Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing

Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 49-64

  Gupta, Barnali ^a   Venkatu, Guhan ^b  

^a MIAMI UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND   (United States)

Author keywords

Delivered pricing; Duopoly; Location; Tacit collusion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036614785     PISSN: 09318658     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s712-002-8220-0     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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6. Horizontal mergers and collusive behavior
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9. A noncooperative equilibrium for supergames
10. Noncooperative collusion under imperfect price information
11. Endogenous product design in an infinitely repeated game
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13. Stability in competition
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19. Cheating on collusive agreements
20. Tacit coordination and imperfect information
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