Frequency-dependent selection in sexual family-structured populations

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 217, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 525-534

  Tao, Yi ^a   Lessard, Sabin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY; FITNESS; FREQUENCY DEPENDENCE; SELECTION;

ALLELE; ARTICLE; DIPLOIDY; FAMILY; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; PHENOTYPE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY;

EID: 0036402997     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jtbi.2002.3041     Document Type: Article

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