Optimum tariffs and retaliation revisited: How country size matters

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 69, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 707-727

  Syropoulos, Constantinos ^a  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FREE TRADE; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; MONOPOLY; TARIFF STRUCTURE; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036655502     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.t01-1-00028     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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4. Trading blocs and the sustainability of inter-regional cooperation
5. Gradualism in trade agreements with asymmetric countries
6. The normative theory of international trade
7. Strategic aspects of trade policy
8. Tariffs, retaliation and the elasticity of demand for imports
9. A note on the optimal tariff, retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in a framework with intra-industry trade
10. Trade wars and trade talks
11. Optimal tariff calculations in alternative trade models and possible implications for current world trading arrangements
12. Optimum tariffs and tariff policy
13. Optimum tariffs and retaliation
14. Do big countries win tariff wars?
15. Is bilateralism bad?
16. Specific and ad valorem tariffs are not equivalent in trade wars
17. Theoretical considerations of negotiated tariff adjustments
18. Endogenous tariff formation
19. Size, sunk costs, and judge Bowker's objection to free trade
20. Strategic equilibrium of tariffs and general equilibrium
21. A reconsideration of the theory of tariffs
22. Customs unions and comparative advantage
23. On tariff preferences and delegation decisions in customs unions: A Heckscher-Ohlin approach
24. The optimum quota and retaliation