Market microstructure and incentives to invest

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 110, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 352-381

  Spulloer, Daniel F ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INVESTMENT; MARKET CONDITIONS; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK;

EID: 0036255050     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/338749     Document Type: Article

References (32)

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6. Market microstructure
7. Intermediation in search markets
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9. Investment and wages in the absence of binding contracts: A nash bargaining approach
10. The theory of contracts
11. Incomplete contracts and renegotiation
12. Property rights and the nature of the firm
13. The firm as a subeconomy
14. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process
15. Evaluating the independent trading exchanges
16. Business-to-business electronic commerce
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18. Comparing equilibria
19. Option contracts and renegotiation: A solution to the hold-up problem
20. Contractual solutions to the hold-up problem
21. Middlemen
22. Market making by price-setting firms
23. Market microstructure and intermediation
24. Minimizing a submodular function on a lattice