Private storage of common property

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 280-302

  Gaudet, Gérard ^a   Moreaux, Michel ^b   Salant, Stephen W ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^b INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE FRANCE   (France)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Free access; Maximum efficient rate of extraction (MER); Rule of capture; Speculative attacks; Total catch quotas; Tragedy of the commons

Indexed keywords

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; PRIVATIZATION; QUOTA SYSTEM;

EID: 0036517019     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.2000.1184     Document Type: Article

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