Free riding and the provision of candy bars

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 277-291

  Haan, Marco ^a   Kooreman, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Free riding; Honor system; Public good experiments

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036175626     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00157-2     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Voluntary contribution games: Efficient private provision of public goods
2. Provision of public goods as a function of group size
3. Organizing groups for collective action
4. Cooperation
5. A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods: Experimental evidence
6. The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting and with incomplete information
7. Introduction to the economics of religion
8. The assurance problem in a laboratory market
9. Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism
10. Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
11. Group size and the voluntary provision of provision of public goods - Experimental evidence utilizing large groups
12. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
13. Public goods: A survey of experimental research
14. Group size and the free-rider hypothesis: An examination of new evidence from churches
15. Experiments on the provision of public goods. I. Resources, interest, group size and the free-rider problem
16. Experiments on the provision of public goods. II. Provision points, stakes, experience and the free-rider problem
17. Optimal church size: The bigger the better?
18. Simultaneous determination of church contributions and church attendance
19. On 'Group size and the free-rider hypothesis: Another hypothesis'
20. Economic and attitudinal factors in Catholic and Protestant religious giving
21. Group size and the free-rider hypothesis: A re-examination of old evidence from churches: Comment