Coalition formation in international monetary policy games

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 56, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 371-385

  Kohler, Marion ^a  

^a BANK OF ENGLAND   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Coalition formation; Currency unions; Free riding; International policy coordination

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC RELATIONS; MONETARY POLICY; MONETARY UNION; SPILLOVER EFFECT;

EID: 0036148940     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00128-3     Document Type: Article

References (10)

1. On the feasibility of a one- or multi-speed European Monetary Union
2. A centre-periphery model of monetary coordination and exchange rate crises
3. Exchange intervention policy in a muliple country world
4. Monetary policy games and the consequences of non-cooperative behavior
5. Participation in a currency union
6. On the stability of collusive price leadership
7. A strategic analysis of monetary independence
8. Free-riding, convergence and two-speed monetary unification
9. Stable coalition structures with externalities