The coordination of capital income and profit taxation with cross-ownership of firms

Regional Science and Urban Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-26

  Huizinga, Harry ^a,b   Nielsen, Søren Bo ^c  

^a EUROPEAN COMMISSION   (Belgium)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^c Department of International Economics and Management   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Foreign ownership; Tax coordination

Indexed keywords

CAPITAL FLOW; FIRM OWNERSHIP; INCOME; TAX SYSTEM;

EID: 0036147241     PISSN: 01660462     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0166-0462(00)00077-6     Document Type: Article

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