Equilibrium locations in a spatial model with sequential entry in real time

Regional Science and Urban Economics

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 47-58

  Lambertini, Luca ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Entry; Location leadership; Time

Indexed keywords

MARKET CONDITIONS; MODEL; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0036145121     PISSN: 01660462     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0166-0462(01)00073-4     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. Spatial competition and price leadership
2. Stackelberg versus Cournot oligopoly equilibrium
3. Strategic investment and timing of entry
4. Location choice, product proliferation and entry deterrence
5. On Hotelling's stability in competition
6. The principle of minimum differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity
7. Free entry in one-dimensional models: Pure profits and multiple equilibria
8. Freedom of entry and the existence of pure profit
9. Exit barriers are entry barriers: The durability of capital as a barrier to entry
10. Sophisticated entry in a model of spatial competition
11. Minimal and maximal differentiation in Hotelling's duopoly
12. Price competition, quality and income disparities
13. Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry
14. Differentiated products with R&D
15. Sequential entry and entry-deterring strategies in spatial competition
16. Credible spatial pre-emptition
17. Unicity of the equilibrium in the unconstrained Hotelling model
18. Product differentiation in a market with endogenous sequential entry
19. Strategic choice of quality when quality is costly: The persistence of the high-quality advantage
20. Endogenous sequential entry in a spatial model
21. Sequential location among firms with foresight
22. Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat cereal industry
23. Relaxing price competition through product differentiation
24. Natural oligopolies
25. Location and spatial pricing theory with nonconvex transportation cost schedules
26. Asymmetric equilibria in spatial competition