Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'

Mind and Language

Volumn 17, Issue 5, 2002, Pages 467-488

  Macdonald, Cynthia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY   (New Zealand)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036840075     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0017.00208     Document Type: Article

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