Corruption: Top down or bottom up?

Economic Inquiry

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 688-703

  Waller, Christopher J ^a   Verdier, Thierry ^b   Gardner, Roy ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

^b Department and Laboratory of Theoretical and Applied Economics ^*  (France)

^c INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036795873     PISSN: 00952583     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ei/40.4.688     Document Type: Article

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