The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-38

  Boyce, John R ^a   Bischak, Diane P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036246766     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/18.1.1     Document Type: Review

References (32)

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