Democratization and urban bias in postcommunist Russia

Comparative Politics

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 457-476

  Wegren, Stephen K ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0036637958     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4146948     Document Type: Review

References (62)

1. There are exceptions. For example, China pursued a rural bias policy during 1978-1984. See Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, eds., The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1985); Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
2. There are exceptions. For example, China pursued a rural bias policy during 1978-1984. See Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, eds., The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1985); Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
3. Robert H. Bates, "Urban Bias: A Fresh Look," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (July 1993), 225.
4. Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development (Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).
5. See Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Robert H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Yahya M. Sadowski, Political Vegetables? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991); special issue "Beyond Urban Bias," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (July 1993); and William C. Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). The eloquence of the model did not make it immune to attack. See T. J. Byres, "Of Neo-Populist Pipe-Dreams: Daedalus in the Third World and the Myth of Urban Bias," Journal of Peasant Studies, 6 (January 1979), 210-44.
6. See Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Robert H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Yahya M. Sadowski, Political Vegetables? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991); special issue "Beyond Urban Bias," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (July 1993); and William C. Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). The eloquence of the model did not make it immune to attack. See T. J. Byres, "Of Neo-Populist Pipe-Dreams: Daedalus in the Third World and the Myth of Urban Bias," Journal of Peasant Studies, 6 (January 1979), 210-44.
7. See Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Robert H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Yahya M. Sadowski, Political Vegetables? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991); special issue "Beyond Urban Bias," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (July 1993); and William C. Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). The eloquence of the model did not make it immune to attack. See T. J. Byres, "Of Neo-Populist Pipe-Dreams: Daedalus in the Third World and the Myth of Urban Bias," Journal of Peasant Studies, 6 (January 1979), 210-44.
8. See Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Robert H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Yahya M. Sadowski, Political Vegetables? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991); special issue "Beyond Urban Bias," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (July 1993); and William C. Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). The eloquence of the model did not make it immune to attack. See T. J. Byres, "Of Neo-Populist Pipe-Dreams: Daedalus in the Third World and the Myth of Urban Bias," Journal of Peasant Studies, 6 (January 1979), 210-44.
9. See Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Robert H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Yahya M. Sadowski, Political Vegetables? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991); special issue "Beyond Urban Bias," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (July 1993); and William C. Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). The eloquence of the model did not make it immune to attack. See T. J. Byres, "Of Neo-Populist Pipe-Dreams: Daedalus in the Third World and the Myth of Urban Bias," Journal of Peasant Studies, 6 (January 1979), 210-44.
10. See Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981); Robert H. Bates, Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); Yahya M. Sadowski, Political Vegetables? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991); special issue "Beyond Urban Bias," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (July 1993); and William C. Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). The eloquence of the model did not make it immune to attack. See T. J. Byres, "Of Neo-Populist Pipe-Dreams: Daedalus in the Third World and the Myth of Urban Bias," Journal of Peasant Studies, 6 (January 1979), 210-44.
11. Ashutosh Varshney, "Urban Bias in Perspective," Journal of Development Studies, 29 (July 1993), 4.
12. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa, p. 33.
13. Rossiyskoy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1999), p. 493.
14. On these points see Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa, chs. 2, 3.
15. Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), pp. 279-82.
16. N. Rafikova, "Vliyaniye tsen na sebestoimost' sel'skokhozyaystvennoy produktsii" [The Influence of Prices on the Cost of Agricultural Production], Ekonomist, 8 (August 1999), 91.
17. V. Kukharenko, "Sovershenstvovaniye bazy sel'skogo stroitel'stva" [Perfecting the Base of Rural Construction], Ekonomist, 11 (November 1998), 88.
18. Calculated from Sel'skoye khozyaystvo v Rossii (Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000), pp. 32, 120.
19. Sel'skaya zhizn', Sept. 9, 1999, p. 3.
20. "World Trade: Fifty Years On," The Economic, May 16, 1998, p. 22.
21. In January 2001 import tariffs on thousands of goods, both food and nonfood, were lowered in response to government instructions. In general, new import tariffs will be somewhat lower than previously, averaging 11-13 percent, although officials at the Committee on State Customs complained that tariffs were being changed without any clear policy as to which producers the state wants to protect from foreign competition. See Moscow Times, Dec. 1, 2000, p. 1.
22. Calculated from data in FAO databases at http://apps.fao.org.
23. Data from Russian ministry of agriculture and foodstuffs website, www.aris.ru/.
24. A. Zakhryapin, "Sovremennoe sostoyaniye agropromyshlennogo kompleksa" [The Contemporary Status of the Agroindustrial Complex], Ekonomist, 1 (January 2000), 86.
25. Krest'yanskiye vedomosti, Jan. 18-24, 1999, p. 1; data from FAS website, http://www.fas.usda.gov.
26. See Stephen K. Wegren, Agriculture and the State in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), chs. 3-7.
27. Set'skaya zhizn', Mar. 29, 1990, p. 2.
28. Krest'yanskaya rossiya, June 19-25, 2000, p. 2.
29. See Zemlevladelets, 1 (July 1995), 2-3.
30. See V. I. Naumov, "Rosagropromsoyuz zashchaet interesy tovaroproizvoditeliy APK" [The Agroindustrial Union of Russia Defends the Interests of Producers in the APK], Ekonomika sel'skokhozyaystvennykh i pererabatyvayushchikh predpriyatiy, 2 (February 2000), 10-12.
31. Krest'yanskaya rossiya, July 24-30, 1995, p. 2.
32. Rossiiskii fermer, June 13-19, 1995, p. 3.
33. Rossiiskii fermer, March 14-20, 1995, pp. 3-4.
34. Quotations from APR party program in Zemlya i trud, Dec. 20-26, 1994, pp. 3-4; and Programma Ustav Agrarnoy Partii Rossii (Moscow: APR, 1995), pp. 16-18.
35. Quotations from APR party program in Zemlya i trud, Dec. 20-26, 1994, pp. 3-4; and Programma Ustav Agrarnoy Partii Rossii (Moscow: APR, 1995), pp. 16-18.
36. Robert H. Bates and William P. Rogerson, "Agricultural in Development: A Coalitional Analysis," Public Choice, 35 (Winter 1980), 523.
37. Agropromyshlenniyy kompleks Rossii (Moscow: Ministry of Agriculture, 2000), p. 3. Privatized land includes agricultural land held by members of agricultural enterprises in the form of land shares for which land deeds have been distributed (about 85 percent of all privatized land), land plots possessed by the population for various types of family garden plots (about six to seven percent of all privatized land), and land used by private farmers (about seven percent of all privatized land).
38. In May 1999 the Duma passed a draft federal law on price parity, which then-president Yeltsin refused to sign into law. See Krest'yanskiye vedomosti, July 19-25, 1999, p. 2.
39. Election data from the Carnegie Institute for Peace website http://pubs.carnegie.ru/.
40. The APR fares better in southern agricultural regions, the so-called red belt of Russia. See John O'Loughlin, Michael Shin, and Paul Talbot, "Political Geographies and Cleavages in the Russian Parliamentary Elections," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 37 (June 1996), 355-85.
41. According to official statistics, there are three to four members per private farm, including children, and there were about 260,000 private farms in January 2000. The rural population in Russia was more than 39,000,000 in 2000.
42. The party was later renamed Russia's Democratic Choice. Renata Yanbykh, "Driving Forces in Russian Agrarian Policy during the 1990s," in L. Alexander Norsworthy, ed., Russian Views of the Transition in the Rural Sector (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000), p. 49.
43. Krest'yanskaya rossiya, June 6-12, 1994, p. 12.
44. Karen Brooks et al., Agricultural Reform in Russia: A View from the Farm Level, World Bank Discussion Paper no. 327 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1996), ch. 5.
45. S. Sazonov, "Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie aspekty razvitiya fermerskogo dvizheniya v Rossii" [Social-Economic Aspects of the Development of the Private Farm Movement in Russia], APK: Ekonomika, upravleniye, 5 (May 1995), 57.
46. Krest'yanskiye vedomosti, July 24-30, 1995, p. 1.
47. Election data from the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://pubs.carnegie.ru/.
48. Krest'yanskiye vedomosti, Feb. 15-21, 1999, p. 3.
49. Sel'skaya zhizn', Dec. 16, 1999, p. 9.
50. Finansovyye izvestiya, Apr. 14-20, 1994, p. 3.
51. Krest'yanskiye vedomosti, Sept. 6-12, 1999, p. 1.
52. Data from State Duma website, http://www.duma.ru/.
53. Ibid. Conservative parties and factions had higher levels of internal solidarity in voting, reflecting party discipline. During 1996-1999 the Communist Party voted together an average of almost 87 percent of the time, and Agrarian Deputies voted together on 77 percent of bills.
54. The agrarian faction in the Duma was created as a consequence of a decision by the Communist Party to donate fifteen of its own deputies in order to meet the size requirements for a faction.
55. On social problems during the 1990s see B. Deineko and D. Toropov, "Sotsial'noye razvitiye sela: problemy i tendentsii" [Social Development of the Countryside: Problems and Tendencies], APK: ekonomika, upravleniye, 5 (May 2000), 21-29.
56. Sel'skaya zhizn', Aug. 19, 1999, p. 3.
57. Krest'yanskiye vedomosti, Sept. 13-19, 1999, p. 5.
58. Ralph S. Clem and Peter R. Craumer, "Regional Patterns of Political Preference in Russia: The December 1999 Duma Elections," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 41 (January 2000), 19. Overall, OVR captured nearly 14 percent of the vote, or more than 8.8 million votes. It won seventy-seven seats, third behind the Communist Party and the progovernment bloc Unity.
59. Sel'skaya zhizn', Oct. 28-Nov. 3, 1999, pp. 3-4.
60. Ibid., Aug. 24, 1999, p. 1.
61. Ibid., Aug. 31, 1999, p. 1.
62. Ibid., Oct. 21-27, 1999, pp. 7-10.