Reserve requirements on sovereign debt in the presence of moral hazard - On debtors or creditors?

Economic Journal

Volumn 112, Issue 476, 2002, Pages 107-132

  Aizenman, Joshua ^a   Turnovsky, Stephen J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; DEBT; LENDING BEHAVIOR; WELFARE IMPACT;

EID: 0036146401     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0297.0j675     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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