The esteem theory of norms

Public Choice

Volumn 113, Issue 1-2, 2002, Pages 211-224

  Cowen, Tyler ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036386717     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1020373530400     Document Type: Article

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