External discipline and financial stability

European Economic Review

Volumn 46, Issue 4-5, 2002, Pages 821-828

  Vives, Xavier ^a  

^a INSEAD   (France)

Author keywords

Bailouts; Coordination failure; Dollarization; Foreign short term debt; Lender of last resort; Moral hazard

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; DEBT; ECONOMIC CONDITIONS; FINANCIAL SYSTEM; INVESTMENT;

EID: 0036264460     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00216-1     Document Type: Article

References (12)

1. Currency unions
2. Can emerging bank regulators establish credible discipline? The case of Argentina, 1992-1999
3. Global games and equilibrium selection
4. Dollarization, bailouts and the stability of the banking system
5. Foreign currency debt and the global financial architecture
6. Do depositors punish banks for bad behavior? Market disciple, deposit insurance, and banking crises
7. Rethinking multiple equilibria in macroeconomic modelling
8. Bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon
9. Short-term capital flows