To give or not to give: Modeling individuals' contribution decisions

Political Behavior

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 31-54

  Grant, J Tobin ^a   Rudolph, Thomas J ^b  

^a SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

Contributions; Information costs; Rational prospecting; Selection effects; Solicitation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036416304     PISSN: 01909320     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020994921777     Document Type: Review

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