Surplus equivalence of leveled commitment contracts

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 142, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 239-264

  Faratin, P ^a   Sierra, C ^b   Jennings, N R ^c  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IIIA CSIC   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Automated contracting; Automated negotiation; Bargaining; Bargaining under uncertainty; Breach; Breach of contract; Contracting; Game theory; Mechanism design; Multiagent systems

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; GAME THEORY; OUTSOURCING; PROBABILITY; SOCIAL ASPECTS;

AUTOMATED NEGOTIATIONS;

MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 0036888594     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(02)00275-8     Document Type: Conference Paper

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