The efficient side of progressive income taxation

European Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 7, 2002, Pages 1359-1368

  Corneo, Giacomo ^a,b,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSNABRÜCK   (Germany)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

^d IZA   (Germany)

Author keywords

Inequality; Progressive income tax; Social status

Indexed keywords

INCOME DISTRIBUTION; SOCIAL STATUS; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 0036305743     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00162-3     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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10. Why are taxes so high in egalitarian societies?
11. Social interactions and habit formation in a model of female labour supply