Locational asymmetry and the potential for cooperation on a canal

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 129-155

  Ray, Isha ^a   Williams, Jeffrey ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Canal irrigation; Cooperation; Enforcement; India

Indexed keywords

CANAL; IRRIGATION; WATER MANAGEMENT;

CANAL; COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; IRRIGATION SYSTEM; WATER MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0036132488     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(01)00180-8     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. An evolutionary approach to norms
2. Commons, regulation and rent-seeking behavior: The dilemma of Pakistan's guzara forests
3. Wealth inequality and efficiency in the commons. Part 1: The unregulated case
4. Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development
5. Rational fools in a poor hydraulic economy
6. Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in South India
7. Water reform and economic development: Institutional aspects of water management in the developing countries
8. Efficient spatial allocation of irrigation water
9. A spatial model of optimal water conveyance
10. Basic concepts in the organization of irrigation
11. The problem of social cost
12. Transactions costs and efficiency in Western water allocation
13. Principles of social organization in an indigenous irrigation system
14. Determinants of collective action on the local commons: A model with evidence from Mexico
15. Water institutions, incentives and markets
16. Social norms and economic theory
17. Information and the coase theorem
18. The potential for water market efficiency when instream flows have value
19. Common property resources and rural poor in dry regions of India
20. Corruptible law enforcers: How should they be compensated?
21. Coping with asymmetries in the commons: Self-governing irrigation systems can work
22. Murray River salinity-an illustrative example
23. Evaluation of price policy in the presence of water theft
24. Markets in tradable water rights: Potential for efficiency gains in developing country water resource allocation
25. Managing local commons: Theoretical issues in incentive design
26. Local consequences of a large-scale irrigation system in India
27. The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation in South India
28. Irrigation institutions and the games irrigators play: Rule enforcement without guards
29. Why are there so few transactions among water users?
30. Efficient management of water in agriculture