Battling over political and cultural power during the Chinese cultural revolution

Theory and Society

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 463-519

  Andreas, Joel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0036424662     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020949030112     Document Type: Review

References (139)

1. Djilas's The New Class was an influential exposition of this common understanding of the socialist order. Djilas portrayed a band of proletarian revolutionaries tearing down the existing class order and perching on top of society, their class positions derived exclusively from political power. Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: Praeger, 1957).
2. See Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger, "Students and Class Warfare: The Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou," China Quarterly 3 (1980): 397-446; Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Gordon White, "The Politics of Class and Class Origin: The Case of the Cultural Revolution," Contemporary China Papers Number 9 (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1976); and Hongbiao Yin, "Kangzhengzhe de Chongtu: Yu Luoke yu Liandong de Lunzheng." (Clash of Protesters: "The Theoretical Struggle Between Yu Luoke and United Action") Zhongguo Qingnian Yanjiu (Chinese Youth Research) 5 (1997): 30-3.
3. See Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger, "Students and Class Warfare: The Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou," China Quarterly 3 (1980): 397-446; Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Gordon White, "The Politics of Class and Class Origin: The Case of the Cultural Revolution," Contemporary China Papers Number 9 (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1976); and Hongbiao Yin, "Kangzhengzhe de Chongtu: Yu Luoke yu Liandong de Lunzheng." (Clash of Protesters: "The Theoretical Struggle Between Yu Luoke and United Action") Zhongguo Qingnian Yanjiu (Chinese Youth Research) 5 (1997): 30-3.
4. See Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger, "Students and Class Warfare: The Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou," China Quarterly 3 (1980): 397-446; Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Gordon White, "The Politics of Class and Class Origin: The Case of the Cultural Revolution," Contemporary China Papers Number 9 (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1976); and Hongbiao Yin, "Kangzhengzhe de Chongtu: Yu Luoke yu Liandong de Lunzheng." (Clash of Protesters: "The Theoretical Struggle Between Yu Luoke and United Action") Zhongguo Qingnian Yanjiu (Chinese Youth Research) 5 (1997): 30-3.
5. See Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen and Jonathan Unger, "Students and Class Warfare: The Roots of the Red Guard Conflict in Guangzhou," China Quarterly 3 (1980): 397-446; Hong Yung Lee, The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Gordon White, "The Politics of Class and Class Origin: The Case of the Cultural Revolution," Contemporary China Papers Number 9 (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, 1976); and Hongbiao Yin, "Kangzhengzhe de Chongtu: Yu Luoke yu Liandong de Lunzheng." (Clash of Protesters: "The Theoretical Struggle Between Yu Luoke and United Action") Zhongguo Qingnian Yanjiu (Chinese Youth Research) 5 (1997): 30-3.
6. See Yongyi Song and Dajin Sun, Wenhua Da Geming he ta de Yiduan Sichao (Heterodox Thinking During the Cultural Revolution) (Hong Kong: Tianyuan Bookhouse, 1996): 365; and Shaojie Tang, "Qinghua Jinggangshan Bingtuan de Xingshuai" ("The Rise and Fall of Tsinghua Jinggangshan Regiment"), in Liu Qingfeng, editor, Wenhua Da Geming: Shishi yu Yanjiu (Cultural Revolution: Facts and Analysis) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996), 49.
7. See Yongyi Song and Dajin Sun, Wenhua Da Geming he ta de Yiduan Sichao (Heterodox Thinking During the Cultural Revolution) (Hong Kong: Tianyuan Bookhouse, 1996): 365; and Shaojie Tang, "Qinghua Jinggangshan Bingtuan de Xingshuai" ("The Rise and Fall of Tsinghua Jinggangshan Regiment"), in Liu Qingfeng, editor, Wenhua Da Geming: Shishi yu Yanjiu (Cultural Revolution: Facts and Analysis) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996), 49.
8. Individual recollections, particularly after several decades of profound social change, must be treated with caution. The accounts provided by former students reflected their particular vantage points at the time and have been filtered by thirty years of history and new conceptual understandings. It was essential to hear many different accounts of the same events and to hear from students from different backgrounds and from students who had participated in all of the different factions. The accounts that remained most partisan were particularly helpful in recreating the contending sides. I was able to corroborate and contextualize individual students' accounts, and adjudicate between conflicting accounts, by comparing them to one another, as well as to newspaper and other textual accounts produced at the time and memoirs written by former students and administrators. Characteristics of the former students interviewed are provided in an appendix.
9. The two newspapers were: Jinggangshan, published from December 1966 to August 1968 by TU Jinggangshan Regiment (the "radical" faction), and Jinggangshan Bao, published from June 1967 to April 1968 by TU Jinggangshan/April 14th (the "moderate" faction). Both newspapers are reproduced in A New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Part 1: Newspapers (Oakton,Va.: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1999).
10. The two newspapers were: Jinggangshan, published from December 1966 to August 1968 by TU Jinggangshan Regiment (the "radical" faction), and Jinggangshan Bao, published from June 1967 to April 1968 by TU Jinggangshan/April 14th (the "moderate" faction). Both newspapers are reproduced in A New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Part 1: Newspapers (Oakton,Va.: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1999).
11. The two newspapers were: Jinggangshan, published from December 1966 to August 1968 by TU Jinggangshan Regiment (the "radical" faction), and Jinggangshan Bao, published from June 1967 to April 1968 by TU Jinggangshan/April 14th (the "moderate" faction). Both newspapers are reproduced in A New Collection of Red Guard Publications, Part 1: Newspapers (Oakton,Va.: Center for Chinese Research Materials, 1999).
12. Big character posters, hand-written by individuals and small groups and posted in public places, played a central role in the political debates of the Cultural Revolution. Collections of posters reprinted by one faction often included posters written by both sides in a fashion designed to highlight polemical arguments.
13. See Pierre Bourdieu, "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction," in Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, editors, Power and Ideology in Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 487-511; and Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in John Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1983).
14. See Pierre Bourdieu, "Cultural Reproduction and Social Reproduction," in Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, editors, Power and Ideology in Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 487-511; and Pierre Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in John Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1983).
15. For discussion of political association as a mechanism of class differentiation within Bourdieu's analytical framework, see Bourdieu, "The 'Soviet' Variant and Political Capital" in Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). Weber discusses this dimension of stratification in his remarks on political parties and social differentiation. See Max Weber, Economy and Society, Volume 2, translated by G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 926-939.
16. For discussion of political association as a mechanism of class differentiation within Bourdieu's analytical framework, see Bourdieu, "The 'Soviet' Variant and Political Capital" in Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). Weber discusses this dimension of stratification in his remarks on political parties and social differentiation. See Max Weber, Economy and Society, Volume 2, translated by G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 926-939.
17. Regarding the role of imperial civil service examinations in shaping a class of scholar officials drawn largely from the landed gentry, see Benjamin Elman, "Political, Social and Cultural Reproduction via Civil Service Examinations in Late Imperial China," The Journal of Asian Studies 50 (1991): 7-28.
18. Members of the old educated elite retained high positions in economic, political, and cultural institutions after they were reorganized under communist control, although real power was placed in the hands of party officials. Children of the educated elite also enjoyed cultural preparation that allowed them to predominate in exams for admission to the best schools.
19. Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Technocrats in Socialist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
20. The family origin system originated as an instrument of revolutionary usurpation during land reform. As part of the investigation that preceded re-division of property in villages, each family was assigned a class designation. The Party mobilized poor and middle peasants to struggle against landlords and rich peasants in a campaign that was extraordinarily violent and reduced the families of landlords and rich peasants to social pariahs. The class structure in the cities, however, was more resistant to such radical leveling. Members of the old urban elites, capitalists and high intellectuals, often retained privileged positions and the discrimination faced by members of their families was often not as severe as that faced by the old rural elites. See Lynn White III, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-1969," in Robert Scalapino, editor, Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 302-377; and Gordon White, "The Politics of Class and Class Origin," 2.
21. The family origin system originated as an instrument of revolutionary usurpation during land reform. As part of the investigation that preceded re-division of property in villages, each family was assigned a class designation. The Party mobilized poor and middle peasants to struggle against landlords and rich peasants in a campaign that was extraordinarily violent and reduced the families of landlords and rich peasants to social pariahs. The class structure in the cities, however, was more resistant to such radical leveling. Members of the old urban elites, capitalists and high intellectuals, often retained privileged positions and the discrimination faced by members of their families was often not as severe as that faced by the old rural elites. See Lynn White III, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-1969," in Robert Scalapino, editor, Elites in the People's Republic of China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), 302-377; and Gordon White, "The Politics of Class and Class Origin," 2.
22. Classes, as defined by the family origin system, are key categories used in this article. Use of these categories presents analytical problems, including the fact that they refer to situations before the radical social and economic changes that took place after 1949. Use of these class categories, however, is unavoidable because they were the juridically reinforced categories that framed group identities during the Cultural Revolution.
23. Those who had participated full-time in the revolutionary movement while the Communist Party was still an insurrectionary organization were designated revolutionary cadres, soldiers, or martyrs, regardless of the socioeconomic position of their families.
24. The category zhiyuan, which I have translated as "white collar employee," included white collar government employees, teachers, and other managerial and professional employees. These occupations required a relatively high level of education and the number of zhiyuan was very small relative to the population of pre-revolutionary China. Their class position was, therefore, higher than that of the ordinary clerical workers in more economically developed countries.
25. In 1949, about 10 percent of adult males had completed high school and about 1 percent had completed college. See Zhong Deng and Don Treiman, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on Trends in Educational Attainment in the People's Republic of China," American Journal of Sociology 103 (1997): 391-428. The proportions were far smaller for women.
26. Meritocratic ideas had deep roots in the Confucian ethics of the scholar gentry. This tradition, based on classical literary culture, was reshaped with the introduction in the twentieth century of Western educational practices, which emphasized technical knowledge. The introduction of Soviet methods in the 1950s reinforced these meritocratic and technocratic traditions, imposing on them a uniform system of disciplinary categories, ranks, and credentials and providing them with socialist ideological legitimacy. See Ruth Hayhoe, China's Universities 1895-1995: A Century of Cultural Conflict (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996); and Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
27. Meritocratic ideas had deep roots in the Confucian ethics of the scholar gentry. This tradition, based on classical literary culture, was reshaped with the introduction in the twentieth century of Western educational practices, which emphasized technical knowledge. The introduction of Soviet methods in the 1950s reinforced these meritocratic and technocratic traditions, imposing on them a uniform system of disciplinary categories, ranks, and credentials and providing them with socialist ideological legitimacy. See Ruth Hayhoe, China's Universities 1895-1995: A Century of Cultural Conflict (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996); and Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
28. Jinggangshan, Aug. 24, 1967.
29. Kexuan Liu et al., editors, Beida yu Qinghua (Peking University and Tsinghua) (National Administrative Institute Press, 1998), 556-591.
30. See Cheng Li, The Rise of Technocracy: Elite Transformation and Ideological Change in Post-Mao China (Princeton: Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Princeton University, 1992), 170-192; William Hinton, Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 28-37; and Shaojie Tang, "Cong Qinghua Daxue Liang Pai Kan 'Wenhua Da Geming' Zhong Qunzhong Zuzhi de Duili he Fenqi" ("The Antagonisms and Differences Between 'Cultural Revolution' Mass Organizations from the Perspective of the Two Fuctions at Tsinghua University"), in Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu (Chinese Communist Party History Research) 2 (1998): 69-74. While senior professors continued to receive high salaries and played an important role academically, most, especially the large number who had been trained in the United States, were marginalized politically.
31. See Cheng Li, The Rise of Technocracy: Elite Transformation and Ideological Change in Post-Mao China (Princeton: Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Princeton University, 1992), 170-192; William Hinton, Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 28-37; and Shaojie Tang, "Cong Qinghua Daxue Liang Pai Kan 'Wenhua Da Geming' Zhong Qunzhong Zuzhi de Duili he Fenqi" ("The Antagonisms and Differences Between 'Cultural Revolution' Mass Organizations from the Perspective of the Two Fuctions at Tsinghua University"), in Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu (Chinese Communist Party History Research) 2 (1998): 69-74. While senior professors continued to receive high salaries and played an important role academically, most, especially the large number who had been trained in the United States, were marginalized politically.
32. See Cheng Li, The Rise of Technocracy: Elite Transformation and Ideological Change in Post-Mao China (Princeton: Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Princeton University, 1992), 170-192; William Hinton, Hundred Day War: The Cultural Revolution at Tsinghua University (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), 28-37; and Shaojie Tang, "Cong Qinghua Daxue Liang Pai Kan 'Wenhua Da Geming' Zhong Qunzhong Zuzhi de Duili he Fenqi" ("The Antagonisms and Differences Between 'Cultural Revolution' Mass Organizations from the Perspective of the Two Fuctions at Tsinghua University"), in Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu (Chinese Communist Party History Research) 2 (1998): 69-74. While senior professors continued to receive high salaries and played an important role academically, most, especially the large number who had been trained in the United States, were marginalized politically.
33. In one TU student's class, for instance, only two students were excluded from the Youth League. One was the interviewee, whose father, a highly educated administrator, was politically suspect because of overseas family connections. The other was a student of poor peasant origin who was suspected of stealing from another student. Interview No. 1.
34. Interview No. 1.
35. Cited in Robert Taylor, China's Intellectual Dilemma: Politics and University Enrollment, 1949-1978 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1981), 132.
36. Nanxiang Jiang, Jiang Nanxiang Wenji (Collected Works of Jiang Nanxiang) (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 1998), 810-811; Jinggangshan, Oct. 12, 1967.
37. Nanxiang Jiang, Jiang Nanxiang Wenji (Collected Works of Jiang Nanxiang) (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 1998), 810-811; Jinggangshan, Oct. 12, 1967.
38. Tsinghua Attached Middle School, School History Group, Qinghua Daxue Fushu Zhongxue Jianshi (A Brief History of Tsinghua University Attached Middle School) (Beijing: Beijing Municipal Education Research Institute, 1987), 22-67.
39. Even though the task of assigning students to class categories is aided by the official codification of these categories in China, the process inevitably involves ambiguities. In cities, classification depended largely on self-reporting, and the process of determining individual class labels was negotiated and contested. Because class line policies made it advantageous for both administrators and students to take a lax attitude toward qualifications for membership in the proletarian classes, it is likely that there were more than a few students of "fake" working class origin (jia gongren). Nevertheless, interviewees' accounts of their own and their classmates' humble family origins make it clear that there were a large number of students at TU who were from poor working class and peasant families.
40. Five former TAMS students (Interviews No. 15, 16, 17, 19 and 20) and ten former TU students (Interviews No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11) classified their classmates by family origin. Altogether there were just over 230 students in the classes described by TAMS students and just over 300 students in the classes described by TU students. Both schools were boarding schools and a class of students typically lived and studied together from admission to graduation. This allowed students to get to know their classmates well. Many students had clear recollections of their classmates' family origin because this became a particularly salient personal characteristic before and during the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, after thirty years, the sharpness of former students' memories varied considerably. Because of ambiguities in class designations and limitations of the power of memory, these estimates should be regarded as rough approximations. They, nevertheless, reveal the sharp difference in the composition of the student bodies at the two schools.
41. These figures, which include only one class of upper middle school students at TAMS, were presented in a statement published by Old Red Guard organizations at a college campus located near Tsinghua (Beijing Forestry Institute Red Guard Fighting Groups, Yi Pian Hen Hao de Fangmian Jiaocai (A Very Good Piece of Negative Teaching Material) (Beijing: Beijing Forestry Institute "East Is Red Commune," 1966).
42. The TU radical faction's newspaper Jinggangshan (Oct. 12, 1967) reported that in 1964, 44 percent of TU students were of working class and peasant origin and 10 percent were of "exploiting class" origin. The former figure, following common practice, presumably included children of revolutionary cadres. The remaining 46 percent were presumably from white-collar employee and other "middle" categories.
43. I have included in this category student estimates of the number of their classmates from families suspect for political reasons (e.g., "counter-revolutionaries" and "Rightists").
44. Peking Review, Aug. 12, 1966: 8, 10.
45. Zedong Mao, "Comment on Comrade Ch'en Cheng-jen's Report on Stay at a Selected Spot" translated in Current Background 891 (1969 [1965]): 49.
46. See Chan, Rosen, and Unger, "Students and Class Warfare"; and Stanley Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982). Chan, Rosen, and Unger's carefully researched studies on factional conflict in Guangzhou middle schools focused on the best schools, where they found that division along family origin lines was most pronounced. At ordinary and vocational middle schools, in contrast, they found the most salient division was between those who had been active in the Communist Youth League and those who had not, with the former tending to be more conservative. Although universities were outside the scope of their investigation, Rosen noted that factional alignment at universities in Guangzhou seemed to follow the pattern at non-elite middle schools (Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 1-6). Chan, Rosen, and Unger, nevertheless, chose to focus analytically on the pattern of factional conflict at elite middle schools, noting divergent patterns at other schools only in passing.
47. See Chan, Rosen, and Unger, "Students and Class Warfare"; and Stanley Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou (Canton) (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982). Chan, Rosen, and Unger's carefully researched studies on factional conflict in Guangzhou middle schools focused on the best schools, where they found that division along family origin lines was most pronounced. At ordinary and vocational middle schools, in contrast, they found the most salient division was between those who had been active in the Communist Youth League and those who had not, with the former tending to be more conservative. Although universities were outside the scope of their investigation, Rosen noted that factional alignment at universities in Guangzhou seemed to follow the pattern at non-elite middle schools (Rosen, Red Guard Factionalism, 1-6). Chan, Rosen, and Unger, nevertheless, chose to focus analytically on the pattern of factional conflict at elite middle schools, noting divergent patterns at other schools only in passing.
48. See, for instance, Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis" in Roderick MacFurquhar and John Fairbank, editors, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions Within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-82 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 154-156; Mark Lupher, Power Restructuring in China and Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 202; Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 335; and Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 64.
49. See, for instance, Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis" in Roderick MacFurquhar and John Fairbank, editors, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions Within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-82 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 154-156; Mark Lupher, Power Restructuring in China and Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 202; Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 335; and Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 64.
50. See, for instance, Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis" in Roderick MacFurquhar and John Fairbank, editors, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions Within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-82 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 154-156; Mark Lupher, Power Restructuring in China and Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 202; Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 335; and Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 64.
51. See, for instance, Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis" in Roderick MacFurquhar and John Fairbank, editors, The Cambridge History of China, Volume 15: People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions Within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-82 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 154-156; Mark Lupher, Power Restructuring in China and Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 202; Maurice Meisner, Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 335; and Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 64.
52. For accounts of the rise of the TAMS Red Guards, from different viewpoints, see Yi Zheng, "Taowang Shengya Gouqile Yi Duan Huiyi" ("An Exile Career Evokes a Memory"), Jiushi Niandai (The Nineties) 6 (1992): 91-95; Weiguang Zhong, "Qinghua Fuzhong Hong Weibing Xiaozu Dansheng Shishi" ("Historical Facts About the Birth of the Tsinghua Attached Middle School Red Guard Organization"), Beijing Zhi Chun (Beijing Spring) 41 (1996); and Weihua Pu, "Qinghua Fuzhong Hong Weibing Chengli Shimo" ('The Whole Story of the Founding of the Tsinghua Attached Middle School Red Guards"), Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao (Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party) 70 (Beijing: Communist Party History Publishing House, 1998): 96-107.
53. For accounts of the rise of the TAMS Red Guards, from different viewpoints, see Yi Zheng, "Taowang Shengya Gouqile Yi Duan Huiyi" ("An Exile Career Evokes a Memory"), Jiushi Niandai (The Nineties) 6 (1992): 91-95; Weiguang Zhong, "Qinghua Fuzhong Hong Weibing Xiaozu Dansheng Shishi" ("Historical Facts About the Birth of the Tsinghua Attached Middle School Red Guard Organization"), Beijing Zhi Chun (Beijing Spring) 41 (1996); and Weihua Pu, "Qinghua Fuzhong Hong Weibing Chengli Shimo" ('The Whole Story of the Founding of the Tsinghua Attached Middle School Red Guards"), Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao (Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party) 70 (Beijing: Communist Party History Publishing House, 1998): 96-107.
54. For accounts of the rise of the TAMS Red Guards, from different viewpoints, see Yi Zheng, "Taowang Shengya Gouqile Yi Duan Huiyi" ("An Exile Career Evokes a Memory"), Jiushi Niandai (The Nineties) 6 (1992): 91-95; Weiguang Zhong, "Qinghua Fuzhong Hong Weibing Xiaozu Dansheng Shishi" ("Historical Facts About the Birth of the Tsinghua Attached Middle School Red Guard Organization"), Beijing Zhi Chun (Beijing Spring) 41 (1996); and Weihua Pu, "Qinghua Fuzhong Hong Weibing Chengli Shimo" ('The Whole Story of the Founding of the Tsinghua Attached Middle School Red Guards"), Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao (Materials on the History of the Chinese Communist Party) 70 (Beijing: Communist Party History Publishing House, 1998): 96-107.
55. Zedong Mao, "A Letter to the Red Guards of the Middle School Attached to Tsinghua University," translated in Current Background 891 (1969 [1966]): 63.
56. Youqin Wang, "1966: Xuesheng Da Laoshi de Geming" ("1966: A Revolution in which Students Beat Teachers") in Qingfeng Liu, editor, Wenhua Da Geming: Shishi yu Yanjiu (Cultural Revolution: Facts and Analysis) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1996): 17-38.
57. Tsinghua Attached Middle School Red Guard, "Hail Line of the Proletarian Class!" translated in China News Analysis 636 (1966): 2-5.
58. I b i d.
59. Core Group of TAMS High School Class No. 655, "Zuo Ding Tian Li Di de Ren" ("Be an Indomitable Person"), Bingtuan Zhanbao (Regiment War Report), Nov. 18, 1966, reprinted in Song and Sun, Heterodox Thinking, 87.
60. Two or more competing Red Guard organizations emerged in many Beijing middle schools in August 1966, sometimes reflecting conflict between revolutionary cadres' children and children of workers and peasants. At TAMS in the summer of 1966, however, there was only one Red Guard organization. It dominated the school until an opposition faction, composed mainly of children of intellectuals, emerged in late 1966.
61. United Action Committee, "Zhongyang, Beijing Dang Zheng Jun Ganbu Zidi (Nu) Lianhe Xingdong Weiyuan Hui Tongbao" ("Notice of the Central and Beijing Party, Government and Military Cadres' Children's United Action Committee"), Jan. 1, 1967, reprinted in Song and Sun, Heterodox Thinking, 108.
62. Like others before him, Mao used the term "revisionist" to accuse international and domestic communist leaders of revising Marxist revolutionary principles.
63. Tsinghua Attached Middle School Jinggangshan Regiment, "Tequan Jieceng de Weidaoshi" ("Apologists for the Privileged Stratum"), Chun Lei (Spring Thunder) July 1967, reproduced in Red Guard Publications, Volume 4 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries, 1979): 753.
64. Tsinghua Attached Middle School Jinggangshan Regiment, "Tequan Jieceng de Weidaoshi" ("Apologists for the Privileged Stratum"), Chun Lei (Spring Thunder) July 1967, reproduced in Red Guard Publications, Volume 4 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries, 1979): 753.
65. Interview No. 17.
66. Interview No. 18.
67. For an English translation of Yu Luoke's essay see White, "The Politics of Class and Class Origin": 71-93. The Chinese original is inlcuded in Song and Sun, Heterodox Thinking, 120-140. Song and Sun also reproduced several other articles by Yu Luoke.
68. For an English translation of Yu Luoke's essay see White, "The Politics of Class and Class Origin": 71-93. The Chinese original is inlcuded in Song and Sun, Heterodox Thinking, 120-140. Song and Sun also reproduced several other articles by Yu Luoke.
69. Cited in Weiran Lin, An Abortive Chinese Enlightenment: The Cultural Revolution and Class Theory (Madison: Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1996): 260.
70. See Anita Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation (London: Macmillan, 1985), 233; Lin, An Abortive Chinese Enlightenment: 255-260; and Rosen, The Origins and Development of the Red Guard Movement: 196-204. After ignoring the debate in the middle school student press about Yu's article for several months, in April 1967 the CCRSG denounced the article, largely stifling further debate.
71. See Anita Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation (London: Macmillan, 1985), 233; Lin, An Abortive Chinese Enlightenment: 255-260; and Rosen, The Origins and Development of the Red Guard Movement: 196-204. After ignoring the debate in the middle school student press about Yu's article for several months, in April 1967 the CCRSG denounced the article, largely stifling further debate.
72. See Anita Chan, Children of Mao: Personality Development and Political Activism in the Red Guard Generation (London: Macmillan, 1985), 233; Lin, An Abortive Chinese Enlightenment: 255-260; and Rosen, The Origins and Development of the Red Guard Movement: 196-204. After ignoring the debate in the middle school student press about Yu's article for several months, in April 1967 the CCRSG denounced the article, largely stifling further debate.
73. Interview No. 18.
74. Interview No. 17.
75. Liu Shaoqi's daughter, Liu Too, put up one of the first posters criticizing Jiang Nanxiang, her father's erstwhile ally. Jinggangshan, Dec. 31, 1966.
76. By 1966, Kuai had become a Youth League leader in his class as well as director of the editorial committee of the university radio station and he was well along in the lengthy process of applying for Party membership. Soon after he arrived at Tsinghua, Kuai sent a report to central Party authorities on corruption among rural cadres. Interview No. 38.
77. In addition to President Liu Shaoqi's daughter and Marshall He Long's son, TU Red Guard leaders included Li Lifeng, son of Li Jingquan (First Secretary of the Southwestern Bureau of the Party Central Committee), Liu Qufen, son of Liu Ningyi (Secretary of the Central Committee's Secretariat) and Wang Xiahu, son of Wang Renzhong (Secretary of the South Central Bureau of the Central Committee). Interviews No. 1 and 13; Jean Esmein, The Chinese Cultural Revolution (Garden City, N.Y: Anchor Press, 1973), 104.
78. Interview No. 14.
79. This shift resulted from Mao's effort to re-direct the movement against his principal target, the "capitalist roaders in authority in the Party." Lin Biao's October 1, 1966 speech was a dramatic public signal of this new offensive, encouraging the rise of TU Jinggangshan and similar organizations. Yan and Gao, Turbulent Decade, 95.
80. The April 14th meeting was inspired by an article in the central Party journal Hong Qi (Red Flag) (No. 5, Apr. 7. 1966) that called for the rehabilitation of cadres. This article was part of a campaign initiated by central Party authorities in February 1967 to reestablish order in schools, workplaces, and localities after rebel "power seizures" in January had disrupted or overthrown existing organs of leadership. Military delegations were sent to schools and workplaces to reconcile contending factions and establish "revolutionary committees" composed of representatives of the new mass organizations, old cadres, and the military. A delegation led by Navy officers was sent toTU, but it was unable to impose its will on Jinggangshan, which steadfastly opposed the rehabilitation of old cadres. A revolutionary committee was not established at TU until after the warring student factions had been suppressed in July 1968. See Hinton, Hundred Day War; Tang, "The Rise and Fall of Tsinghua Jinggangshan Regiment;" and Shaojie Tang, "Hong Weibing Yundong de Sangzhong: Qinghua Daxue Bai Ri Da Wudou" ("Death Knell of the Red Guards: The Hundred Day War at Tsinghua University") in Liu Qingfeng, editor, Wenhua Da Geming: Shishi Yu Yanjiu (Cultural Revolution Facts and Analysis) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press 1996): 65-79.
81. The April 14th meeting was inspired by an article in the central Party journal Hong Qi (Red Flag) (No. 5, Apr. 7. 1966) that called for the rehabilitation of cadres. This article was part of a campaign initiated by central Party authorities in February 1967 to reestablish order in schools, workplaces, and localities after rebel "power seizures" in January had disrupted or overthrown existing organs of leadership. Military delegations were sent to schools and workplaces to reconcile contending factions and establish "revolutionary committees" composed of representatives of the new mass organizations, old cadres, and the military. A delegation led by Navy officers was sent toTU, but it was unable to impose its will on Jinggangshan, which steadfastly opposed the rehabilitation of old cadres. A revolutionary committee was not established at TU until after the warring student factions had been suppressed in July 1968. See Hinton, Hundred Day War; Tang, "The Rise and Fall of Tsinghua Jinggangshan Regiment;" and Shaojie Tang, "Hong Weibing Yundong de Sangzhong: Qinghua Daxue Bai Ri Da Wudou" ("Death Knell of the Red Guards: The Hundred Day War at Tsinghua University") in Liu Qingfeng, editor, Wenhua Da Geming: Shishi Yu Yanjiu (Cultural Revolution Facts and Analysis) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press 1996): 65-79.
82. The April 14th meeting was inspired by an article in the central Party journal Hong Qi (Red Flag) (No. 5, Apr. 7. 1966) that called for the rehabilitation of cadres. This article was part of a campaign initiated by central Party authorities in February 1967 to reestablish order in schools, workplaces, and localities after rebel "power seizures" in January had disrupted or overthrown existing organs of leadership. Military delegations were sent to schools and workplaces to reconcile contending factions and establish "revolutionary committees" composed of representatives of the new mass organizations, old cadres, and the military. A delegation led by Navy officers was sent toTU, but it was unable to impose its will on Jinggangshan, which steadfastly opposed the rehabilitation of old cadres. A revolutionary committee was not established at TU until after the warring student factions had been suppressed in July 1968. See Hinton, Hundred Day War; Tang, "The Rise and Fall of Tsinghua Jinggangshan Regiment;" and Shaojie Tang, "Hong Weibing Yundong de Sangzhong: Qinghua Daxue Bai Ri Da Wudou" ("Death Knell of the Red Guards: The Hundred Day War at Tsinghua University") in Liu Qingfeng, editor, Wenhua Da Geming: Shishi Yu Yanjiu (Cultural Revolution Facts and Analysis) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press 1996): 65-79.
83. Interview No. 38.
84. See Jinggangshan, Apr. 5. 1967 and May 13, 1967; and a Jinggangshan Fighting Group poster reprinted in Tsinghua Jinggangshan United General Headquarters April 14th Cadre Office, Dazibao Xuanbian (Selected Big Character Posters) Volume 2 (Beijing, 1967): 35.
85. See Jinggangshan, Apr. 5. 1967 and May 13, 1967; and a Jinggangshan Fighting Group poster reprinted in Tsinghua Jinggangshan United General Headquarters April 14th Cadre Office, Dazibao Xuanbian (Selected Big Character Posters) Volume 2 (Beijing, 1967): 35.
86. Jinggangshan, July 5, 1968.
87. Jinggangshan, May 13, 1967.
88. Han Yinshan, a revolutionary cadre of poor peasant origin, was kicked off the University Party Committee in 1959 following conflicts with the leadership. He was subsequently relegated to a position in charge of campus maintenance. Jinggangshan, Apr. 29, 1967.
89. Interview No. 39.
90. This loose, unruly network of rebel organizations did not recognize a definite hierarchy of authority. Kuai Dafu and Jinggangshan were particularly feisty and Jinggangshan leaders even joined abortive campaigns against powerful patrons in the CCRSG including Kang Sheng and Zhang Chunqiao. Tang, "The Rise and Fall of Tsinghua Jinggangshan Regiment": 52; Neale Hunter, Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969): 230.
91. This loose, unruly network of rebel organizations did not recognize a definite hierarchy of authority. Kuai Dafu and Jinggangshan were particularly feisty and Jinggangshan leaders even joined abortive campaigns against powerful patrons in the CCRSG including Kang Sheng and Zhang Chunqiao. Tang, "The Rise and Fall of Tsinghua Jinggangshan Regiment": 52; Neale Hunter, Shanghai Journal: An Eyewitness Account of the Cultural Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969): 230.
92. Dafu Kuai, Qinghua Daxue Dazibao (Tsinghua University Big Character Posters) (Beijing: Tsinghua University Jinggangshan Red Guard Propaganda Team, no date), 61, Aug. 6. 1967.
93. Tsinghua Jinggangshan Regiment, "Chushen Lun" ("Origin Theory") in Jinggangshan Tongxun (Jinggangshan News Report) 138, Feb. 2,1967.
94. The effort made by one student to oppose the family origin system illustrates the limited hearing such views received at TU. Li Leiluo's father had been an officer in the Nationalist army and he was, therefore, of very "bad" family origin. An acquaintance described him as an ardent admirer of Mao, but an opponent of class line. At mass meetings held at TU in the autumn of 1966 to debate bloodline theory, Li called for an end to the family origin system, but the rebel organizations all roundly rejected his views. Li, nevertheless, became an active supporter of Jinggangshan. In August 1967, he was killed in factional fighting in Wuhan and was buried as a martyr by TU Jinggangshan. Jinggangshan, Aug. 12, 1967.
95. Interview No. 9.
96. Jinggangshan, Nov. 17, 1967; Nov. 24, 1967.
97. Jinggangshan, Nov. 9, 1967.
98. Jinggangshan, May 1, 1967; May 8, 1967, May 13, 1967; and Nov. 17, 1967.
99. Jinggangshan, Oct. 19, 1967.
100. Jinggangshan, Oct. 19, 1967; Dec. 28, 1967.
101. This statement took the form of a report on the excesses committed by the work team sent to Tsinghua in the summer of 1966. See Hongqi (Red Fag) 5, Apr. 7, 1967.
102. Interview No. 37.
103. After Jinggangshan split, both factions insisted on using the Jinggangshan name. The moderates were popularly known as the "April 14th faction" (414 pai) while the radicals were known as the "Regiment faction" (tuan pai). I continue to call the radicals " Jinggangshan" for the sake of readers who feel overwhelmed by the number of factional names introduced.
104. Jinggangshan Bao, Dec. 1, 1967; July 5, 1967.
105. Interview No. 13.
106. Interview No. 14.
107. Jinggangshan Bao, Nov. 24, 1967; Dec. 14, 1967.
108. Interview No. 13.
109. Tang, "The Antagonisms and Differences Between 'Cultural Revolution' Mass Organizations from the Perspective of the Two Factions at Tsinghua University"; Jinggangshan Bao, Dec. 14, 1967.
110. Interview No. 29.
111. Interview No. 9.
112. These tables are based on information provided by members of the leadership of both organizations and other activists familiar with the leadership. When interviewees provided contradictory recollections, I used information that seemed most reliable, either because more people corroborated it or because it was provided by informants who seemed more acquainted with the individual. Where I was not satisfied with making a judgment, I have left a question mark. The leading bodies of both factions were not stable. I included individuals whom many informants agreed participated in these bodies for significant periods.
113. Quanying Zhou, "Wo Xinzhong de Wenge" ("My Understanding of the Cultural Revolution") in Ershiyi Shiji (Twenty-first Century) 52 (April 1999): 139-143.
114. Interview No. 7.
115. Jinggangshan Bao, Sep. 5, 1967.
116. April 14th Cadre Office, Selected Big Character Posters 5.
117. Interview No. 12.
118. Interview No. 38.
119. Interview No. 38.
120. Interview No. 38.
121. Interview No. 6.
122. Students of peasant origin have always been a minority in China's elite educational institutions, but this minority has been an important source of recruits for left-wing causes. Before 1949, Communist Party organizers in middle schools and universities relied particularly on recruiting students of peasant origin. See Xiaoping Cong, Localizing the Global, Nationalizing the Local: the Role of Teachers' Schools in Making China Modern (Los Angeles: Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, University of California, Los Angeles, 2001). I noticed that Leftist students I met at present-day Tsinghua were all of peasant origin, despite the fact that rural-origin students only make up about 20 percent of the student body.
123. Interview No. 1.
124. Interview No. 5.
125. Interview No. 12.
126. Interview No. 38.
127. Names used in this paper, with the exception of those of public figures (including the leaders of TU fuctions) are not real.
128. Interview No. 7.
129. Interview No. 10.
130. Interview No. 6.
131. Factional conflict at Tsinghua was suppressed by tens of thousands of Beijing factory workers, led by army officers and authorized by Mao Zedong, who marched onto the campus on July 27, 1968. This watershed event signaled the end of the period of mass factional conflict during the Cultural Revolution. See Hinton, Hundred Day War, and Tang, "Death Knell of the Red Guards."
132. Factional conflict at Tsinghua was suppressed by tens of thousands of Beijing factory workers, led by army officers and authorized by Mao Zedong, who marched onto the campus on July 27, 1968. This watershed event signaled the end of the period of mass factional conflict during the Cultural Revolution. See Hinton, Hundred Day War, and Tang, "Death Knell of the Red Guards."
133. Dongping Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Education Reforms and Their Impact on China's Rural Development (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000); Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
134. Dongping Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Education Reforms and Their Impact on China's Rural Development (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000); Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
135. Dongping Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Education Reforms and Their Impact on China's Rural Development (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000); Suzanne Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Jonathan Unger, Education Under Mao: Class and Competition in Canton Schools, 1960-1980 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
136. Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution; Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform; Stanley Rosen, "Restoring Key Secondary Schools in Post-Mao China: The Politics of Competition and Educational Quality" in David Lampton, editor, Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
137. Han, The Unknown Cultural Revolution; Pepper, Radicalism and Education Reform; Stanley Rosen, "Restoring Key Secondary Schools in Post-Mao China: The Politics of Competition and Educational Quality" in David Lampton, editor, Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
138. Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Technocrats.
139. The technocratic project described by Konrad and Szelenyi was undermined in Eastern Europe by the revival of private property and the unraveling of party authority. While technocratic ideas were widely celebrated in China during the 1980s, today the class structure is again being fundamentally transformed, and the technocratic vision undermined, as economic capital is once more becoming the main foundation of class.