Co-ordinating fiscal authorities in the euro-zone: A key role for the ECB

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 56-71

  Gatti, Donatella ^a   Van Wijnbergen, Christa ^b  

^a UNIV LILLE   (France)

^b OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; EUROPEAN UNION; MONETARY POLICY; MONETARY UNION;

EUROPE;

EID: 0036147111     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oep/54.1.56     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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19. Strategic uncertainty, equilibrium selection, and coordination failure in average opinion games
20. The evolution of conventions