Smuggling and Bhagwati's nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas

Review of International Economics

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 729-748

  Larue, Bruno ^a   Lapan, Harvey E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

^b IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

QUOTA SYSTEM; TARIFF STRUCTURE; THEORETICAL STUDY; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 0036839799     PISSN: 09657576     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9396.00361     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas
2. On the equivalence of tariffs and quotas
3. A theoretical analysis of smuggling
4. Smuggling and trade policy
5. Tax sheltering and the cost of evasion
6. A note on preferential and illegal trade under quantitative restrictions
7. Domestic monopoly and redundant tariff protection
8. Why do large countries prefer quantitative trade restrictions?
9. Incremental protection and efficient political choice between tariffs and quotas
10. Optimal commodity taxation with costly noncompliance
11. Smuggling, trade and price disparity: A crime-theoretic approach
12. Black markets and optimal evadable taxation
13. When are a tariff and a quota equivalent?
14. The interaction of tariffs and quotas
15. Smuggling and price disparity
16. Tariffs vs quotas with implicit collusion
17. A note on the equivalence of tariffs and quotas
18. Smuggling, production and welfare
19. The ranking of alternative tariff and quota policies in the presence of domestic monopoly
20. Smuggling, camouflaging, and market structure
21. A note on the equivalence of tariffs and quotas