International economic law in times that are stressful

Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 3-16

  Hufbauer, Gary Clyde ^a  

^a PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036285329     PISSN: 13693034     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/5.1.3     Document Type: Review

References (36)

1. John H. Jackson, 'International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting', 3(1) JIEL (2000) 3.
2. Wall Street Journal (25 September 2001), A1.
3. Wall Street Journal (19 November 2001), A2.
4. Wall Street Journal (12 September 2001), A1.
5. Westphalian principles were not truly realized until the Congress of Vienna in 1815; after the Congress they guided relations between European states for nearly a century until the mindless diplomacy that erupted in the First World War. See Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster 1994).
6. The Montreal Protocol strictly limits production and trade in chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), and authorizes trade restrictions on nonparties. Plurilateral agreements of this sort are common in the environmental realm. See Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future. (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1994).
7. See Drusilla K. Brown, 'Labor Standards: Where Do They Belong on the International Trade Agenda?' 5(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives (Summer 2001).
8. The figures cited here are updated from those in Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, 'Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990s', 89(2) American Economic Review (May 1999).
9. To cite one conspicuous example, over the past four years, the IMF and the World Bank have constantly adjusted their commitments and disbursements to Indonesia in response to Washington's evaluation of Indonesia's questionable economic policies. Stop-go financial support began in 1997 when Indonesia was ruled by President Suharto, persisted during the quixotic leadership of President Wahid, and continues to this day during the administration of President Megawatt.
10. For a detailed evaluation of the NAFTA Side Agreement on the Environment, and the nonapplication of fines and trade sanctions, see Gary C. Hufbauer, Daniel C. Esty, Diana Orejas, Luis Rubio, and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA and the Environment: Seven Years Later 18-20 (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 2000).
11. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment. Revised edition 159-63 (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1993).
12. See Patrick Fitzmaurice, 'Attorney General v. X', 26(4) Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2001). The author observes (fn 90, p 1738) 'Until recently if a Member State simply refused to follow Community law there was not much that the Community could do, either in retaliation, or as enforcement. However, with the introduction of sanctioning power in [the Maastricht Treaty], the EU now possesses some coercive power.'
13. The work of these various institutions is described in Barry Eichengreen, Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post-Asia Agenda (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1999).
14. See the articles collected in JIEL, vol 4, no 1, March 2001, part II.
15. The Beef Hormone and Banana disputes between the United States and Europe illustrate instances where retaliation did not resolve cases (the Banana dispute was eventually resolved by negotiation, not by EU compliance with the letter of the WTO decisions).
16. See Kissinger, above n 5.
17. See Patrick A. Messerlin, Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 2001), ch 6.
18. So far as I know, Japan has quickly modified its laws and regulations to come in compliance with adverse WTO rulings, as for example in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case and in Japan Varietals from the US. But see Peter C. Evans and Kenneth A. Oye, 'International Competition: Conflict and Cooperation in Government Export Financing', in Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Rita M. Rodriguez (eds), The Ex-Im Bank in the 21st Century: A New Approach? (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 2001) for a description of Japan's highly competitive export credit behavior, conducted al the margins of the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits.
19. See Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD Development Centre Studies 2001) and Kevin H. O'Rourke, 'Globalization and Inequality: Historical Trends'. Discussion Paper 2865 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research 2001).
20. See Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: OECD Development Centre Studies 2001) and Kevin H. O'Rourke, 'Globalization and Inequality: Historical Trends'. Discussion Paper 2865 (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research 2001).
21. In addition to the data in Table 1 of this article, see O'Rourke, above n 19.
22. Williamson (1990) coined the phrase 'Washington consensus'. During the 1990s, the concepts of macroeconomic stability and market capitalism became increasingly intertwined, and the term 'Washington consensus' was mostly used to refer to macroeconomic policy, while 'Anglo-Saxon capitalism' was often used to refer to the ingredients of market capitalism. Here I use 'Washington consensus' to refer to both components.See John Williamson, 'What Washington Means by Policy Reform' in John Williamson (ed), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1990).
23. See Maddison, above n 19, table C1.
24. See Gautam Jaggi, Mary Rundle, Daniel Rosen, and Yuichi Takahashi, 'China's Economic Reforms: Chronology and Statistics', APEC Working Paper 96-5 (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1996).
25. See Maddison, above n 19, table C3.
26. See Lori Wallach and Michelle Sforza, Whose Trade Organization: Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy (Washington DC: Public Citizen 1999).
27. For citations, see Wendy Dobson and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, World Capital Markets: Challenge to the G-10, 57-58. (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 2001).
28. See The Economist (8 September 2001), 55.
29. For a relatively restrained expression of radical left opinion, see Robert Weissman, 'Why We Protest: The IMF and World Bank Hurt Poor Countries and Undermine Democracy', Washington Post (10 September 2001), A21.
30. See Allan H. Meltzer, Chairman, Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission. Washington DC (2000), 42-53 (the Fund) and 85-96 (the Bank).
31. For a debate on the benefits of free trade, see Gary Hufbauer, 'Globalization Facts & Consequences' (2001) www.iie.com. For a debate on the benefits of capital movements, see Dobson and Hufbauer, above n 26.
32. For a debate on the benefits of free trade, see Gary Hufbauer, 'Globalization Facts & Consequences' (2001) www.iie.com. For a debate on the benefits of capital movements, see Dobson and Hufbauer, above n 26.
33. Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US Enterprises (New York: Basic Books 1971).
34. Raymond Vernon, In the Hurricane's Eye: The Troubled Prospects of Multinational Enterprises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1998).
35. See Dobson and Hufbauer, above n 26, 63.
36. See Ernest H. Preeg, Doing Rather Than Feeling Good about Labor and Environmental Standards in Developing Countries (Washington DC: Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI 2001).