The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 169-191

  Busch, Lutz Alexander ^a,b   Horstmann, Ignatius J ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO   (Canada)

Author keywords

Agenda determination; Implementation rules; Multi issue bargainning; Signaling

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036869766     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00505-5     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Admati, A., Perry, M., 1987. Strategic delay in bargaining. Rev. Econ. Stud. LIV, 345-364.
2. Avery, C., Zemsky, P.B., 1994. Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining. Games Econ. Behav. 7, 154-168.
3. Bac, M., Raff, H., 1996. Issue-by-issue negotiations: The role of information and time preferences. Games Econ. Behav. 13, 125-134.
4. Busch, L.-A., Horstmann, I., 1997a. A comment on issue-by-issue negotiations. Games Econ. Behav. 19, 144-148.
5. Busch, L.-A., Horstmann, I., 1997b. Bargaining frictions, bargaining procedures and implied costs in multiple-issue bargaining. Economica 64, 669-680.
6. Busch, L.-A., Horstmann, I., 1999a. Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information. Econ. Theory 13, 561-576.
7. Busch, L.-A., Horstmann, I., 1999b. Endogenous incomplete contracts: A bargaining approach. Can. J.Econ. 32, 956-975.
8. Busch, L.-A., Wen, Q., 1995. Perfect equilibria in a negotiation model. Econometrica 63, 545-565.
9. Busch, L.-A., Shi, S., Wen, Q., 1998. Bargaining with surplus destruction. Can. J. Econ. 31, 915-931.
10. Cho, I., 1987. A refinement of sequential equilibrium. Econometrica 55, 1367-1389.
11. Cho, I., Kreps, D., 1987. Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quart. J. Econ. CII 179-221.
12. Churchman, D., 1995. Negotiation Process, Tactics, Theory, 2nd Ed. University Press of America, Lanham, NY.
13. Fernandez, R., Glazer, J., 1991. Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents. Amer. Econ. Rev. 81, 240-252.
14. Fershtman, C., 1990. The importance of the agenda in bargaining. Games Econ. Behav. 2, 224-238.
15. Fershtman, C., 2000. A note on multi-issue two-sided bargaining: Bilateral procedures. Games Econ. Behav. 30, 216-227.
16. Fudenberg, D., Levine, D., Tirole, J., 1985. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. In: Roth, A. (Ed.), Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 73-98.
17. Grossman, S., Perry, M., 1986. Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information. J. Econ. Theory 39, 120-154.
18. Haller, H., Holden, S., 1990. A letter to the editor on wage bargaining. J. Econ. Theory 52, 232-236.
19. Herrero, M.J., 1989. Single-package versus issue-by-issue bargaining. Mimeo.
20. In, Y., Serrano, R., 2000. First things first: Setting the agenda in multi-issue bargaining. Working paper No. 00-8, Department of Economics, Brown University.
21. Inderst, R., 2000. Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda. Games Econ. Behav. 30, 64-82.
22. Kalai, E., 1977. Proportional solutions to bargaining situations: Interpersonal utility comparisons. Econometrica 45, 1623-1630.
23. Jun, B., 1989. Non-cooperative bargaining and union formation. Rev. Econ. Stud. 56, 59-76.
24. Lang, K., Rosenthal, R.W., 2001. Bargaining piecemeal or all at once? Econ. J., forthcoming.
25. Lewis, D.V., 1981. Power Negotiating Tactics and Techniques. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
26. Muthoo, A., 1999. Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
27. Ponsati, C., Watson, J., 1997. Multiple issue bargaining and axiomatic solutions. Int. J. Game Theory 26, 501-524.
28. Ramundo, B.A., 1992. Effective Negotiation: A Guide to Dialogue Management and Control. Quorum Books, New York.
29. Rubinstein, A., 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50, 97-110.
30. Rubinstein, A., 1985. A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences. Econometrica 53, 1151-1171.
31. Rubinstein, A., 1987. A sequential strategic theory of bargaining. In: Bewley, T. (Ed.), Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 197-224.
32. Weinberger, C.J., 2000. Selective acceptance and inefficiency in a two-issue complete information bargaining game. Games Econ. Behav. 31 (2), 262-293.
33. Wilson, R., 1987. Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes. In: Bewley, T. (Ed.), Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.