement Law Review 1 (2000); Abbott, 'Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption', 4 JIEL 275 (2001); Rege, 'Transparency in Government Procurement - Issues of Concern and Interest to Developing Countries', 35 Journal of World Trade 489 (2001); Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International Relations Theory', in Arrowsmith and Trybus, n 3 above; Priess and Pitschas, 'The Proposed WTO Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement - Doha and Beyond', 11 Public Procurement Law Review NA13 (2002); Low, Mattoo and Subramaniam, 'Government Procurement in Services', 30 World Competition 5 (1996).
7. See generally Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement', 47 ICLQ 793-816 (1998); Dischendorfer, The Existence and Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement under the Framework of the WTO', 9 Public Procurement Law Review 1 (2000); Abbott, 'Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption', 4 JIEL 275 (2001); Rege, 'Transparency in Government Procurement - Issues of Concern and Interest to Developing Countries', 35 Journal of World Trade 489 (2001); Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International Relations Theory', in Arrowsmith and Trybus, n 3 above; Priess and Pitschas, 'The Proposed WTO Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement - Doha and Beyond', 11 Public Procurement Law Review NA13 (2002); Low, Mattoo and Subramaniam, 'Government Procurement in Services', 30 World Competition 5 (1996).
8. See generally Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement', 47 ICLQ 793-816 (1998); Dischendorfer, The Existence and Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement under the Framework of the WTO', 9 Public Procurement Law Review 1 (2000); Abbott, 'Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption', 4 JIEL 275 (2001); Rege, 'Transparency in Government Procurement - Issues of Concern and Interest to Developing Countries', 35 Journal of World Trade 489 (2001); Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International Relations Theory', in Arrowsmith and Trybus, n 3 above; Priess and Pitschas, 'The Proposed WTO Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement - Doha and Beyond', 11 Public Procurement Law Review NA13 (2002); Low, Mattoo and Subramaniam, 'Government Procurement in Services', 30 World Competition 5 (1996).
9. See generally Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement', 47 ICLQ 793-816 (1998); Dischendorfer, The Existence and Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement under the Framework of the WTO', 9 Public Procurement Law Review 1 (2000); Abbott, 'Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption', 4 JIEL 275 (2001); Rege, 'Transparency in Government Procurement - Issues of Concern and Interest to Developing Countries', 35 Journal of World Trade 489 (2001); Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International Relations Theory', in Arrowsmith and Trybus, n 3 above; Priess and Pitschas, 'The Proposed WTO Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement - Doha and Beyond', 11 Public Procurement Law Review NA13 (2002); Low, Mattoo and Subramaniam, 'Government Procurement in Services', 30 World Competition 5 (1996).
10. See generally Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement', 47 ICLQ 793-816 (1998); Dischendorfer, The Existence and Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement under the Framework of the WTO', 9 Public Procurement Law Review 1 (2000); Abbott, 'Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption', 4 JIEL 275 (2001); Rege, 'Transparency in Government Procurement - Issues of Concern and Interest to Developing Countries', 35 Journal of World Trade 489 (2001); Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International Relations Theory', in Arrowsmith and Trybus, n 3 above; Priess and Pitschas, 'The Proposed WTO Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement - Doha and Beyond', 11 Public Procurement Law Review NA13 (2002); Low, Mattoo and Subramaniam, 'Government Procurement in Services', 30 World Competition 5 (1996).
11. See generally Arrowsmith, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement', 47 ICLQ 793-816 (1998); Dischendorfer, The Existence and Development of Multilateral Rules on Government Procurement under the Framework of the WTO', 9 Public Procurement Law Review 1 (2000); Abbott, 'Rule-making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption', 4 JIEL 275 (2001); Rege, 'Transparency in Government Procurement - Issues of Concern and Interest to Developing Countries', 35 Journal of World Trade 489 (2001); Linarelli, The WTO Transparency Agenda: Law, Economics and International Relations Theory', in Arrowsmith and Trybus, n 3 above; Priess and Pitschas, 'The Proposed WTO Agreement on Transparency in Government Procurement - Doha and Beyond', 11 Public Procurement Law Review NA13 (2002); Low, Mattoo and Subramaniam, 'Government Procurement in Services', 30 World Competition 5 (1996).
12. GATT Articles III.8 and XVII.2. On the precise application of the GATT provisions see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 3.2 and the works cited there.
13. GATS Article XIII. 1. See further Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 3.3. On the application of other WTO multilateral agreements to procurement and the possibility of non-violation complaints relating to procurement measures see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 3.3 and 3.8.
14. GATS Article XIII. 1. See further Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 3.3. On the application of other WTO multilateral agreements to procurement and the possibility of non-violation complaints relating to procurement measures see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 3.3 and 3.8.
15. GATT Article X and GATS Article III.
16. See generally Reich, International Public Procurement Law: the Evolution of International Regimes on Public Purchasing (1999) ch 5; Bourgeois, 'The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective', 19 Common Market Law Review 5 (1982); Jones, 'The GATT-MTN System and the European Community as International Frameworks for the Regulation of Economic Activity: the Removal of Barriers to Trade in Government Procurement', 8 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 53 (1984); Horsch, 'Eliminating Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement', 12 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 315 (1979).
17. See generally Reich, International Public Procurement Law: the Evolution of International Regimes on Public Purchasing (1999) ch 5; Bourgeois, 'The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective', 19 Common Market Law Review 5 (1982); Jones, 'The GATT-MTN System and the European Community as International Frameworks for the Regulation of Economic Activity: the Removal of Barriers to Trade in Government Procurement', 8 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 53 (1984); Horsch, 'Eliminating Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement', 12 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 315 (1979).
18. See generally Reich, International Public Procurement Law: the Evolution of International Regimes on Public Purchasing (1999) ch 5; Bourgeois, 'The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective', 19 Common Market Law Review 5 (1982); Jones, 'The GATT-MTN System and the European Community as International Frameworks for the Regulation of Economic Activity: the Removal of Barriers to Trade in Government Procurement', 8 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 53 (1984); Horsch, 'Eliminating Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement', 12 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 315 (1979).
19. See generally Reich, International Public Procurement Law: the Evolution of International Regimes on Public Purchasing (1999) ch 5; Bourgeois, 'The Tokyo Round Agreements on Technical Barriers and on Government Procurement in International and EEC Perspective', 19 Common Market Law Review 5 (1982); Jones, 'The GATT-MTN System and the European Community as International Frameworks for the Regulation of Economic Activity: the Removal of Barriers to Trade in Government Procurement', 8 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 53 (1984); Horsch, 'Eliminating Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: the MTN Agreement on Government Procurement', 12 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 315 (1979).
20. WTO, Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference First Session, 13 December 1996 (WT/MIN(96)/DEC) ('Singapore Declaration').
21. WTO, Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference Fourth Session, 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/1) ('Doha Declaration'), para 26.
22. I b i d
23. Evenett, 'Multilateral Disciplines and Government Procurement' in Hoekman, Mattoo and English (eds), Development, Trade and the WTO (forthcoming, World Bank); Evenett and Hoekman, 'Transparency in Government Procurement: What Can We Expect from International Trade Agreements?' in Arrowsmith and Trybus (eds), n 3 above.
24. Evenett, 'Multilateral Disciplines and Government Procurement' in Hoekman, Mattoo and English (eds), Development, Trade and the WTO (forthcoming, World Bank); Evenett and Hoekman, 'Transparency in Government Procurement: What Can We Expect from International Trade Agreements?' in Arrowsmith and Trybus (eds), n 3 above.
25. For example, by reducing the contracts available to foreign suppliers, by reducing confidence of suppliers in the market, and because of the uneven effect between suppliers from different states with different national rules on bribery (an issue addressed by the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and other international instruments). However, controlling corruption is not an explicit objective: see Abbott, n 4 above, and Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, List of the Issues Raised and Points Made: Informal Note by the Chair, Fifth Revision, 24 September 1999, JOB(99)/5534, attached to WTO, Report (1999) of the Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement to the General Council, 12 October 1999 (WT/WGTGP/3) paras 111-15.
26. For example, by reducing the contracts available to foreign suppliers, by reducing confidence of suppliers in the market, and because of the uneven effect between suppliers from different states with different national rules on bribery (an issue addressed by the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and other international instruments). However, controlling corruption is not an explicit objective: see Abbott, n 4 above, and Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, List of the Issues Raised and Points Made: Informal Note by the Chair, Fifth Revision, 24 September 1999, JOB(99)/5534, attached to WTO, Report (1999) of the Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement to the General Council, 12 October 1999 (WT/WGTGP/3) paras 111-15.
27. For example, by reducing the contracts available to foreign suppliers, by reducing confidence of suppliers in the market, and because of the uneven effect between suppliers from different states with different national rules on bribery (an issue addressed by the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and other international instruments). However, controlling corruption is not an explicit objective: see Abbott, n 4 above, and Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, List of the Issues Raised and Points Made: Informal Note by the Chair, Fifth Revision, 24 September 1999, JOB(99)/5534, attached to WTO, Report (1999) of the Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement to the General Council, 12 October 1999 (WT/WGTGP/3) paras 111-15.
28. See generally Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, Report on the Meeting of 7 June 2000 (WT/WGTGP/M/10), Report on the Meeting of 25 September 2000 (WT/WGTGP/M/1) and Report on the Meeting of 4 May 2001 (WT/WGTGP/M/12); and for a review Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 16.
29. See generally Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement, Report on the Meeting of 7 June 2000 (WT/WGTGP/M/10), Report on the Meeting of 25 September 2000 (WT/WGTGP/M/1) and Report on the Meeting of 4 May 2001 (WT/WGTGP/M/12); and for a review Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 16.
30. See, for example, the views of the Indian delegation in Report on the Meeting of 4 May 2001, n 14 above, para 4. With very limited qualifications, Malaysia, Pakistan and Egypt agreed.
31. The government procurement mandate was first taken up at the meeting of 8 December 1995: see Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 8 December 1995 (S/WPGR/M/3).
32. See Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 10 May 2001 (S/WPGR/M/32), paras 18-19; Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 30 November 2000 (S/WPGR/M/30), para 52 (indicating that the only procurement-related work was to distribute information on the work in other WTO fora).
33. See Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 10 May 2001 (S/WPGR/M/32), paras 18-19; Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 30 November 2000 (S/WPGR/M/30), para 52 (indicating that the only procurement-related work was to distribute information on the work in other WTO fora).
34. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
35. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
36. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
37. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
38. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
39. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
40. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
41. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
42. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
43. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
44. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
45. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
46. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
47. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
48. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
49. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
50. See generally Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 4-16; and for an overview de Graaf and King, 'Towards a More Global Government Procurement Market: The Expansion of the GATT Government Procurement Agreement in the Context of the Uruguay Round', 29 International Lawyer 435 (1995); Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'Basic Elements of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 1 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997); Cameron May, The GPA Handbook; Arrowsmith, 'The WTO Agreement on Public Procurement: Obstacles and Opportunities', Malaysian Journal of Law and Society 15 (1997); Brown and Pouncey, 'Expanding the International Market for Public Procurement: the WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement', [1995] Intl Tr LR 69; Reich, 'The New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement: the Pitfalls of Plurilateralism and Strict Reciprocity', 31 Journal of World Trade 125 (1997); Hird, 'Government Procurement'; ch 10 in Anderson (ed), Strengthening the Global Trading System: from GATT to WTO (1996) ; Graaf and Trepte, 'The Revised GATT Procurement Agreement', 3 Public Procurement Law Review (1994) CS170; Reich, n 8 above, ch X; McGovern, International Trade Law and Regulation (looseleaf) at 6.2; Carrier, 'Domestic Price Preferences in Public Procurement: an Overview and Proposal of the Amendment to the Agreement on Government Procurement', 10 New York International Law Review (1997) 59; Liefer, The GATT Agreement on Government Procurement in Theory and Practice', 26 University of Baltimore Law Review (1997) 31; Laird, 'Transition Economies, Business and the WTO', 22 World Competition (1999) 171, section II; Wallace and Sahayadachny, 'Opening Government Procurement Markets', ch 19 in Mendoza, Low and Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making (1999); Corr and Zissis, (1999) 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 306. A concise overview and related information is found on the WTO website www.wto.org.
51. Information from the WTO website, above.
52. See the works cited in n 18 above and n 131 and n 133 below.
53. Even when discrimination does not actually occur, in the absence of transparency foreign suppliers cannot verify this, and thus may be deterred from participating in the market.
54. GPA Article XIX.5. There is a current debate over whether to include further obligations. 23 GPA Article IX.
55. GPA Article XIX. 1
56. GPA Articles XII.2 and XIII.4.
57. GPA Article XVIII.2.
58. See generally Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives (2000), ch 2.
59. See generally Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, n 27 above.
60. See further Arrowsmith, 'The National and International Perspectives on the Regulation of Public Procurement: Harmony or Conflict?' in Arrowsmith and Davies (eds), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (1998), 1.
61. And also the need to consider national objectives when designing international rules.
62. As reflected in the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services, Articles 33 and 34.
63. See, for example, Hunja, 'The UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services and its Impact on Procurement Reform', ch 5 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 29 above.
64. The procedure is actually referred to just as 'tendering'.
65. This is the main method for procuring services envisaged under the Model Law.
66. On this problem generally see Dymond and Hart, 'Post-Modern Trade Policy: Reflections on the Challenges to Multilateral Trade Negotiations after Seattle', 34 Journal of World Trade (2000) 21.
67. Technically EU membership is that of the three European Communities (the European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community) that form part (although the major part) of the arrangements referred that come under the umbrella of the EU. The single term 'EU' is used here to refer to these Communities, collectively or individually.
68. Completion of negotiations with Estonia and Latvia has, however, been delayed because of EU concerns that these potential EU members have undertaken commitments that exceed those of the EC.
69. Information obtained from Vesile Kulacoglu, WTO.
70. For details see the reports of the working parties on WTO accession for Albania (WT/ACC/ALB/51, paras 122-23), Bulgaria (WT/ACC/BGR/5, para 80), China (WT/ACC/CHN49, para 341), Chinese Taipei (WT/ACC/TPKM/18), Croatia (WT/ACC/HRV/59, para 156), Estonia (WT/ACC/EST/28, para 106), Georgia (WT/ACC/GEO/31, paras 116-17), Jordan (WT/ACC/JOR/33, para 170), the Kyrgyz Republic (WT/ACC/KGZ/26), Latvia (WT/ACC/LVA/32, para 100), Lithuania (WT/ACC/LTU/52, para 140), Moldova (WT/ACC/MOL/37, para 50), Oman (WT/ACC/OMN/26, para 121), Mongolia (WT/ACC/MNG/12, para 59), Panama (WT/ACC/PAN/19, para 68).
71. Article 2 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China WT/L/432, and para 341 of the Working Party report, above.
72. Article 2 of the Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China WT/L/432, and para 341 of the Working Party report, above.
73. The markets of most existing parties are relatively open in any case: see, for example, Commonwealth of Australia, Foreign Affairs and Trade, WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: Review of Membership (1996). A review of the laws of twelve EU Member States found no significant legal barriers to third country access and also that EU challenge procedures were made available by Member States to third country suppliers: see EuroStrategy, Public Procurement (1996), report submitted to the European Commission (Annex II; unpublished). The notable exception to this position is the United States, which excludes non-GPA parties from access to GPA-covered procurement.
74. The markets of most existing parties are relatively open in any case: see, for example, Commonwealth of Australia, Foreign Affairs and Trade, WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: Review of Membership (1996). A review of the laws of twelve EU Member States found no significant legal barriers to third country access and also that EU challenge procedures were made available by Member States to third country suppliers: see EuroStrategy, Public Procurement (1996), report submitted to the European Commission (Annex II; unpublished). The notable exception to this position is the United States, which excludes non-GPA parties from access to GPA-covered procurement.
75. See, for example, Hunja, 'Obstacles to Public Procurement Reform in Developing Countries', forthcoming in Arrowsmith and Trybus, n 3 above.
76. Hoekman and Mavroidis, 'The WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement: Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership', 4 Public Procurement Law Review (1995) 3, at 73.
77. United States - Measures Affecting Government Procurement - Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities and Japan (21 October 1998, WT/DS88/4, WT/DS95/4) ('the Burma/Massachusetts dispute').
78. For example, Debroy and Pursell, 'Government Procurement Policies in India') ch 10 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997) consider this to be a factor in relation to India; and see generally Hunja, n 42 above.
79. For example, Debroy and Pursell, 'Government Procurement Policies in India') ch 10 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), Law and Policy in Public Purchasing: the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (1997) consider this to be a factor in relation to India; and see generally Hunja, n 42 above.
80. See, for example, Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 8 December 1995 (S/WPGR/M/3), para 3
81. See, for example, Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 8 December 1995 (S/WPGR/M/3), para 3 and Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 23 February 1996 (S/WPGR/M/4), para 2, where some delegates (including from one country that professes to have open markets) mention these as reasons for declining GPA membership.
82. See, for example, Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 8 December 1995 (S/WPGR/M/3), para 3 and Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting of 23 February 1996 (S/WPGR/M/4), para 2, where some delegates (including from one country that professes to have open markets) mention these as reasons for declining GPA membership.
83. A reason cited in Commonwealth of Australia, n 41 above. On the complexities of adaptation in the EU see Williams, 'Directive 98/4 Amending the EC Utilities Procurement Regime', 7 Public Procurement Law Review (1998) 95; Williams, 'The Long Awaited Directive (92/57/EC) Amending the EC Public Sector Procurement Regime', 7 Public Procurement Law Review (1998) 25.
84. A reason cited in Commonwealth of Australia, n 41 above. On the complexities of adaptation in the EU see Williams, 'Directive 98/4 Amending the EC Utilities Procurement Regime', 7 Public Procurement Law Review (1998) 95; Williams, 'The Long Awaited Directive (92/57/EC) Amending the EC Public Sector Procurement Regime', 7 Public Procurement Law Review (1998) 25.
85. A reason cited in Commonwealth of Australia, n 41 above. On the complexities of adaptation in the EU see Williams, 'Directive 98/4 Amending the EC Utilities Procurement Regime', 7 Public Procurement Law Review (1998) 95; Williams, 'The Long Awaited Directive (92/57/EC) Amending the EC Public Sector Procurement Regime', 7 Public Procurement Law Review (1998) 25.
86. See, for example, Commonwealth of Australia, n 41 above.
87. The strict conditions governing use of limited tendering have been cited as another example: Walker, 'Government Procurement: A Small Open Economy Perspective', ch 9 in Hoekman and Mavroidis, n 45 above.
88. It has not, on the other hand, been applied to coverage of products and construction.
89. See, for example, Walker, 'Government Procurement: A Small Open Economy Perspective', ch 9 in Hoekman and Mavroidis (eds), n 41 above, at 179.
90. See, for example, Walker, ibid at 180.
91. Another major problem is the inability of the supply side to respond even to opportunities that exist. GPA Article V(8)-(11) and (13) contains some weak technical assistance provisions.
92. WTO Report (1996) of the Committee on Government Procurement (1994 Agreement) (GPA/8) 17 October 1996: paras 21 and 22.
93. Ibid, para 22.
94. As stated in WTO Report (1996) of the Committee on Government Procurement, n 54 above, para 22 and reiterated most recently in WTO Report (2001) of the Committee on Government Procurement (1994 Agreement) (GPA/58) 11 October 2001 para 23.
95. As stated in WTO Report (1996) of the Committee on Government Procurement, n 54 above, para 22 and reiterated most recently in WTO Report (2001) of the Committee on Government Procurement (1994 Agreement) (GPA/58) 11 October 2001 para 23.
96. Ibid, para 22.
97. Report (1996) of the Committee on Government Procurement, n 54 above para 23.
98. Ibid, para 22; and see GPA Article XXIV.7(c).
99. Ibid, para 22; and see GPA Article XXIV.7(c)
100. WTO Report (2001) of the Committee on Government Procurement, n 56 above, para 23.
101. More recently an additional half-time appointment has been made. This point on resources has also been highlighted in the context of the Transparency Working Group by Abbott, n 4 above
102. See Arrowsmith, 'The European Commission's Proposals for New Directives on Public and Utilities Procurement', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) NA125.
103. See Reich, n 8 above, especially at 323-27.
104. UNCITRAL Model Law Articles 18-22.
105. See, for example, by Reich, n 8 above, at 324-25.
106. The author has elaborated on these arguments in the context of EU policy in Arrowsmith, 'The EC Procurement Directives, National Procurement Policies and Better Governance: The Case for a New Approach', 27 European Law Review (2002) 3.
107. For a review of the US reforms, see Schooner, 'Commercial Purchasing: the Chasm between the United States Government's Evolving Policy and Practice' in Arrowsmith and Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: the Continuing Revolution (2002); Corr and Zissis, 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law (1999) 306. On the UK policy, see United Kingdom Government White Paper, Setting New Standards: a Strategy for Government Procurement (1995) CM 2840.
108. For a review of the US reforms, see Schooner, 'Commercial Purchasing: the Chasm between the United States Government's Evolving Policy and Practice' in Arrowsmith and Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: the Continuing Revolution (2002); Corr and Zissis, 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law (1999) 306. On the UK policy, see United Kingdom Government White Paper, Setting New Standards: a Strategy for Government Procurement (1995) CM 2840.
109. For a review of the US reforms, see Schooner, 'Commercial Purchasing: the Chasm between the United States Government's Evolving Policy and Practice' in Arrowsmith and Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: the Continuing Revolution (2002); Corr and Zissis, 18 New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law (1999) 306. On the UK policy, see United Kingdom Government White Paper, Setting New Standards: a Strategy for Government Procurement (1995) CM 2840.
110. See Whiteman, 'Charging Ahead: Has the Government Purchase Card Exceeded its Limit?', 30 Public Contract Law Journal (2001) 403; Schooner and Whiteman, 'Purchase Cards and Micro-purchases: Sacrificing Traditional United States Procurement Policies at the Altar of Efficiency', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 148; MacHarg, 'Doing More with Less - Continued Expansion of the Government Purchase Card Program by Increasing the Micropurchase Threshold: A Response to Recent Articles Criticizing the Government Purchase Card Program', 31 Public Contract Law Journal (2002) 293.
111. See Whiteman, 'Charging Ahead: Has the Government Purchase Card Exceeded its Limit?', 30 Public Contract Law Journal (2001) 403; Schooner and Whiteman, 'Purchase Cards and Micro-purchases: Sacrificing Traditional United States Procurement Policies at the Altar of Efficiency', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 148; MacHarg, 'Doing More with Less - Continued Expansion of the Government Purchase Card Program by Increasing the Micropurchase Threshold: A Response to Recent Articles Criticizing the Government Purchase Card Program', 31 Public Contract Law Journal (2002) 293.
112. See Whiteman, 'Charging Ahead: Has the Government Purchase Card Exceeded its Limit?', 30 Public Contract Law Journal (2001) 403; Schooner and Whiteman, 'Purchase Cards and Micro-purchases: Sacrificing Traditional United States Procurement Policies at the Altar of Efficiency', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 148; MacHarg, 'Doing More with Less - Continued Expansion of the Government Purchase Card Program by Increasing the Micropurchase Threshold: A Response to Recent Articles Criticizing the Government Purchase Card Program', 31 Public Contract Law Journal (2002) 293.
113. Such a strict rule would be totally unacceptable to many parties.
114. On the position under the GPA see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 5.5.
115. Information from discussions with those participating in the review and from restricted documents available to the author as a member of the European Commission's Advisory Committee for the Opening Up of Government Procurement.
116. GPA Article IX.
117. GPA Article XI.
118. For a detailed consideration see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, chs 8-12.
119. Simplification might produce a set of transparency rules similar to that being considered by the Transparency Working Group. This raises the prospect of a single WTO instrument, involving market access and transparency commitments by some states (although probably not, initially, MFN), and transparency only for others. However, flexible enforcement would be needed: see X.
120. See, for example, GPA Article XIV.
121. In the author's view the appropriate answer is to apply the specific time periods to the first tendering phase of a procedure, which is when most time is needed. Other phases are still subject to the general requirement for 'adequate' time periods stated in GPA Article XI.1.
122. GPA Articles X.1, XIV.4 and IX.10.
123. See further Arrowsmith, n 1 above at 15.2.3; Haagsma, 'Information and Communication Technology Issues in International Public Procurement', ch 9 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 29 above; Davies, 'New Thoughts on Information Technology and International Procurement Opportunities Under the GPA' (1997) 6 Public Procurement Law Review CS52.
124. See further Arrowsmith, n 1 above at 15.2.3; Haagsma, 'Information and Communication Technology Issues in International Public Procurement', ch 9 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 29 above; Davies, 'New Thoughts on Information Technology and International Procurement Opportunities Under the GPA' (1997) 6 Public Procurement Law Review CS52.
125. See further Arrowsmith, n 1 above at 15.2.3; Haagsma, 'Information and Communication Technology Issues in International Public Procurement', ch 9 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 29 above; Davies, 'New Thoughts on Information Technology and International Procurement Opportunities Under the GPA' (1997) 6 Public Procurement Law Review CS52.
126. See further Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 15.2.3.
127. The review is likely to clarify the position of which electronic communications can be used, but the possibility for accommodating new techniques may be more difficult to deal with.
128. See further Arrowsmith, 'Framework Purchasing and Qualification Lists under the European Procurement Directives', (1999) 8 Public Procurement Law Review, 115 and 168.
129. For detailed discussion see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 10.3.6.5.
130. GPA Article XVIII.1. See further Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 10.5.
131. GPA Article XVIII.1. See further Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 10.5.
132. As noted above, a detailed agreement has both advantages and disadvantages in this respect.
133. Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 8.4.4 and 8.5.7.
134. Obviously these matters can be considered in deciding whether a supplier is eligible (GPA Article VIII.b); the question here is whether relative performance can be considered in selecting the winner.
135. Even if it is considered desirable to retain the current level of detail: it would be useful to restate some requirements in a more principled manner.
136. For an overview and references see McCrudden, Public Procurement and Equal Opportunities in the EC: a study of 'contract compliance' in the Member States of the European Community and under European Community Law (1995; unpublished report for the European Commission); Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, n 27 above, ch 5; International Trade Centre, Improving Access of Small and Medium Enterprises to Public Procurement:Experiences of Selected Countries (supplement to Modular Learning System on International Purchasing and Supply Management for Public Sector); Arrowsmith, Meyer and Trybus, Non-commercial Factors in Public Procurement (2000; unpublished report for the United Kingdom Office of Government Commerce); Cibinic and Nash, Formation of Government Contracts (3rd ed 1998), ch 10 (on US federal programmes).
137. For an overview and references see McCrudden, Public Procurement and Equal Opportunities in the EC: a study of 'contract compliance' in the Member States of the European Community and under European Community Law (1995; unpublished report for the European Commission); Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, n 27 above, ch 5; International Trade Centre, Improving Access of Small and Medium Enterprises to Public Procurement:Experiences of Selected Countries (supplement to Modular Learning System on International Purchasing and Supply Management for Public Sector); Arrowsmith, Meyer and Trybus, Non-commercial Factors in Public Procurement (2000; unpublished report for the United Kingdom Office of Government Commerce); Cibinic and Nash, Formation of Government Contracts (3rd ed 1998), ch 10 (on US federal programmes).
138. For an overview and references see McCrudden, Public Procurement and Equal Opportunities in the EC: a study of 'contract compliance' in the Member States of the European Community and under European Community Law (1995; unpublished report for the European Commission); Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, n 27 above, ch 5; International Trade Centre, Improving Access of Small and Medium Enterprises to Public Procurement:Experiences of Selected Countries (supplement to Modular Learning System on International Purchasing and Supply Management for Public Sector); Arrowsmith, Meyer and Trybus, Non-commercial Factors in Public Procurement (2000; unpublished report for the United Kingdom Office of Government Commerce); Cibinic and Nash, Formation of Government Contracts (3rd ed 1998), ch 10 (on US federal programmes).
139. For an overview and references see McCrudden, Public Procurement and Equal Opportunities in the EC: a study of 'contract compliance' in the Member States of the European Community and under European Community Law (1995; unpublished report for the European Commission); Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, n 27 above, ch 5; International Trade Centre, Improving Access of Small and Medium Enterprises to Public Procurement:Experiences of Selected Countries (supplement to Modular Learning System on International Purchasing and Supply Management for Public Sector); Arrowsmith, Meyer and Trybus, Non-commercial Factors in Public Procurement (2000; unpublished report for the United Kingdom Office of Government Commerce); Cibinic and Nash, Formation of Government Contracts (3rd ed 1998), ch 10 (on US federal programmes).
140. For an overview and references see McCrudden, Public Procurement and Equal Opportunities in the EC: a study of 'contract compliance' in the Member States of the European Community and under European Community Law (1995; unpublished report for the European Commission); Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace, n 27 above, ch 5; International Trade Centre, Improving Access of Small and Medium Enterprises to Public Procurement:Experiences of Selected Countries (supplement to Modular Learning System on International Purchasing and Supply Management for Public Sector); Arrowsmith, Meyer and Trybus, Non-commercial Factors in Public Procurement (2000; unpublished report for the United Kingdom Office of Government Commerce); Cibinic and Nash, Formation of Government Contracts (3rd ed 1998), ch 10 (on US federal programmes).
141. Although many policies can be formulated to avoid discrimination: see Arrowsmith, 'Public Procurement as a Tool of Policy and the Impact of Market Liberalisation', (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 235.
142. See GPA Article XVI.
143. For a detailed discussion see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 13; Arrowsmith, n 90 above; Kruger, Nielsen and Bruun, European Public Contracts in a Labour Law Perspective (1997) passim especially ch V; Kunzlik, 'Environmental Issues in International Procurement', and McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', respectively chs 11 and 12 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 27 above; McCrudden, 'International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: a Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Procurement Agreement', 2 JIEL (1999) 3; Priess and Pitschas, 'Secondary Criteria and Their Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement - The Case of the German Scientology Declaration', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 171; Spennermann, 'The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement - a Means of Furtherance of Human Rights', 4 Zeitschrift für europa-rechtliche studien (2001) 43.
144. For a detailed discussion see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 13; Arrowsmith, n 90 above; Kruger, Nielsen and Bruun, European Public Contracts in a Labour Law Perspective (1997) passim especially ch V; Kunzlik, 'Environmental Issues in International Procurement', and McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', respectively chs 11 and 12 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 27 above; McCrudden, 'International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: a Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Procurement Agreement', 2 JIEL (1999) 3; Priess and Pitschas, 'Secondary Criteria and Their Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement - The Case of the German Scientology Declaration', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 171; Spennermann, 'The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement - a Means of Furtherance of Human Rights', 4 Zeitschrift für europa-rechtliche studien (2001) 43.
145. For a detailed discussion see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 13; Arrowsmith, n 90 above; Kruger, Nielsen and Bruun, European Public Contracts in a Labour Law Perspective (1997) passim especially ch V; Kunzlik, 'Environmental Issues in International Procurement', and McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', respectively chs 11 and 12 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 27 above; McCrudden, 'International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: a Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Procurement Agreement', 2 JIEL (1999) 3; Priess and Pitschas, 'Secondary Criteria and Their Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement - The Case of the German Scientology Declaration', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 171; Spennermann, 'The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement - a Means of Furtherance of Human Rights', 4 Zeitschrift für europa-rechtliche studien (2001) 43.
146. For a detailed discussion see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 13; Arrowsmith, n 90 above; Kruger, Nielsen and Bruun, European Public Contracts in a Labour Law Perspective (1997) passim especially ch V; Kunzlik, 'Environmental Issues in International Procurement', and McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', respectively chs 11 and 12 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 27 above; McCrudden, 'International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: a Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Procurement Agreement', 2 JIEL (1999) 3; Priess and Pitschas, 'Secondary Criteria and Their Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement - The Case of the German Scientology Declaration', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 171; Spennermann, 'The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement - a Means of Furtherance of Human Rights', 4 Zeitschrift für europa-rechtliche studien (2001) 43.
147. For a detailed discussion see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 13; Arrowsmith, n 90 above; Kruger, Nielsen and Bruun, European Public Contracts in a Labour Law Perspective (1997) passim especially ch V; Kunzlik, 'Environmental Issues in International Procurement', and McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', respectively chs 11 and 12 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 27 above; McCrudden, 'International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: a Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Procurement Agreement', 2 JIEL (1999) 3; Priess and Pitschas, 'Secondary Criteria and Their Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement - The Case of the German Scientology Declaration', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 171; Spennermann, 'The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement - a Means of Furtherance of Human Rights', 4 Zeitschrift für europa-rechtliche studien (2001) 43.
148. For a detailed discussion see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 13; Arrowsmith, n 90 above; Kruger, Nielsen and Bruun, European Public Contracts in a Labour Law Perspective (1997) passim especially ch V; Kunzlik, 'Environmental Issues in International Procurement', and McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', respectively chs 11 and 12 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 27 above; McCrudden, 'International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: a Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Procurement Agreement', 2 JIEL (1999) 3; Priess and Pitschas, 'Secondary Criteria and Their Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement - The Case of the German Scientology Declaration', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 171; Spennermann, 'The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement - a Means of Furtherance of Human Rights', 4 Zeitschrift für europa-rechtliche studien (2001) 43.
149. For a detailed discussion see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 13; Arrowsmith, n 90 above; Kruger, Nielsen and Bruun, European Public Contracts in a Labour Law Perspective (1997) passim especially ch V; Kunzlik, 'Environmental Issues in International Procurement', and McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', respectively chs 11 and 12 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 27 above; McCrudden, 'International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: a Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Procurement Agreement', 2 JIEL (1999) 3; Priess and Pitschas, 'Secondary Criteria and Their Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement - The Case of the German Scientology Declaration', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 171; Spennermann, 'The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement - a Means of Furtherance of Human Rights', 4 Zeitschrift für europa-rechtliche studien (2001) 43.
150. For a detailed discussion see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, ch 13; Arrowsmith, n 90 above; Kruger, Nielsen and Bruun, European Public Contracts in a Labour Law Perspective (1997) passim especially ch V; Kunzlik, 'Environmental Issues in International Procurement', and McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', respectively chs 11 and 12 in Arrowsmith and Davies, n 27 above; McCrudden, 'International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: a Framework for Discussion of the Legality of "Selective Purchasing" Laws under the WTO Procurement Agreement', 2 JIEL (1999) 3; Priess and Pitschas, 'Secondary Criteria and Their Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement - The Case of the German Scientology Declaration', 9 Public Procurement Law Review (2000) 171; Spennermann, 'The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement - a Means of Furtherance of Human Rights', 4 Zeitschrift für europa-rechtliche studien (2001) 43.
151. United States - Measures Affecting Government Procurement - Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities and Japan (WT/DS88/4, WT/DS95/4, adopted 21 October 1998) ('the Burma/Massachusetts dispute'). On the background see Cleveland, 'Norm Internalisation and U.S. Economic Sanctions', 26 Yale Journal of International Law (2001) 7; Fitzgerald, 'Massachusetts, Burma and the World Trade Organization: A Comment on Blacklisting, Federalism and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era', 34 Cornell International Law Journal (2001) 1 ; Baker, 'Flying over the Judicial Hump: A Human Rights Drama Featuring Burma, the Commonwealth of Massuchusetts, the WTO and the Federal Courts', 32 Law and Policy in International Business (2000) 51.
152. United States - Measures Affecting Government Procurement - Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities and Japan (WT/DS88/4, WT/DS95/4, adopted 21 October 1998) ('the Burma/Massachusetts dispute'). On the background see Cleveland, 'Norm Internalisation and U.S. Economic Sanctions', 26 Yale Journal of International Law (2001) 7; Fitzgerald, 'Massachusetts, Burma and the World Trade Organization: A Comment on Blacklisting, Federalism and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era', 34 Cornell International Law Journal (2001) 1 ; Baker, 'Flying over the Judicial Hump: A Human Rights Drama Featuring Burma, the Commonwealth of Massuchusetts, the WTO and the Federal Courts', 32 Law and Policy in International Business (2000) 51.
153. United States - Measures Affecting Government Procurement - Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities and Japan (WT/DS88/4, WT/DS95/4, adopted 21 October 1998) ('the Burma/Massachusetts dispute'). On the background see Cleveland, 'Norm Internalisation and U.S. Economic Sanctions', 26 Yale Journal of International Law (2001) 7; Fitzgerald, 'Massachusetts, Burma and the World Trade Organization: A Comment on Blacklisting, Federalism and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era', 34 Cornell International Law Journal (2001) 1 ; Baker, 'Flying over the Judicial Hump: A Human Rights Drama Featuring Burma, the Commonwealth of Massuchusetts, the WTO and the Federal Courts', 32 Law and Policy in International Business (2000) 51.
154. United States - Measures Affecting Government Procurement - Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities and Japan (WT/DS88/4, WT/DS95/4, adopted 21 October 1998) ('the Burma/Massachusetts dispute'). On the background see Cleveland, 'Norm Internalisation and U.S. Economic Sanctions', 26 Yale Journal of International Law (2001) 7; Fitzgerald, 'Massachusetts, Burma and the World Trade Organization: A Comment on Blacklisting, Federalism and Internet Advocacy in the Global Trading Era', 34 Cornell International Law Journal (2001) 1 ; Baker, 'Flying over the Judicial Hump: A Human Rights Drama Featuring Burma, the Commonwealth of Massuchusetts, the WTO and the Federal Courts', 32 Law and Policy in International Business (2000) 51.
155. An Act Regulating Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in Burma (Myanmar), ch 130, 1996 Session Laws, Mass Gen Laws Ann, ch 7 223 (West 1997). The law excluded such persons from many contracts and in exceptional cases when they could be admitted because of limited competition established a price preference for other bidders.
156. Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 120 SCt 2288 (2000). See Denning and McCall, Note in 94 American Journal of International Law 750, Linarelli, 'Economic Sanctions and the US Supreme Court: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 10 Public Procurement Law Review (2001) NA91; and Banerjee, 'The Burma Law Dilemma: The Constitutionality of US State and Local Sanctions in the Sphere of Foreign Commerce: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 530 US 2000', 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2000) 293; Stumberg, 'Pre-emption and Human Rights: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 32 Law and Policy in International Business (2000) 109.
157. Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 120 SCt 2288 (2000). See Denning and McCall, Note in 94 American Journal of International Law 750, Linarelli, 'Economic Sanctions and the US Supreme Court: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 10 Public Procurement Law Review (2001) NA91; and Banerjee, 'The Burma Law Dilemma: The Constitutionality of US State and Local Sanctions in the Sphere of Foreign Commerce: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 530 US 2000', 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2000) 293; Stumberg, 'Pre-emption and Human Rights: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 32 Law and Policy in International Business (2000) 109.
158. Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 120 SCt 2288 (2000). See Denning and McCall, Note in 94 American Journal of International Law 750, Linarelli, 'Economic Sanctions and the US Supreme Court: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 10 Public Procurement Law Review (2001) NA91; and Banerjee, 'The Burma Law Dilemma: The Constitutionality of US State and Local Sanctions in the Sphere of Foreign Commerce: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 530 US 2000', 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2000) 293; Stumberg, 'Pre-emption and Human Rights: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 32 Law and Policy in International Business (2000) 109.
159. Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 120 SCt 2288 (2000). See Denning and McCall, Note in 94 American Journal of International Law 750, Linarelli, 'Economic Sanctions and the US Supreme Court: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 10 Public Procurement Law Review (2001) NA91; and Banerjee, 'The Burma Law Dilemma: The Constitutionality of US State and Local Sanctions in the Sphere of Foreign Commerce: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 530 US 2000', 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2000) 293; Stumberg, 'Pre-emption and Human Rights: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 32 Law and Policy in International Business (2000) 109.
160. Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 120 SCt 2288 (2000). See Denning and McCall, Note in 94 American Journal of International Law 750, Linarelli, 'Economic Sanctions and the US Supreme Court: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 10 Public Procurement Law Review (2001) NA91; and Banerjee, 'The Burma Law Dilemma: The Constitutionality of US State and Local Sanctions in the Sphere of Foreign Commerce: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council 530 US 2000', 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2000) 293; Stumberg, 'Pre-emption and Human Rights: Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council', 32 Law and Policy in International Business (2000) 109.
161. United States - Measures Affecting Government Procurement - Lapse of the Authority for the Establishment of the Panel - Note by the Secretariat (WT/DS88/6, WT/DS95/6, adopted 11 February 2000). The panel had previously been requested by the complaining parties to suspend its work: United States Measures Affecting Government Procurement (WT/DS88/5, WT/DS95/5, adopted 10 February 1999).
162. United States - Measures Affecting Government Procurement - Lapse of the Authority for the Establishment of the Panel - Note by the Secretariat (WT/DS88/6, WT/DS95/6, adopted 11 February 2000). The panel had previously been requested by the complaining parties to suspend its work: United States Measures Affecting Government Procurement (WT/DS88/5, WT/DS95/5, adopted 10 February 1999).
163. For further discussion and references see the works cited in n 92 above.
164. Based on the rulings in United States - Restrictions of Imports of Tuna from Mexico (the First 'Tuna Dolphin' Case) (Panel Report unadopted, circulated on 3 September 1991), suggesting extraterritorial measures are not permitted; and United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (the Second 'Tuna Dolphin' Case) (Panel Report unadopted, circulated on 16 June 1994), suggesting that they are not permitted at least when they are directed at securing a change in the policy of another state.
165. Based on the rulings in United States - Restrictions of Imports of Tuna from Mexico (the First 'Tuna Dolphin' Case) (Panel Report unadopted, circulated on 3 September 1991), suggesting extraterritorial measures are not permitted; and United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (the Second 'Tuna Dolphin' Case) (Panel Report unadopted, circulated on 16 June 1994), suggesting that they are not permitted at least when they are directed at securing a change in the policy of another state.
166. See, for example, Korea Appendix 1 Note 3 to Annex 1, Note 3 to Annex 2, and Note 2 to Annex 3; Canada Appendix 1, General Notes Note 1(d); United States Appendix 1, General Notes and Note 2 to Annex 2; Japan Appendix 1 Note 3 to Annex 1, Note 3 to Annex 2 and Note 3 to Annex 3.
167. Where they are discriminatory: GPA Article XXIV.7(c).
168. See further Arrowsmith, n 90 above, at 244-48.
169. In Burma/Massachusetts and reiterated, most recently, in Commission of the European Communities, Commission interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to public procurement and the possibilities for integrating social considerations into public procurement, COM(2001)566 final 15 October 2001 at 1.4.1.
170. See, for example, Kruger, Nielsen, and Bruun, n 92 above, passim; McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', n 92 above; Tobler, 'Encore: "Women's clauses" in public procurement under community law', 25 European Law Review (2000) 618.
171. See, for example, Kruger, Nielsen, and Bruun, n 92 above, passim; McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', n 92 above; Tobler, 'Encore: "Women's clauses" in public procurement under community law', 25 European Law Review (2000) 618.
172. See, for example, Kruger, Nielsen, and Bruun, n 92 above, passim; McCrudden, 'Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: a Legal Overview', n 92 above; Tobler, 'Encore: "Women's clauses" in public procurement under community law', 25 European Law Review (2000) 618.
173. The author likewise gave this insufficient consideration in Arrowsmith, n 90 above.
174. For example, with policies that encourage the development of supplier programmes of equal opportunities, ethical purchasing or other desired practices for the supplier's business generally.
175. It was for this reason that procurement was first used as a tool for promoting equal opportunities policies in the USA: see McCrudden, Public Procurement and Equal Opportunities in the EC: a study of 'contract compliance' in the Member States of the European Community and under European Community Law (1995; unpublished report for the European Commission) 48.
176. See, for example, Arrowsmith, Meyer and Trybus, n 89 above.
177. See, for example, the conclusions of the US review of its policies in Federal Register vol 61 No 101. The review followed the US Supreme Court decision in Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena 515 US 200 (1995) subjecting affirmative action programmes that involve race or ethnic criteria to a standard of 'strict scrutiny'. See also Bercusson, The Fair Wages Resolutions (1998).
178. See, for example, the conclusions of the US review of its policies in Federal Register vol 61 No 101. The review followed the US Supreme Court decision in Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena 515 US 200 (1995) subjecting affirmative action programmes that involve race or ethnic criteria to a standard of 'strict scrutiny'. See also Bercusson, The Fair Wages Resolutions (1998).
179. See, for example, the conclusions of the US review of its policies in Federal Register vol 61 No 101. The review followed the US Supreme Court decision in Adarand Constructors Inc v Pena 515 US 200 (1995) subjecting affirmative action programmes that involve race or ethnic criteria to a standard of 'strict scrutiny'. See also Bercusson, The Fair Wages Resolutions (1998).
180. Cleveland, n 93 above.
181. In other words, it should be permitted to exclude firms convicted of criminal offences without the need to show any concrete impact of the policy.
182. See the review of the debate in the context of labour and environmental norms respectively by McCrudden and Davies, 'A perspective on trade and labour rights', 3 JIEL (2000) 43 and Abdel Motaal, 'Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO Rules: why the Burden should Shift to MEAs', 35 Journal of World Trade (2001) 1215.
183. See the review of the debate in the context of labour and environmental norms respectively by McCrudden and Davies, 'A perspective on trade and labour rights', 3 JIEL (2000) 43 and Abdel Motaal, 'Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO Rules: why the Burden should Shift to MEAs', 35 Journal of World Trade (2001) 1215.
184. The experiences of GATT parties/WTO Members in reviewing regional trading agreements under GATT Article XXIV may be instructive; for political reasons there has been a reluctance to find agreements incompatible with WTO rules. Currently, however, there is a specific provision in Israel's Annexes for review of its offsets policy, although the criteria for review are not stated.
185. The other main common rules are those on aggregation and valuation: see GPA Article II.
186. Clearly there is no element of procurement when the government merely confers a right to exploit an asset or facility without any obligation to provide a public service or benefit.
187. A similar debate has occurred over the application to concessions of the multilateral initiatives, and the scope of the GATT and GATS procurement exclusions: see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 3.2.1.6.
188. Model Law Article 1 and 2(a).
189. UNCITRAL has already produced a guide for national legislators on concessions and similar arrangements: see UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects (2001), available at http://www.uncitral.org.
190. On the sort of procedures used see UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects, n 117 above. In the author's view the procedures set out there are compatible with the GPA.
191. Information obtained from delegates to the Committee on Government Procurement.
192. Canada, Appendix I General Notes to Annexes, Note 2. Several Parties have exclusions covering services procured from other public entities that enjoy special or exclusive rights connected with the service provision, and there are also some explicit exclusions for services procured from entities with which the procuring entity has a 'parent' or subsidiary relationship, especially in the case of utilities.
193. Hoekman and Mavroidis, n 43 above, at 76. See also Evenett, 'Multilateral Disciplines and Government Procurement' in Hoekman, Mattoo and English (eds), Development, Trade and the WTO (forthcoming, World Bank); Hoekman, 'Using International Institutions to Improve Public Procurement', 13 The World Bank Research Observer (1998) 249 at 263.
194. Hoekman and Mavroidis, n 43 above, at 76. See also Evenett, 'Multilateral Disciplines and Government Procurement' in Hoekman, Mattoo and English (eds), Development, Trade and the WTO (forthcoming, World Bank); Hoekman, 'Using International Institutions to Improve Public Procurement', 13 The World Bank Research Observer (1998) 249 at 263.
195. Hoekman and Mavroidis, n 43 above, at 76. See also Evenett, 'Multilateral Disciplines and Government Procurement' in Hoekman, Mattoo and English (eds), Development, Trade and the WTO (forthcoming, World Bank); Hoekman, 'Using International Institutions to Improve Public Procurement', 13 The World Bank Research Observer (1998) 249 at 263.
196. For discussion of this point see Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 5.11.
197. Carrier, n 30 above, section IV.C. See also Carrier, 'Sovereignty under the Agreement on Government Procurement', 6 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (1997) 67 at 102-4. This is the approach adopted under GATT and has recently extended to agriculture.
198. Carrier, n 30 above, section IV.C. See also Carrier, 'Sovereignty under the Agreement on Government Procurement', 6 Minnesota Journal of Global Trade (1997) 67 at 102-4. This is the approach adopted under GATT and has recently extended to agriculture.
199. See Haagsma, 'Gordian Knots in Relation to the GPA: Myth or Reality?', in Gormley, Gordian Knots in Public Procurement Law (1997) 11, at 18.
200. Because of factors such as inadequate information and political pressure to retain policies when they are no longer justified such policies are rarely successful, even in the few cases in which economic theory suggests that they might be beneficial. (See the works cited in Trionfetti, n 2 above.
201. Chadha et al., 'Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations', ch 1 in Hoekman and Martin (eds), Developing Countries and the WTO: A Pro-active Agenda (2001), 4.
202. Olivares has argued that rather then being revoked because they are ineffective these provisions should be made legally enforceable: see Olivares, 'The Case for Giving Effectiveness to GATT/WTO Rules on Developing Countries and LDCs', 35 Journal of World Trade (2001) 545. However, he does not examine how this might work or how provisions might be redrafted to achieve this.
203. It should also be mentioned that the parties are considering extending the benefits of the Agreement to the least developed countries without requiring those countries to accept its burdens. However, the effects of this would be limited (and such effects as there are might even involve trade distortion).
204. Deloltte Touche, Study of Public Procurement Opportunities, European Union, Government of the United States (1994).
205. This point has been stressed by several commentators, for example, Reich, n 8 above, at 353.
206. On its application to the GPA see Dalby, 'Remedies for Infringement of the Government Procurement Agreement', ch 14 in Tyrell and Bedford (eds), Public Procurement in Europe: Enforcement and Remedies (1997); Davies, 'Remedies for Enforcing the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement from the Perspective of the European Community: a Critical Analysis', 20 World Competition (1997) 113; Footer, 'Remedies under the New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement', 4 Public Procurement Law Review (1995) 80; Mavroidis, 'The Trondheim Case: the Remedies Issue', 48 Aussenwirtschaft (1993) 77; Schede, 'The "Trondheim" Provision in the World Trade Organisation up to the Needs of the Private Sector', 5 Public Procurement Law Review (1996) 161; Weiss, 'Dispute Settlement under the "Plurilateral Trade Agreements": The Case of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 15 in Petersmann (ed), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997); Reich, n 8 above, at 312-16.
207. On its application to the GPA see Dalby, 'Remedies for Infringement of the Government Procurement Agreement', ch 14 in Tyrell and Bedford (eds), Public Procurement in Europe: Enforcement and Remedies (1997); Davies, 'Remedies for Enforcing the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement from the Perspective of the European Community: a Critical Analysis', 20 World Competition (1997) 113; Footer, 'Remedies under the New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement', 4 Public Procurement Law Review (1995) 80; Mavroidis, 'The Trondheim Case: the Remedies Issue', 48 Aussenwirtschaft (1993) 77; Schede, 'The "Trondheim" Provision in the World Trade Organisation up to the Needs of the Private Sector', 5 Public Procurement Law Review (1996) 161; Weiss, 'Dispute Settlement under the "Plurilateral Trade Agreements": The Case of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 15 in Petersmann (ed), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997); Reich, n 8 above, at 312-16.
208. On its application to the GPA see Dalby, 'Remedies for Infringement of the Government Procurement Agreement', ch 14 in Tyrell and Bedford (eds), Public Procurement in Europe: Enforcement and Remedies (1997); Davies, 'Remedies for Enforcing the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement from the Perspective of the European Community: a Critical Analysis', 20 World Competition (1997) 113; Footer, 'Remedies under the New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement', 4 Public Procurement Law Review (1995) 80; Mavroidis, 'The Trondheim Case: the Remedies Issue', 48 Aussenwirtschaft (1993) 77; Schede, 'The "Trondheim" Provision in the World Trade Organisation up to the Needs of the Private Sector', 5 Public Procurement Law Review (1996) 161; Weiss, 'Dispute Settlement under the "Plurilateral Trade Agreements": The Case of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 15 in Petersmann (ed), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997); Reich, n 8 above, at 312-16.
209. On its application to the GPA see Dalby, 'Remedies for Infringement of the Government Procurement Agreement', ch 14 in Tyrell and Bedford (eds), Public Procurement in Europe: Enforcement and Remedies (1997); Davies, 'Remedies for Enforcing the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement from the Perspective of the European Community: a Critical Analysis', 20 World Competition (1997) 113; Footer, 'Remedies under the New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement', 4 Public Procurement Law Review (1995) 80; Mavroidis, 'The Trondheim Case: the Remedies Issue', 48 Aussenwirtschaft (1993) 77; Schede, 'The "Trondheim" Provision in the World Trade Organisation up to the Needs of the Private Sector', 5 Public Procurement Law Review (1996) 161; Weiss, 'Dispute Settlement under the "Plurilateral Trade Agreements": The Case of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 15 in Petersmann (ed), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997); Reich, n 8 above, at 312-16.
210. On its application to the GPA see Dalby, 'Remedies for Infringement of the Government Procurement Agreement', ch 14 in Tyrell and Bedford (eds), Public Procurement in Europe: Enforcement and Remedies (1997); Davies, 'Remedies for Enforcing the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement from the Perspective of the European Community: a Critical Analysis', 20 World Competition (1997) 113; Footer, 'Remedies under the New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement', 4 Public Procurement Law Review (1995) 80; Mavroidis, 'The Trondheim Case: the Remedies Issue', 48 Aussenwirtschaft (1993) 77; Schede, 'The "Trondheim" Provision in the World Trade Organisation up to the Needs of the Private Sector', 5 Public Procurement Law Review (1996) 161; Weiss, 'Dispute Settlement under the "Plurilateral Trade Agreements": The Case of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 15 in Petersmann (ed), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997); Reich, n 8 above, at 312-16.
211. On its application to the GPA see Dalby, 'Remedies for Infringement of the Government Procurement Agreement', ch 14 in Tyrell and Bedford (eds), Public Procurement in Europe: Enforcement and Remedies (1997); Davies, 'Remedies for Enforcing the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement from the Perspective of the European Community: a Critical Analysis', 20 World Competition (1997) 113; Footer, 'Remedies under the New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement', 4 Public Procurement Law Review (1995) 80; Mavroidis, 'The Trondheim Case: the Remedies Issue', 48 Aussenwirtschaft (1993) 77; Schede, 'The "Trondheim" Provision in the World Trade Organisation up to the Needs of the Private Sector', 5 Public Procurement Law Review (1996) 161; Weiss, 'Dispute Settlement under the "Plurilateral Trade Agreements": The Case of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 15 in Petersmann (ed), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997); Reich, n 8 above, at 312-16.
212. On its application to the GPA see Dalby, 'Remedies for Infringement of the Government Procurement Agreement', ch 14 in Tyrell and Bedford (eds), Public Procurement in Europe: Enforcement and Remedies (1997); Davies, 'Remedies for Enforcing the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement from the Perspective of the European Community: a Critical Analysis', 20 World Competition (1997) 113; Footer, 'Remedies under the New GATT Agreement on Government Procurement', 4 Public Procurement Law Review (1995) 80; Mavroidis, 'The Trondheim Case: the Remedies Issue', 48 Aussenwirtschaft (1993) 77; Schede, 'The "Trondheim" Provision in the World Trade Organisation up to the Needs of the Private Sector', 5 Public Procurement Law Review (1996) 161; Weiss, 'Dispute Settlement under the "Plurilateral Trade Agreements": The Case of the Agreement on Government Procurement', ch 15 in Petersmann (ed), International Trade Law and the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System (1997); Reich, n 8 above, at 312-16.
213. Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 14.4. The Committee's activities mainly involve reviewing implementing measures and collecting statistics under GPA Article XIX.5.
214. See further Dalby, n 131 above; Davies, n 131 above; Footer, n 131 above; Reich, n 8 above, at 307-12 and 333-40; Dendauw, 'New WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: an Analysis of the Framework for Bid Challenge Procedures and the Question of Direct Effect', 18 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2000) 254. On implementation see Cameron May, Business Opportunities and the Government Procurement Agreement: a Handbook for EU Companies (1998) (which provides a very brief description of challenge procedures in each country chapter).
215. See further Dalby, n 131 above; Davies, n 131 above; Footer, n 131 above; Reich, n 8 above, at 307-12 and 333-40; Dendauw, 'New WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: an Analysis of the Framework for Bid Challenge Procedures and the Question of Direct Effect', 18 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2000) 254. On implementation see Cameron May, Business Opportunities and the Government Procurement Agreement: a Handbook for EU Companies (1998) (which provides a very brief description of challenge procedures in each country chapter).
216. See further Dalby, n 131 above; Davies, n 131 above; Footer, n 131 above; Reich, n 8 above, at 307-12 and 333-40; Dendauw, 'New WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: an Analysis of the Framework for Bid Challenge Procedures and the Question of Direct Effect', 18 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2000) 254. On implementation see Cameron May, Business Opportunities and the Government Procurement Agreement: a Handbook for EU Companies (1998) (which provides a very brief description of challenge procedures in each country chapter).
217. See further Dalby, n 131 above; Davies, n 131 above; Footer, n 131 above; Reich, n 8 above, at 307-12 and 333-40; Dendauw, 'New WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: an Analysis of the Framework for Bid Challenge Procedures and the Question of Direct Effect', 18 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2000) 254. On implementation see Cameron May, Business Opportunities and the Government Procurement Agreement: a Handbook for EU Companies (1998) (which provides a very brief description of challenge procedures in each country chapter).
218. See further Dalby, n 131 above; Davies, n 131 above; Footer, n 131 above; Reich, n 8 above, at 307-12 and 333-40; Dendauw, 'New WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: an Analysis of the Framework for Bid Challenge Procedures and the Question of Direct Effect', 18 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2000) 254. On implementation see Cameron May, Business Opportunities and the Government Procurement Agreement: a Handbook for EU Companies (1998) (which provides a very brief description of challenge procedures in each country chapter).
219. See further Dalby, n 131 above; Davies, n 131 above; Footer, n 131 above; Reich, n 8 above, at 307-12 and 333-40; Dendauw, 'New WTO Agreement on Government Procurement: an Analysis of the Framework for Bid Challenge Procedures and the Question of Direct Effect', 18 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (2000) 254. On implementation see Cameron May, Business Opportunities and the Government Procurement Agreement: a Handbook for EU Companies (1998) (which provides a very brief description of challenge procedures in each country chapter).
220. Most notably under Article 4 Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection; GATT Article X; Article VI (2) GATS; Article XI Agreement on the Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Agreement on Customs Valuation); Article 23 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Under the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Measures (TRIPS) Article 42 states must also give holders of IP rights remedies to enforce their rights against public or private entities.
221. Under GATT Article X, states must make available procedures for review of customs matters before an independent body; but there is an exception to the independence requirement for review mechanisms that already exist.
222. See, in particular, List of the Issues Raised and Points Made, n 13 above, item VIII, 'Domestic review procedures', item X, 'Notification', and item XI, 'WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures'.
223. This possibility was suggested by the USA during the Uruguay Round but rejected (see de Graaf and King, n 30 above, at 440), and is also favoured by Reich, n 8 above, at 339.
224. This possibility was suggested by the USA during the Uruguay Round but rejected (see de Graaf and King, n 30 above, at 440), and is also favoured by Reich, n 8 above, at 339.
225. European Commission The Single Market Review subseries III, Dismantling of Barriers, Vol 2, Public Procurement (1997). See also Marshall, Meurer and Richard, 'Curbing Agency Problems in the procurement process by protest oversight', 25 Rand Journal of Economics 297-317 (1994).
226. European Commission The Single Market Review subseries III, Dismantling of Barriers, Vol 2, Public Procurement (1997). See also Marshall, Meurer and Richard, 'Curbing Agency Problems in the procurement process by protest oversight', 25 Rand Journal of Economics 297-317 (1994).
227. Since the EC's own rules are more stringent - for example, requiring damages for lost profits.
228. See Arrowsmith, n 1 above, at 14.4.
229. It will be difficult to provide a compensation remedy which depends on proof of actual loss.