Why firms pay occasional bribes: The connection economy

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 47-60

  Lambert Mogiliansky, Ariane ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST   (France)

Author keywords

Corruption; Enforceability; Network

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036191286     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(01)00068-4     Document Type: Article

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