The competitive effects of resale versus facility-based entry: Evidence from the long-distance market

Telecommunications Policy

Volumn 26, Issue 7-8, 2002, Pages 415-424

  Kaserman, David L ^a   Ulrich, Marc ^b  

^a AUBURN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Econ One Research Inc   (United States)

Author keywords

Facilities based; InterLATA; Resale

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; PUBLIC POLICY; QUALITY OF SERVICE;

TELECOMMUNICATION MARKET;

TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY;

EID: 0036670711     PISSN: 03085961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0308-5961(02)00023-X     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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4. Related market conditions and interindustrial mergers
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7. Competition and asymmetric regulation in long-distance telecommunications: An assessment of the evidence
8. An efficient avoided cost pricing rule for resale of local exchange telephone service
9. Competition in the US long distance market
10. Bilateral monopoly, successive monopoly, and vertical integration
11. A regulated firm's incentive to discriminate: A reevaluation and extension of Weisman's result
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13. Vertically integrated utilities: The regulators' poison'd chalice
14. Regulation and the vertically integrated firm: The case of RBOC entry into interLATA long distance
15. The incentive to discriminate by a vertically integrated regulated firm: A reply