Can there be a "duty to die" without a normative theory?

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 266-272

  Seay, Gary ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FAMILY; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE COST; HEALTH CARE FINANCING; HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION; HUMAN; LIVING WILL; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; MEDICAL ETHICS; METHODOLOGY; MORALITY; PATIENT RIGHT; REVIEW; THEORY;

EID: 0036627258     PISSN: 09631801     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0963180102113077     Document Type: Review

References (37)

1. Hardwig J. Is There a Duty to Die? and Other Essays in Bioethics. New York: Routledge, 2000:34, 132, 174-5.
2. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:120.
3. Hardwig J. What about the family? the role of family interests in medical decision making (1990), reprinted in: Is There a Duty to Die? (see note 1, Hardwig 2000:29-43); Hardwig J. The problem of proxies with interests of their own: toward a better theory of proxy decisions (1993), reprinted in: Is There a Duty to Die? (see note 1, Hardwig 2000:45-60).
4. Hardwig J. What about the family? the role of family interests in medical decision making (1990), reprinted in: Is There a Duty to Die? (see note 1, Hardwig 2000:29-43); Hardwig J. The problem of proxies with interests of their own: toward a better theory of proxy decisions (1993), reprinted in: Is There a Duty to Die? (see note 1, Hardwig 2000:45-60).
5. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:9-27.
6. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:3-4, 35. Here he means that the currently accepted version of the principle should be abandoned, to be replaced by a revised version (see below) that is not vulnerable to these objections.
7. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:121-2.
8. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:31, 49-51.
9. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:122-3.
10. That major, long-term disability, and the associated needs for care not provided by HMOs, can have a truly disastrous effect on the quality of life of family members can be seen from Carol Levine's recent personal account. Levine C. The loneliness of the long-term care giver. The New England Journal of Medicine 1999;340(20):1587-90.
11. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:48-9. Hardwig is not the first philosopher to take this position. See: Brandt R. Defective newborns and the morality of termination. In: Kohl M, ed. Infanticide and the Value of Life. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1978; Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants. London: Oxford University Press, 1985:146 55. For an opposing view, see: Weir R. Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns: Moral Dilemmas in Neonatal Medicine. London: Oxford University Press, 1984:195-6.
12. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:48-9. Hardwig is not the first philosopher to take this position. See: Brandt R. Defective newborns and the morality of termination. In: Kohl M, ed. Infanticide and the Value of Life. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1978; Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants. London: Oxford University Press, 1985:146-55. For an opposing view, see: Weir R. Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns: Moral Dilemmas in Neonatal Medicine. London: Oxford University Press, 1984:195-6.
13. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:48-9. Hardwig is not the first philosopher to take this position. See: Brandt R. Defective newborns and the morality of termination. In: Kohl M, ed. Infanticide and the Value of Life. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1978; Kuhse H, Singer P. Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants. London: Oxford University Press, 1985:146-55. For an opposing view, see: Weir R. Selective Nontreatment of Handicapped Newborns: Moral Dilemmas in Neonatal Medicine. London: Oxford University Press, 1984:195-6.
14. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:36.
15. On Hardwig's view, both medical and nonmedical interests of each affected person are to be taken into account, with all interests counted the same. "[P]rima facie," he writes, "equal interests deserve equal consideration." See note 1, Hardwig 2000:54, also 3, 35, 123.
16. Hardwig contends that an appeal to familial duties of loyalty, family solidarity, self-sacrifice, or care are not sufficient to overcome the duty to die in cases where that duty obtains, for these familial duties are also obligations of the patient no less than of the family. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:124.
17. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:33, 37-8, 53.
18. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:120-1.
19. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:33.
20. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:31-2, 127.
21. Hardwig often prefers to use the term "responsibilities" (see note 1, Hardwig 2000:37-8), but it is clear that he intends it as interchangeable with "duties" and "obligations." See note 1, Hardwig 2000:32, 120-4, 127-33.
22. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:52-5.
23. Velleman JD. A right of self-termination? Ethics 1999;109(3):606-28.
24. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:6.
25. I owe this example to James Lindemann Nelson, who suggested it in a discussion with Prof. Hardwig, but I have added some details.
26. That the young woman's views on abortion are probably not shared by her parents would almost certainly be irrelevant on Hardwig's view. He holds that, for better or worse, the lives of family members are closely linked, and that an antagonistic relationship between a patient and her family does not make their concerns less relevant in decisions about her treatment (see note 1, Hardwig 2000:3 [endnote 2]).
27. This objection was suggested by Rick O'Neil, in a discussion with Prof. Hardwig.
28. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:16-20.
29. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:10.
30. See note 1, Hardwig 2000:17.
31. Philosophers who have been persuaded by the writings of Jonathan Dancy, Bernard Williams, and other proponents of particularism are likely to find this whole train of argument unconvincing. Dancy J. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; Williams B. Moral Luck. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981:ix-x, 12-9; see also MacIntyre A. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988. But it is very much an unresolved question in moral philosophy whether particularists are able to give a plausible account of practical reasoning at all. See, for example: Hooker B. Moral particularism: wrong and bad. In: Hooker B, Little M, eds. Mortal Particularism. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 2000:1-22; also Blackburn S. Ruling Passions. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 1998:225-6, 308; also Gewirth A. Ethical universalism and particularism. The Journal of Philosophy 1988;85:283-302; and Scanlon T. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998:161.
32. Philosophers who have been persuaded by the writings of Jonathan Dancy, Bernard Williams, and other proponents of particularism are likely to find this whole train of argument unconvincing. Dancy J. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; Williams B. Moral Luck. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981:ix-x, 12-9; see also MacIntyre A. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988. But it is very much an unresolved question in moral philosophy whether particularists are able to give a plausible account of practical reasoning at all. See, for example: Hooker B. Moral particularism: wrong and bad. In: Hooker B, Little M, eds. Mortal Particularism. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 2000:1-22; also Blackburn S. Ruling Passions. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 1998:225-6, 308; also Gewirth A. Ethical universalism and particularism. The Journal of Philosophy 1988;85:283-302; and Scanlon T. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998:161.
33. Philosophers who have been persuaded by the writings of Jonathan Dancy, Bernard Williams, and other proponents of particularism are likely to find this whole train of argument unconvincing. Dancy J. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; Williams B. Moral Luck. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981:ix-x, 12-9; see also MacIntyre A. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988. But it is very much an unresolved question in moral philosophy whether particularists are able to give a plausible account of practical reasoning at all. See, for example: Hooker B. Moral particularism: wrong and bad. In: Hooker B, Little M, eds. Mortal Particularism. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 2000:1-22; also Blackburn S. Ruling Passions. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 1998:225-6, 308; also Gewirth A. Ethical universalism and particularism. The Journal of Philosophy 1988;85:283-302; and Scanlon T. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998:161.
34. Philosophers who have been persuaded by the writings of Jonathan Dancy, Bernard Williams, and other proponents of particularism are likely to find this whole train of argument unconvincing. Dancy J. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; Williams B. Moral Luck. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981:ix-x, 12-9; see also MacIntyre A. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988. But it is very much an unresolved question in moral philosophy whether particularists are able to give a plausible account of practical reasoning at all. See, for example: Hooker B. Moral particularism: wrong and bad. In: Hooker B, Little M, eds. Mortal Particularism. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 2000:1-22; also Blackburn S. Ruling Passions. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 1998:225-6, 308; also Gewirth A. Ethical universalism and particularism. The Journal of Philosophy 1988;85:283-302; and Scanlon T. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998:161.
35. Philosophers who have been persuaded by the writings of Jonathan Dancy, Bernard Williams, and other proponents of particularism are likely to find this whole train of argument unconvincing. Dancy J. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; Williams B. Moral Luck. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981:ix-x, 12-9; see also MacIntyre A. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988. But it is very much an unresolved question in moral philosophy whether particularists are able to give a plausible account of practical reasoning at all. See, for example: Hooker B. Moral particularism: wrong and bad. In: Hooker B, Little M, eds. Mortal Particularism. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 2000:1-22; also Blackburn S. Ruling Passions. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 1998:225-6, 308; also Gewirth A. Ethical universalism and particularism. The Journal of Philosophy 1988;85:283-302; and Scanlon T. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998:161.
36. Philosophers who have been persuaded by the writings of Jonathan Dancy, Bernard Williams, and other proponents of particularism are likely to find this whole train of argument unconvincing. Dancy J. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; Williams B. Moral Luck. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981:ix-x, 12-9; see also MacIntyre A. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988. But it is very much an unresolved question in moral philosophy whether particularists are able to give a plausible account of practical reasoning at all. See, for example: Hooker B. Moral particularism: wrong and bad. In: Hooker B, Little M, eds. Mortal Particularism. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 2000:1-22; also Blackburn S. Ruling Passions. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 1998:225-6, 308; also Gewirth A. Ethical universalism and particularism. The Journal of Philosophy 1988;85:283-302; and Scanlon T. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998:161.
37. Philosophers who have been persuaded by the writings of Jonathan Dancy, Bernard Williams, and other proponents of particularism are likely to find this whole train of argument unconvincing. Dancy J. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; Williams B. Moral Luck. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981:ix-x, 12-9; see also MacIntyre A. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1988. But it is very much an unresolved question in moral philosophy whether particularists are able to give a plausible account of practical reasoning at all. See, for example: Hooker B. Moral particularism: wrong and bad. In: Hooker B, Little M, eds. Mortal Particularism. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 2000:1-22; also Blackburn S. Ruling Passions. London: Oxford University Press (Clarendon), 1998:225-6, 308; also Gewirth A. Ethical universalism and particularism. The Journal of Philosophy 1988;85:283-302; and Scanlon T. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998:161.