Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 825-844

  Hokari, Toru ^a  

^a KYOTO UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036771901     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550200160     Document Type: Article

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