Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazard

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 84, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 251-278

  Jack, William ^a  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036238279     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00128-1     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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5. Adverse selection in health insurance
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8. The existence of equilibrium in discontinuous economic games, II: Applications
9. Tax subsidies, the rational demand for insurance, and the health care crisis
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14. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem
15. Taxation, health insurance, and market failure in the medical economy
16. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information
17. The Theory of Industrial Organization
18. Optimal contacts and competitive markets with costly state verification
19. A model of insurance markets with incomplete information