How practitioners set share fractions in target cost contracts

International Journal of Project Management

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 59-66

  Broome, J ^a   Perry, J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Contract strategy; Incentive contract; Target cost contract; Utility theory

Indexed keywords

COST ACCOUNTING;

COST CONTRACTS;

PROJECT MANAGEMENT;

COST;

EID: 0036132448     PISSN: 02637863     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0263-7863(00)00035-1     Document Type: Article

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