Anticipating organized and transnational crime

Crime, Law and Social Change

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 311-355

  Williams, Phil ^a   Godson, Roy ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036296407     PISSN: 09254994     EISSN: 15730751     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1016095317864     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. For a discussion of this issue see Jay Albanese, "Where Organized and White Collar Crime Meet: Predicting the Infiltration of Legitimate Business," in Jay Albanese (ed.), Contemporary Issues in Organized Crime (Monsey, New York: Willow Tree Press, 1995) pp. 35-60.
2. The question could still be asked, of course, about why we have chosen these five sets of models rather than any other. The answer concerns their utility in anticipating both future developments likely to impinge on organized crime, and the future behavior of criminal organizations. An alternative and useful conceptualization of organized crime that also categorizes models can be found in Boronia Halstead, "The Use of Models in the Analysis of Organized Crime and Development of Policy," Transnational Organized Crime Spring 1998 (4:1), 1-24.
3. This reflects work done on the Political-Criminal Nexus by Roy Godson and the National Strategy Information Center. See, for example, Trends in Organized Crime Spring 1999 (4:3) and Fall 2000 (5:1).
4. Francisco E. Thoumi, Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1995).
5. Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).
6. This formula was developed by Robert Klitgaard. See, for example, his "International Cooperation Against Corruption," Finance & Development March 1998 (35:1), 3-7.
7. See Stanley Pimentel, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico," and Louise Shelley, "The Political-Criminal Nexus: Russian-Ukrainian Case Studies," in Trends in Organized Crime, Transaction Periodicals Consortium Spring 1999 (4:3).
8. See Stanley Pimentel, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico," and Louise Shelley, "The Political-Criminal Nexus: Russian-Ukrainian Case Studies," in Trends in Organized Crime, Transaction Periodicals Consortium Spring 1999 (4:3).
9. Stanley Pimentel, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics: Mexico," Trends in Organized Crime Spring 1999 (4:3).
10. See Robert Kelly, "The Political-Criminal Nexus in the United States," in Trends in Organized Crime, Transaction Periodicals Consortium Fall 2000 (5:1). Also, James J. Jacobs et al., Gotham Unbound: How New York was Liberated from the Grip of Organized Crime (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
11. See Robert Kelly, "The Political-Criminal Nexus in the United States," in Trends in Organized Crime, Transaction Periodicals Consortium Fall 2000 (5:1). Also, James J. Jacobs et al., Gotham Unbound: How New York was Liberated from the Grip of Organized Crime (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
12. Buckovic, "Heroin for Kalashnikovs," Belgrade Borba in Serbo-Croatian 17 Jun 1998 p. 6. The involvement of the Kosovo Albanians in drug trafficking became a much more frequent item in press reports during the Kosovo crisis in March and April 1999.
13. CNN/Time Impact: Interview Transcript "Cherif Bassiouni on Arkan and ethnic cleansing," 〈http://cgi.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/impact〉.
14. Cyrille Fijnaut, Frank Bovenkerk, Gerben Bruinsma, and Henk van de Bunt, Organized Crime in the Netherlands (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998) p. 194.
15. Charles Hanley, "Increasingly, Guerrillas Financed by Drugs," Toronto Star December 29, 1994, p. A19. R. Thomas Naylor, "The Insurgent Economy: Black Market Operations of Guerilla Organizations," Crime, Law and Social Change 1993 (20), 13-51.
16. Charles Hanley, "Increasingly, Guerrillas Financed by Drugs," Toronto Star December 29, 1994, p. A19. R. Thomas Naylor, "The Insurgent Economy: Black Market Operations of Guerilla Organizations," Crime, Law and Social Change 1993 (20), 13-51.
17. Soledad Alameda, "Floren Aoiz," El Pais Dec 13, 1992 (95), 14-27. We are grateful for this reference to Magdalena Hindie and have drawn on her unpublished paper, "Terror in Spain" Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh (January 1998).
18. Paul K. Clare, Racketeering in Northern Ireland-A New Version of the Patriot Game (Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice at the University of Illinois at Chicago, 1989).
19. Ko-lin Chin, Chinese Subculture and Criminality: Non-tradition Crime Groups in America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) p. 9.
20. Pino Arlacchi, "Large Scale Crime and World Illegal Markets," in Organized Crime: International Strategies Report of the International Seminar on Policies and Strategies to Combat Organized Crime held under the auspices of the United Nations and the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico (December 8-11, 1987) pp. 47-61 at p. 49.
21. See Peter Reuter, The Organization of Illegal Markets: An Economic Analysis (Washington DC.: National Institute of Justice, 1985) and R. Thomas Naylor, "From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New National Security Threat," Transnational Organized Crime 1995 (1:4), 37-56.
22. See Peter Reuter, The Organization of Illegal Markets: An Economic Analysis (Washington DC.: National Institute of Justice, 1985) and R. Thomas Naylor, "From Cold War to Crime War: The Search for a New National Security Threat," Transnational Organized Crime 1995 (1:4), 37-56.
23. See Naylor, Ibid. This theme is also developed in the same author's "Mafias, Myths and Markets: On the Theory and Practice of Enterprise Crime" in Transnational Organized Crime 1997 (3:3), 1-45.
24. This view of organized crime is most clearly associated with Dwight C. Smith. See, for example, his "Paragons, Pariahs, and Pirates: a Spectrum Based Theory of Enterprise," in Crime and Delinquency July 1982 (26), 358-386. The analysis here also draws on remarks by Ambassador David Miller at an NSIC workshop on transnational organized crime held Nov 17-18 1994.
25. This view of organized crime is most clearly associated with Dwight C. Smith. See, for example, his "Paragons, Pariahs, and Pirates: a Spectrum Based Theory of Enterprise," in Crime and Delinquency July 1982 (26), 358-386. The analysis here also draws on remarks by Ambassador David Miller at an NSIC workshop on transnational organized crime held Nov 17-18 1994.
26. Peter Gastrow, Organized Crime in South Africa (Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies, 1998).
27. It is also worth noting that the converse of this can also occur with criminal organizations providing information to law enforcement regarding their competitors. Members of the Medellin and Cali drug trafficking organizations routinely did this as part of their struggle during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
28. One of the best statements and illustrations of this argument is Letizia Paoli, The Pledge to Secrecy: Culture, Structure and Action of Mafia Associations, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute Firenze, June 1997.
29. Jane Schneider, Trends in Organized Crime Winter 1998 (4:1).
30. Ko-lin Chin, Chinese Subculture and Criminality: Non-traditional Crime Groups in America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) p. 9.
31. Ibid. p. 19.
32. Ibid. p. 11.
33. I b i d.
34. For the criteria and rituals of traditional Triad membership see W.P. Morgan, Triad Societies in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1960), which was used in Hong Kong courts to identify Triad members. For a discussion of guanxi see M. Cordell Hart, " 'Guanxi': an Important Concept for the Law Enforcement Officer," Trends in Organized Crime 1996 (2:2). Some believe the concept is too broad to serve as an effective indicator of criminal association.
35. For the criteria and rituals of traditional Triad membership see W.P. Morgan, Triad Societies in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1960), which was used in Hong Kong courts to identify Triad members. For a discussion of guanxi see M. Cordell Hart, " 'Guanxi': an Important Concept for the Law Enforcement Officer," Trends in Organized Crime 1996 (2:2). Some believe the concept is too broad to serve as an effective indicator of criminal association.
36. R. Sandbrook, Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) p. 28 quoted in Rachel Flanary, "The State in Africa: Implications for Democratic Reform," Crime, Law and Social Change 1998 (29:2-3), 179-196 in endnote 4 at p. 193.
37. R. Sandbrook, Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999) p. 28 quoted in Rachel Flanary, "The State in Africa: Implications for Democratic Reform," Crime, Law and Social Change 1998 (29:2-3), 179-196 in endnote 4 at p. 193.
38. Frank Bovenkerk, "Crime and the Multi-ethnic Society: a View from Europe," Crime, Law and Social Change 1993 (19), 271-280 at p. 279.
39. See Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (New York: Appleton, Crofts, 1971) and Francis J. Ianni, Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).
40. See Joseph Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend (New York: Appleton, Crofts, 1971) and Francis J. Ianni, Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).
41. Alan Block, East Side-West Side: Organizing Crime in New York 1939-1959 (Swansea UK.: Christopher Davis, 1979).
42. See David Ronfeldt, Tribes, Institutions, Markets, Networks: a Framework about Societal Evolution (Santa Monica: RAND P-7967, 1996).
43. Gary Potter, Criminal Organizations: Vice Racketeering and Politics in an American City (Prospect Heights Ill.: Waveland Press, 1993) and James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring, Russian Mafia in America (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998).
44. Gary Potter, Criminal Organizations: Vice Racketeering and Politics in an American City (Prospect Heights Ill.: Waveland Press, 1993) and James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring, Russian Mafia in America (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998).
45. Fijnaut et al., Organized Crime in the Netherlands p. 74.
46. I b i d.
47. For a fuller analysis see Phil Williams, "The Nature of Drug Trafficking Networks," Current History April 1998, 154-159.
48. The most documented case is that of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra. On the relationship between organized crime and politics in Mexico, see John Bailey and Roy Godson (eds.), Organized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S. Mexican Borderlands (Pittsburgh Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001).
49. See Ernesto U. Savona, Harmonising Policies for Reducing The Transnational Organised Crime Risk Transcrime (University of Trento) Working Paper No. 2 (June 1995).
50. The following analysis is based on a chapter by Phil Williams entitled "Risk Management by Transnational Criminal Organizations: Threat or Opportunity for Law Enforcement?," in Gina Pattagulan (ed.), Transnational Organized Crime in the Asia-Pacific Region (forthcoming).
51. The most extensive and detailed published discussion of the strategic interaction between the Cali and Medellin cartels, and the US and Colombian governments, can be found in Robert J. Nieves, Colombian Cocaine Cartels: Lessons from the Front US Working Group on Organized Crime (Washington: National Strategy Information Center, April 1997).
52. Lawrence B. Sulc, Law Enforcement Counter Intelligence (Kansas City: Varro Press, 1996) pp. 65-67.
53. Yves Lavigne, Hell's Angels (Toronto: Carol Publishing Group, 1996) pp. 133-143.
54. This emerges clearly from the chronology of nuclear material smuggling incidents developed by Paul N. Woessner at the Ridgway Center for International Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh. An earlier version was published as "Chronology of Radioactive and Nuclear Materials Smuggling Incidents July 1991 June 1997," Transnational Organized Crime Spring 1997 (3:1), 114-209.
55. Phil Williams and Carl Florez, "Transnational Criminal Organizations and Drug Trafficking," Bulletin of Narcotics 1994 (46:2), 9-24.
56. Shona Morrison, "The Dynamics of Illicit Drugs Shipments and Potential Transit Points for Australia," Transnational Organized Crime Spring 1997 (3:1), 1-22.
57. Richard Friman, "Just Passing Through: Transit States and the Dynamics of Illicit Transshipment," Transnational Organized Crime 1995 (1:1), 65-83.
58. Maria Velez de Berliner and Kristin Lado, "Brazil: The Emerging Drug Superpower," Transnational Organized Crime 1995 (1:2), 239-260.
59. Richard Friman, "Just Passing Through: Transit States and the Dynamics of Illicit Transshipment," Transnational Organized Crime 1995 (1:1), 65-83.
60. Shona Morrison, "The Dynamics of Illicit Drugs Shipments and Potential Transit Points for Australia," Transnational Organized Crime 1997 (3:1), 1-22.
61. See Roy Godson, Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards (Rutgers, NJ: Transaction, 2000) pp. 196-198.
62. Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, The Warning-Response Problems and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Corporation, May 1997) p. 11. The following paragraphs adapt several of the arguments put forward by George and Holl to the subject being considered here.
63. Ibid. p. 5.