Oligopsonistic landlords, segmented labor markets, and the persistence of tied-labor contracts

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 84, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 438-453

  Basu, Arnab K ^a  

^a Dept of Economics and Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy at the College of William and Mary   (United States)

Author keywords

Insurance; Optimum wage subsidies; Permanent labor contracts; Rural unemployment

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT; LABOR MARKET; RURAL ECONOMY; THEORETICAL STUDY; UNEMPLOYMENT;

EID: 0036249993     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8276.00309     Document Type: Article

References (15)

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3. Terms and conditions of labor contracts in agriculture: Results of a survey in west bengal, 1979
4. A theory of two-tier labor markets in agrarian economies
5. Interlocking transactions: Obstacles, precursors or instruments of agrarian capitalism?
6. Wages and involuntary unemployment in the slack season of a village economy
7. Labor tying
8. Wage determination in rural labor markets: The theory of implicit cooperation
9. Land and labor contracts in agrarian economies
10. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device
11. Labor contracting and a theory of contract choice in California agriculture