Attracting FDI in a politically risky world

International Economic Review

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 1127-1155

  Janeba, Eckhard ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036853215     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.t01-1-00051     Document Type: Article

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