Inter-firm governance and structural power in industrial relationships: The moderating effect of bargaining power on the contractual safeguarding of specific assets

Scandinavian Journal of Management

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2002, Pages 261-284

  Buvik, Arnt ^a   Reve, Torger ^b  

^a Molde College   (Norway)

^b BI NORWEGIAN BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036194479     PISSN: 09565221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0956-5221(01)00018-5     Document Type: Article

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